University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
IRCS Technical Reports Series

Institute for Research in Cognitive Science

December 1993

Understanding Natural Language Instructions: A Computational
Approach to Purpose Clauses
Barbara Di Eugenio
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports

Di Eugenio, Barbara, "Understanding Natural Language Instructions: A Computational Approach to
Purpose Clauses" (1993). IRCS Technical Reports Series. 198.
https://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports/198

University of Pennsylvania Institute for Research in Cognitive Science Technical Report No. IRCS-93-52.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports/198
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Understanding Natural Language Instructions: A Computational Approach to
Purpose Clauses
Abstract
Human agents are extremely flexible in dealing with Natural Language instructions. I argue that most
instructions don't exactly mirror the agent's knowledge, but are understood by accommodating them in
the context of the general plan the agent is considering: the accommodation process is guided by the
goal(s) that the agent is trying to achieve. Therefore a NL system which interprets instructions must be
able to recognize and/or hypothesize goals; it must make use of a flexible knowledge representation
system, able to support the specialized inferences necessary to deal with input action descriptions that
do not exactly match the stored knowledge.
The data that support my claim are Purpose Clauses (PCs), infinitival constructions as in Do α to do β,
and Negative Imperatives. I present a pragmatic analysis of both PCs and Negative Imperatives.
Furthermore, I analyze the computational consequences of PCs, in terms of the relations between actions
PCs express, and of the inferences an agent has to perform to understand PCs.
I propose an action representation formalism that provides the required flexibility. It has two components.
The Terminological Box (TBox) encodes linguistic knowledge about actions, and is expressed by means
of the hybrid system CLASSIC [Brachman et al., 1991].
To guarantee that the primitives of the representation are linguistically motivated, I derive them from
Jackendoff's work on Conceptual Structures [1983; 1990]. The Action Library encodes planning
knowledge about actions. The action terms used in the plans are those defined in the TBox.
Finally, I present an algorithm that implements inferences necessary to understand Do α to do β, and
supported by the formalism I propose. In particular, I show how the TBox classifier is used to infer
whether α can be assumed to match one of the substeps in the plan for β, and how expectations
necessary for the match to hold are computed.
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Abstract
Human agents are extremely exible in dealing with Natural Language instructions. I
argue that most instructions don't exactly mirror the agent's knowledge, but are understood by accommodating them in the context of the general plan the agent is considering
the accommodation process is guided by the goal(s) that the agent is trying to achieve.
Therefore a NL system which interprets instructions must be able to recognize and/or
hypothesize goals it must make use of a exible knowledge representation system, able to
support the specialized inferences necessary to deal with input action descriptions that do
not exactly match the stored knowledge.
The data that support my claim are Purpose Clauses (PCs), in nitival constructions as in
Do to do  , and Negative Imperatives. I present a pragmatic analysis of both PCs and
Negative Imperatives. Furthermore, I analyze the computational consequences of PCs, in
terms of the relations between actions PCs express, and of the inferences an agent has to
perform to understand PCs.
I propose an action representation formalism that provides the required exibility. It
has two components. The Terminological Box (TBox) encodes linguistic knowledge about
actions, and is expressed by means of the hybrid system CLASSIC Brachman et al., 1991].
To guarantee that the primitives of the representation are linguistically motivated, I derive
them from Jackendo 's work on Conceptual Structures 1983 1990]. The Action Library
encodes planning knowledge about actions. The action terms used in the plans are those
de ned in the TBox.
Finally, I present an algorithm that implements inferences necessary to understand Do
to do  , and supported by the formalism I propose. In particular, I show how the TBox
classi er is used to infer whether can be assumed to match one of the substeps in the
plan for  , and how expectations necessary for the match to hold are computed.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1 Thesis Statement
Consider an agent, whether human or arti cial, faced with the following two possible
instructions:
(1.1a) Place a plank between two ladders.
(1.1b) Place a plank between two ladders to create a simple scaold.
In both (1.1a) and (1.1b), the action to be executed is place a plank between two ladders .
However, (1.1a) would be correctly interpreted by placing the plank anywhere between
the two ladders: this shows that in (1.1b) the agent must be inferring the proper position
for the plank from the expressed goal to create a simple scaold . How is this further
constraint on place a plank between two ladders computed? What is the relation between
the action described in input and its more constrained version? The problem I address in
this thesis is how constraints on actions arising in interpreting complex action descriptions
are computed.
My primary claim is that:
Most instructions, especially complex ones, don't exactly mirror the agent's knowledge,
but are understood by accommodating them in the context of the general plan the agent is
considering the agent's accommodation process is guided by the goal(s) that s/he is trying
to achieve. The concept of goal itself is pervasive in NL instructions: a NL system which
interprets instructions must be able to recognize and/or hypothesize goals it must make
use of a exible knowledge representation system, that facilitates computing the description
of the action to be performed and it may need to execute some specialized inferences to
perform such computation.
To show that my claim is justi ed , I will illustrate my views on the agent's inference
processes by means of the analysis of naturally occurring data, purpose clauses and
negative imperatives .
1

I will also show how the inferences necessary to understand such data are directed
by the notion of goal.
To show that my claim is valid , I will present a computational model of instruction
understanding composed of a representation formalism that addresses some of the
requirements posed by the need to represent both linguistic and planning knowledge
about actions. Such formalism provides support to perform the inferences I will
discuss.
A caveat to the reader before proceeding: claiming that agents' goals pay an important
role in understanding NL text is not very novel, as it has long been recognized in work
on plan inference Schank and Abelson, 1977 Wilensky, 1983 Allen and Perrault, 1980
Litman and Allen, 1990]. However, in such work goals are generally used to infer actions or
motivations not mentioned in input (e.g. inferring that John was hungry from John went
to a restaurant ), or to disambiguate between di erent \global" interpretations, such as
whether Harry carried a gun in order to rob the bank or go hunting  however, the problem
of inferring how features of the action to be executed are a ected by the surface form of
the input has not been addressed. Consider:
(1.2) Open the box and hand me the red block.
I suspect that none of the systems above would be able to generate the expectation associated with (1.2), namely, that the red block is in the box: it is the interaction between
the surface form and the knowledge about open that gives rise to such expectation.
Turning now to systems that interpret and execute NL instructions, they have not given
agents' goals as much prominence as plan inference work has when goals are used, they
are considered as global constraints on permissible activities Vere and Bickmore, 1990],
or as guide for repair when a known plan for action fails Alterman et al., 1991], rather
than as originating constraints on the interpretation and re nement of surface forms. In
general, I claim that the model proposed by researchers such as Winograd 1972] or Vere and
Bickmore 1990] is not sucient to compute constraints deriving from complex instructions.
In such model, the logical form is mapped onto planning knowledge to produce the plan
for action to be executed or simulated: in general, such mapping is performed by a more
or less sophisticated pattern matcher. What the pattern matcher lacks is the capacity of
dealing in a principled way with action descriptions more or less speci c than the stored
knowledge, and with non standard modi ers such as temporal clauses, extent, manner,
purpose | such as the clause to create a simple scaold in (1.1b) | and so forth.

1.2 Contributions
I see the contributions of this thesis as falling into three categories: a pragmatic analysis
of purpose clauses, and, to a lesser degree, of negative imperatives a more exible computational model of instruction understanding and a practical application of my work in
the context of the Animation from Natural Language Instructions project.
2

Pragmatics. I provide a pragmatic analysis of both purpose clauses and negative imper-

atives.
Purpose clauses have been examined mainly from a syntactic / formal semantics
point of view Hegarty, 1990 Jones, 1991 Green, 1991] the only pragmatic work
on purpose clauses I know of is by Thompson, 1985], and, in a more computational
setting, by Balkanski 1992a 1992b 1993]. I will show what pragmatic functions
such clauses perform, what kind of relations between actions they express, and what
kind of inferences an agent has to do to understand them. Moreover, my analysis, by
showing that purpose clauses express generation or enablement between the actions
described in the main clause and in the purpose clause respectively, lends support to
the proposal, made in Pollack, 1986 Balkanski, 1992a Balkanski, 1993], that such
two relations should be used in modeling actions.
My analysis of negative imperatives is much more limited in scope: I have classi ed
negative imperatives into two subtypes, and shown that they correlate with di erent
discourse functions. The analysis of the computational consequences of negative
imperatives is left for future work.

Instruction understanding.

1. As mentioned above, instruction understanding systems assume a direct map
between a logical form | built by a parser if the system is actually accepting NL
input, or otherwise built by hand | and the knowledge about actions stored
in the system's Knowledge Bases. I challenge such assumption, and provide
mechanisms to make the mapping more exible.
2. Action representation formalism. The formalism I will present tries to address
the di erent demands posed by the need to represent both linguistic and planning knowledge about actions. My view is that hierarchical relations between
action descriptions are necessary to provide the exibility required to interpret
NL descriptions of actions however, as the space of such action descriptions is
in nite, and therefore they cannot be all known in advance, hierarchical relations need to be computable on demand. The classi cation algorithm provided
by hybrid systems Brachman et al., 1983b] proves to be useful to perform some
of these inferences therefore, I use one such hybrid system Brachman et al.,
1991].
To guarantee that the primitives of the representation are linguistically motivated, I use ones derived from Jackendo 's work 1990] on the semantic representation of verbs and actions such linguistic action types are then combined
into commonsense plans about actions using notions derived from the planning
literature.
3. Plan inference. As mentioned above, the necessity of taking goals into account,
and of performing plan inference , has long been recognized by researchers operating in NL discourse understanding however, as I will show in Chapter 3,
the focus of the research has not been on how to account for the linguistic
form of the utterance with all its variability, and on how to map it to the plan
knowledge. My work addresses this issue.
3

AnimNL. The Animation from Natural Language (AnimNL) project at the University of

Pennsylvania has as its goal the automatic creation of animated task simulations from
NL instructions, which are fed to the AnimNL system, and simulated by means of an
animation system Webber et al., 1992]. The program I have implemented provides
the interface between the parser and the plan inference / planning processes: it builds
the rst pass of the plan graph , namely, the structure of the intentions the performing
agent adopts.

1.3 Thesis Outline
First of all, a note on terminology: I will refer to the agent understanding and executing the
instructions as agent or hearer (H for short), and with masculine pronouns the instructor
will be referred to as instructor or speaker (S for short), and with feminine pronouns.
In Chapter 2, I provide the context for my work: after some general considerations on
understanding instructions, and on some necessary inferences, I de ne what I mean by
accommodating instructions , deriving the notion of accommodation from Lewis, 1979] I
draw some preliminary conclusions on accommodation inferences, and on the important
role that the goals play in directing such inferences and I discuss the need for some
reference semantics for instructions.
My work relates to various areas of investigation, such as psychology, theories of actions,
plan inference: in Chapter 3, I report on relevant literature from the various elds, with
particular prominence given to plan inference work on the one hand, and to computational
theories of instruction understanding on the other. As a side remark, notice that I will use
the term plan inference throughout, while in the literature both plan inference and plan
recognition are used interchangeably.
Chapter 4 is devoted to a pragmatic analysis of both purpose clauses and negative imperatives . After reviewing some relevant literature, I examine each construct from the point
of view of the discourse functions it performs.
Chapter 5 opens the computational part of the thesis. I start by examining the computational consequences that data like purpose clauses have: I describe the possible relations
between the two actions described respectively in the matrix and in the purpose clause,
and some inferences necessary to process such data.
In the following two chapters, Chapter 6 and 7, I describe my computational model of
instructions: in Chapter 6 I describe the action representation formalism in Chapter 7, I
discuss the algorithm that implements the inference processes that build the plan graph.
The application context in which my work is taking place, namely, the Animation from
Natural Language project at the University of Pennsylvania, is described in Appendix D.
Chapter 8 is devoted to conclusions and directions for future research.
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Chapter 2

On instruction understanding
Instruction understanding, like all other intelligent activities, requires performing inferences. It sounds reasonable, and in fact quite obvious, to assume that such inferences rely
on an agent's knowledge. For example, research on user modeling tries to assess how the
knowledge level, or expertise of an agent, a ects the exchange of information in interfaces
to computer systems Kobsa and Wahlster, 1989].1 However, another component to the
inferences that an agent makes is frequently overlooked: that is, the input to the inference
process | the surface form that the agent is presented with. This may sound surprising,
given that much work has been done on understanding Natural Language instructions, and
therefore on interpreting their surface forms | see for example Winograd, 1972 Chapman, 1991 Vere and Bickmore, 1990 Alterman et al., 1991]. What I mean by saying the
surface form has not been given adequate attention is that little work has been done on how
modi ers and adjuncts to an action description modify its interpretation | speci cally, I
will concentrate on adjuncts. Reconsider the example from Ch. 1:
(2.1a) Place a plank between two ladders.
(2.1b) Place a plank between two ladders to create a simple scaold. 2
As discussed in Ch. 1, in (2.1b) the agent must be inferring the proper position for the
plank from the expressed goal to create a simple scaold . The interpretation of the adjunct
clause is therefore constraining the interpretation of the action to be executed.
Prince, 1981] points out that a recipe whose description is several pages long in a cookbook for the
general public, is reduced to one line in a cookbook for expert chefs.
2
Although this example does not appear in my corpus per se, it is a paraphrase of a real one expressed
by a Means Clause: Create a simple sca old by placing a plank between two ladders .
1
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In (2.1b), the goal constrains the interpretation of the prepositional phrase as the target
location of the placing action in other examples, the goal can be seen as constraining other
features of the action. Consider:
(2.2a) Cut the square in half.
(2.2b) Cut the square in half to create two triangles.3
As in (2.1b), in (2.2b) the goal create two triangles constrains the interpretation of the
action description cut the square in half : however, in this case the constraint is on the
path of the cut, namely, along the diagonal. The computation of restrictions on action
descriptions is one kind of inference I will deal with in this thesis.
Another kind of inference deriving from the same surface form is illustrated by the following
examples:4
(2.3a) Go into the kitchen to get me the coee urn.
(2.3b) Go into the kitchen to wash the coee urn.
In both cases, it appears that a basic expectation E is developed about the location of the
action  described in the purpose clause. 5 However, the interpretation of (2.3a) yields
a further expectation E1 that the co ee urn is in the kitchen, while the interpretation of
(2.3b) does not. Notice that such expectations don't derive simply from knowledge about
 . For example, neither (2.4a) nor (2.4b) convey much information about the locations of
the co ee urn or of the washing site:
(2.4a) Get me the coee urn.
(2.4b) Wash the coee urn.
Moreover, such expectations can't simply be attributed to world knowledge. For example,
one explanation of the oddness of (2.5) is that one doesn't normally nd washing equipment
in the living room. As such, (2.5) indeed appears to convey the expectation E that the
washing site is the living room, which goes against world knowledge:
(2.5) Go into the living room to wash the coee urn.
What I will argue is that it is the relation R between and  , combined with speci c
knowledge about both and  , that can give rise to the expectations about the location
Also this example is a paraphrase of a really occurring one, this time expressed by a gerundive adjunct:
Cut in half on the diagonal creating two triangles.
4
These are not really occurring examples, but they are of interest as we are trying to animate them
in AnimNL. While my analysis of the discourse functions of purpose clauses is indeed based on a corpus
of naturally occurring examples, I will illustrate my inferences on examples such as (2.2b) and (2.3a) and
(2.3b), that are either paraphrases of naturally occurring ones or are made up. I am con dent the reader
will be sympathetic to the view that really occurring examples bring in too many diverse issues, and that
to test a computational model it is necessary to simplify the examples to a certain degree in order to focus
on the issues of interest.
5
As we will see in Ch. 5, E may concern the location of some substeps belonging to the decomposition
of , rather than seen as a whole.
3
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of objects involved in an action. The surface form, by employing a to construction, constrains what R really is. Clearly, there is a m:n correspondence between surface form and
inferences: we have already seen that the presence of an in nitival to stimulates at least
two di erent kinds of inference likewise, some of these same inferences would be performed
in case other surface forms, such as in order to, so as to, by , were used instead of to , as
we will see in Sec. 4.1.4.
There are three major points I would like to make:
1. The inferences I am interested in constrain the description of the action the agent
should perform by augmenting it.
2. The accommodation process is directed by the goal the agent is pursuing.
3. Action description interpretation should be grounded in performance.
1. All the inferences I have described so far in a sense constrain the description of the
action the agent should perform by augmenting it. This is consistent with Suchman's
observations 1987] that instructions are irremediably incomplete, and that
the problem of the instruction-follower is viewed as one of turning essentially
partial descriptions of objects and actions into concrete practical activities with
predictable outcome. ... Instructions rely upon the recipient's ability to do the
implicit work of anchoring descriptions to concrete objects and actions.
This quote also supports the view that, in the vast majority of cases, instructions assume
a certain basic set of skills and abilities of the agent and just specify how they are to be
related to one another. This point of view is shared for example by Chapman, 1991]:
Routine activity is by far the more common. We spend most of our lives
engaged in activities like making breakfast, driving to work, reading the paper
... these rarely involve novel elements. Even creative work is mainly routine:
it's rewording sentences or painting the background of the scene.
While Chapman is mainly concerned with how much you can do with just these basic skills,
I am more concerned with how you can understand instructions by assuming basic building
blocks and relating them as the instructions suggest | therefore I am not looking at
instructions as a means of learning to do something radically new, but rather, of exploiting
preexisting knowledge to perform tasks. Following directions to reach a certain place is a
good example of the kind of instruction processing I am thinking of: known actions, such
as go straight until ..., turn left at ..., cross over ..., are related in a way that teaches the
agent something new, namely, how to reach an unknown place.
Even in following directions, nding relations between basic actions does not simply amount
to mapping reference points onto their referents in the environment and then executing the
command. Directions, like all other instructional text, may involve complex imperatives,
that require complex inferences, such as
7

Purpose clauses, as in to get into the building, turn left at the rst intersection and
ring the bell at the second door on your right : in this case, the minimal inference the
agent should perform is to understand what the surface form leaves implicit, namely,
that after ringing the bell, one is supposed to open the door and go in when the door
release buzzer sounds.
Negative commands, as turn left, but don't take the rst left because it is a blind
alley . In this case, the negative imperative rules out the default interpretation of
turn left as turn left at the rst opportunity .
Warnings, as take the rst left, but be careful if you're driving because it is very steep .
In this case, the warning will impose constraints both on the execution of turn left ,
and on the actions that will follow turn left .
The following example, presented above as (2.3a), also illustrates what I mean with relating
basic blocks to each other:
(2.6) Go into the kitchen to get me the coee urn.
I assume that the agent doesn't have a particular plan for getting someone a coee urn.
He will have a generic plan for get x to y, which he will adapt to the instructions given to
him.6 Some of this adaptation task is quite easy, namely, parameter instantiation, in this
case binding the patient parameter of get to an individual satisfying the description coee
urn. But the rest is not so direct: the agent has to nd the relation R between go into the
kitchen and get me the coee urn. If the agent's plan for get x to y contains a requirement
that the agent move to the place where the object to be \gotten" is located, the agent
can derive that the (most direct) connection between these two actions is that go into the
kitchen ful lls this requirement, under the expectation that the referent of coee urn is in
the kitchen.
My view is that the agent's task includes both understanding the role that an input instruction plays in a plan to do something, and adapting his own knowledge of that plan
to the instruction he has to understand. (2.1b) and (2.2b) are examples of adapting an
instruction to the plan, in this case simply speci ed by the goal contained in the instruction itself. Examples of adapting the stored plan to the input instructions are (2.3a) and
(2.3b), in which the plans for get x to y and wash x are augmented by expectations, as
illustrated above.
I would claim that this process of adapting the agent's plan to the instructions and vice
versa is what normally happens when people interpret instructions. I will call this process accommodation, borrowing the term from Lewis, 1979]. In Sec. 2.1, I will discuss
accommodation , rst as described in Lewis, 1979], and then as related to instruction understanding.
6
Actually the agent may have more than one single plan for get x, in which case go into the kitchen may
in fact help to select the plan the instructor has in mind | I will address this issue in Sec. 5.2.1.2.
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2. The second issue I want to raise is that the accommodation process is directed by the
goals that the agent is pursuing. In the examples above, we have seen that an in nitival
to construction implies that the action it describes is the goal to whose achievement the
action described in the main clause contributes we have also seen that the goal a ects the
interpretation of the action to be performed. This is true even for very simple instructions,
such as:
(2.7) Open the door.
The execution of this action will vary according to whether the goal of opening the door
is letting the cat in or out | a small opening is sucient letting a guest in or out |
the door has to be open wider than for the cat letting in or out movers carrying bulky
furniture | the door is best propped open.
That NL phenomena have to be interpreted in context is a truism by now. That goals
should be taken into account is widely acknowledged in plan recognition work Litman
and Allen, 1990 Schank and Abelson, 1977 Wilensky, 1983], as I will discuss in Sec. 3.2.
However, it has not been acknowledged as much in work on understanding NL instructions
| see Sec. 3.3. Even in the case of plan recognition work, however, goals generally have
been considered as global constraints on interpretation, not as a ecting features of the
input action description.
Quite naturally, giving prominence to goals in instruction interpretation would seem to
presuppose a precise de nition of what a goal is. I will discuss this issue in Sec. 2.1.2.
3. Finally, my interest in the constraining function of goals on logical forms also derives
from the need to ground action in performance. In theories that are not concerned with
action performance, equating the interpretation of an instruction to deriving its logical form
is enough however, if one's research interest is in how actions are actually mapped into
performance, and what such performance amounts to, then assuming that the semantics
of an instruction is equivalent to its logical form is not sucient. I will discuss the issue of
grounding action in performance , and the related notion of reference semantics , in Sec. 2.3.

2.1 Lewis on accommodation
Lewis in 1979] uses the term accommodation to refer to the process by which conversational
score does tend to evolve in such a way as is required in order to make whatever occurs
count as correct play. By conversational score, Lewis means the state of the conversation,
described by various components, such as sets of presuppositions.
The rule of accommodation reads:
(2.8) If at time t something is said that requires component sn of conversational score to
have a value in the range r if what is said is to be true, or otherwise acceptable and
if sn does not have a value in the range r just before t  and if such-and-such further
conditions hold then at t the score-component sn takes some value in the range r .
Lewis uses the concept of accommodation to deal with di erent linguistic phenomena,
among which
9

Presuppositions. If I say All of Fred's children are asleep, and there has been no mention

of Fred's children so far, the presupposition that Fred has children is readily added
to the set of current presuppositions.
De nite descriptions. I will actually describe the way that Heim in 1982] exploits accommodation to deal with novel de nites, because her treatment is more perspicuous.
In the le-change semantics Heim develops for NPs, the usage of a de nite NP is
felicitous only if there is already an appropriate card in the le describing the referent
of that NP. However, there are some usages of de nite NPs that do not t with this
condition, for example the inferable usage (\the author" in \John read a book about
Schubert, and wants to write to the author"). Heim rewrites her Novelty-FamiliarityCondition by postulating accommodation as
an adjustment of the le that is triggered by a violation of a felicity condition and consists of adding to the le enough information to remedy the
infelicity.
Planning. Lewis also talks about planning, albeit briey. Discussing a conversation about
a plan to steal plutonium from a nuclear plant, Lewis says:
Much as some things said in ordinary conversation require suitable presuppositions, so some things that we say in the course of planning require, for
their acceptability, that the plan contains some suitable provisions. If I say
\Then you drive the getaway car up to the side gate", that is acceptable
only if the plan includes provision for a getaway car. That might or might
not have been part of the plan already. If not, it may become part of the
plan just because it is required by what I said.
In the context of plans, therefore, Lewis's accommodation refers to a global process, very
similar to the one occurring for presuppositions, of making room for new things in the
plan if they are not already there. I am talking about a similar form of accommodation,
that allows an agent to understand instructions that don't exactly mirror his knowledge.
To see how the inferences I discussed above can be seen as accommodation , refer to rule
(2.8): in the case of (2.2b), augmenting the description cut the square in half with along
the diagonal can be thought of as setting the right value of the proper component sn of the
conversational score computing the proper expectation in (2.3a) and (2.3b) would have
an analogous e ect on the value of the proper sn .
More recently, Thomason, 1990] discusses accommodation as a fundamental strategy for
pragmatic inferences, and de nes it as a combination of plan recognition and cooperative
goal adoption , and therefore, as a special type of obstacle elimination. Thomason mentions
that the principle behind accommodation is to adjust the conversational record to eliminate
obstacles to the detected plans of one's interlocutor: stretching the analogy a bit, the
inferences I propose could be seen as eliminating the obstacles to the detected plan of the
instructor, namely, producing meaningful instructions that result in the agent correctly
carrying them out. As we will see in Sec. 3.2, the point of view that accommodation is
related to plan recognition is supported by the strong ties between plan recognition and
the kinds of inferences I propose.
10

2.1.1 The notion of goal as guide to accommodation
Two questions that Lewis does not address, but that are relevant to the role that accommodation plays in planning, are: why does the agent accept a certain instruction and
accommodate it in his plan to do something? What supports and justi es accommodation?
My claim is that the answer to the latter question is the notion of goal. In Lewis's example
above, the accommodation necessary to account for the getaway car is readily performed
because there is a global goal for the plan in question, which is steal plutonium from a
nuclear plant and a subgoal of this plan is escape safely. It is not blind accommodation,
then: it happens because there is something that justi es it. Notice that mentioning the
function of the car, getaway, is crucial to the accommodation process: if the instruction to
be accommodated had been Then you drive the car up to the side gate, and if no car had
been mentioned so far, it would have been much harder to nd its role in the global plan.
In general, there is not a single goal according to which an instruction has to be interpreted
and executed, but a set of them. Consider this instruction step in making a stu ed toy:
(2.9) To attach arms, use doubled white carpet thread and push needle in one side of the
body and out the other side at points indicated by dots on the pattern.
The action push needle in one side of the body ... has to be performed to attach arms.
In turn, the action attach arms has to be performed in the context of making a doll: this
puts some requirements on attaching arms, e.g. where the arms have to be attached.
These requirements \ lter down" to the interpretation and execution of push needle in
one side of the body .... Notice that the modi er at points indicated by dots in the pattern
is not sucient to establish where to attach the arms. The pattern contains many dots,
corresponding to where arms, legs, head should be attached: therefore, the goal to attach
arms does a ect the interpretation of the prepositional phrases in one side of the body and
out the other side.
Goals are very often hierarchically organized however, it may happen that an action
achieves two independent goals, as in
(2.10) Line the tub with cardboard to protect the nish and to prevent debris from clogging
the drain.
There are at least two possible objections to my proposal of using goals in instruction
interpretation:
1.

The function of goals is only that of giving the agent the reason why he
should perform a certain action. This is a common view, but naturally occurring

purpose clauses show that there is something else going on.
Going back to Exs. (2.1b) and (2.2b), we saw that the goal, create a simple scaold
in the former pair, create two triangles in the latter, isn't simply used to tell the
agent why he should perform , but also to help him execute the action correctly.
11

2.

Goals are signi cant only at execution time: while the concept of goal is
de nitely relevant, it has to be taken into account only at the moment of
executing an action. This is the view embodied in Alterman et al., 1991]. While

this is true for example for (2.7) above, there are various reasons why one would
think that goals a ect the interpretation of instructions too.
First of all, it is very often NL itself that speci es the goal that provides the context
for instruction interpretation, as in Exs. (2.1b) and (2.2b). Therefore a NL system
that interprets instructions has to be able to recognize and actively use goals as they
arise from NL speci cations of actions, to compute the descriptions of the actions to
be executed.
Secondly, the goal may a ect actions that need to be executed prior to the intended
action: in (2.2b), the goal make two triangles will a ect how the agent picks up the
square, namely, which part of the square he grasps, and how he orients it | grasping
site and orientation will be di erent in the case the agent has to cut the square in
half along the perpendicular axis.
Thirdly, sometimes instructions point to general policies that have to apply in speci c
situations, as in
(2.11) To prevent stains, wipe up spills as soon as they happen.
Clearly in this case no immediate execution is meant. One interesting question is
how the policy is stored so that the agent becomes aware of it at all and only the
right times: it is possible that the way policies are indexed is by means of both the
goal to be achieved and the description of the situation in which the policy applies.
In conclusion, what I want to point out is that I am not claiming that the computation
of the action to be executed necessarily happens at interpretation time what I do
want to stress though is that, given his basic abilities, the agent can understand what
is required simply from the NL instruction. These are the kind of inferences I'd like
to account for and this is the sense in which I am saying that the goal a ects not
just execution, but also interpretation of instructions.

2.1.2 What are goals?
I have been talking a lot about goals, and the important role they play in understanding
instructions: such prominence given to goals would seem to presuppose an understanding
of what goals really are . However, as we will see, it is not easy to go beyond the intuitive
de nition that a goal is The purpose toward which an endeavor is directed objective (The
American Heritage Electronic Dictionary, 1991).
In the planning literature, a goal is any desirable state. According to Hobbs, 1990, p.445],
a goal is simply a proposition, or rather a logical expression representing a
proposition, that the agent tries to make true. The proposition can be anything, not just actions on the part of the agent there are no restrictions on its
predicates or arguments. Just as pick-up(I, BLOCK3, NOW) is a possible goal,
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so are push(fJOHN,Ig, CAR5, NOW) and win(S.F.GIANTS, World-Series,
1996). The goals can represent events in which I myself am the agent and
am able to perform directly, events I can bring about in concert with others,
and events I have little control over. The goals can be immediate, like the
rst two, or they can be long-term, like write(I, Great-American-Novel,
Before 2002).
For others Schank and Abelson, 1977 Wilensky, 1983], the notion of goal is left informal
they talk about actors having goals and they classify possible goals according to several
dimensions, but they don't give any formal de nition of what goals are | see Sec. 3.2.1.4.
Clearly, goals and intentions are closely related according to Hobbs, 1990, p.446], intentions can be viewed as goals, provided that we don't take the use of the English word
\intend" too seriously. Future-directed intentions Bratman, 1990] are high-level goals
expressing conditions in the future, while intentions-in-action are low-level goals to be
executed now.
These de nitions still seem to beg the question, or are too broad, as in the case of planning
where any proposition can be a goal. More precise de nitions of goal may be found in
the context of logical formalisms. For example, the notion of goal proposed in Cohen and
Levesque, 1990] is embedded in the context of a modal logic whose model theory is based
on a possible worlds semantics. Their logic has four primary modal operators: BELief,
GOAL, HAPPENS (which event happens next), DONE (which event has just occurred).
BEL is de ned by means of the usual Hintikka-style axiom schemata Halpern and Moses,
1985], and goals are de ned on top of beliefs.
An agent has many, possibly conicting, desires. From these he chooses his goals, namely,
those desires he wants most to see ful lled. Goals are modeled as propositions true in all
of the agent's chosen worlds. The following proposition holds:
(2.12) j= (BEL x p) ! (GOAL x p)
namely, worlds compatible with an agent's goals must be included in those compatible with
his beliefs: given a set of worlds that are possible given what an agent believes, a subset
of these are the worlds in which the agent's goals are achieved.
Notice that Cohen and Levesque's notion of goal is rather counter-intuitive, as noted in
Allen, 1990, p.73]:
the formula (GOAL x p) does not assert that the agent x has p as a goal in
the intuitive sense of the word. Rather, it says that p will be true in any world
where the agent's goals are achieved. In some ways, the term \consequence-ofgoals" might be a better term name for the operator.
By means of the de nition of goal, Cohen and Levesque de ne the concept of persistent
goal , and on top of it, the concept of intention.
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Persistent goal, (P-GOAL x p). An agent x has a P-GOAL p if he has a goal p that he

believes currently to be false and that he will continue to choose { at least as long as
a given condition q remains valid, where q concerns, among others, the achievability
of p .
Intention, INTEND(x, p, q), is de ned as a persistent goal on the part of agent x either
to do an action p , believing one is about to do it, or to achieve some state of a airs,
believing one is about to achieve it. This goal persists as long as condition q does
not hold. q 's becoming true permits x to drop his intention to do p .

For a critique of Cohen and Levesque's formalism, see Allen, 1990].
My own view of what a goal is is rather informal: in my opinion, any action that can
be seen as achieving a certain result can be considered as a goal. The analysis of NL
instructions shows that any action description, even one concerning bodily movements
such as To stretch your back, 7 lean over from the waist rst to your right and then to your
left can be seen as a goal that an agent intends to achieve. At this point the question may
then become, what is an action? I will adopt the informal view expressed in Jackendo ,
1983], that an action can be the answer to the question what did you do? .
As we will see in Ch. 6 and Ch. 7, actions will be de ned as events having an animate
intentional agent and goals in terms of their relations to other actions in the plan graph ,
which represents the intentions the agent adopts.

2.2 Speaker's expectations and Hearer's choices
Instructions are meant to a ect an agent's behavior. While interpreting instructions, an
agent is continually faced with an in nite number of choices to interpret even a simple
instruction such as wash your hands an agent has to \decide", among other things, where
to wash one's hands, whether to use soap and how much soap to use, and so on. However,
the vast majority of these choices are not consciously considered, because they don't matter
in the situation at hand. One task an instructor is faced with, then, is to identify which
choices matter, and to constrain the alternatives.
Another function that goals perform is one of constraining such alternatives going back to
goals expressed by a purpose clause, as in Exs. (2.1b), (2.2b), and (2.3a), we saw that the
action described in the main clause admits an in nite number of possible interpretations,
and that the goal constrains the choice among such alternative courses of action.
Negative Imperatives are another kind of data that I have examined, and that show how
the possible choices of the agent a ect how the instructor builds her instructions: negative
imperatives, by telling the agent what he should not do, are one explicit way of identifying
and pruning such choices. More speci cally, they can be shown to identify either a choice
point that the agent is likely to overlook, or a wrong alternative that the agent could choose
when recognizing a certain choice point.
In fact, from the point of view of an instructor, a negative imperative is produced when
7

A made-up example that nonetheless describes a perfectly plausible goal to achieve in an aerobics class.
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the speaker (S) expects the hearer (H) to overlook a choice point. The choice point
is sometimes identi ed through a side e ect that the wrong choice will cause. For
example, in
(2.13) To hang the border, begin at the least conspicuous corner. The work will go
much faster if you have someone hold the folded section while you apply the
border to the wall. Take care not to drip paste onto the wall.
S expects H not to realize that there are di erent ways of performing the action
hanging the border, some of which result in the side e ect of dripping paste on the
wall and therefore S alerts H to take steps in order to prevent that from happening.
S expects H to choose the wrong alternative among many | possibly in nite | ones.
(2.14) After washing the tile, rinse it thoroughly to remove detergent lm then wipe
with a soft, dry cloth. For stubborn dirt, scrub tiles with a white, cleansing
powder. Don't use a cleaner containing bleach this can pull the color out
of the colored grouts.
If not cautioned against using a cleaner containing bleach, the agent may choose one
such.
Although I haven't examined negative imperatives as thoroughly as purpose clauses, and
in particular the analysis of the necessary processing inferences is missing, in Sec. 4.2 I
will discuss a corpus study of negative imperatives, and some preliminary but suggestive
conclusions on the discourse functions of such constructs.

2.3 Grounding action in performance
As I mentioned above, my interest in the kind of inferences illustrated earlier derives from
the necessity of grounding action in performance , which in turn stems from the Animation
from Natural Language (AnimNL) project in whose context my work is situated, and in
which NL instructions indeed get executed, namely, animated in a simulated environment.
Over the years, Penn's Graphics Laboratory has developed an extensive model-based animation system. The system embodies anthropometric, kinematic and dynamic models,
so that agents of di erent builds and strengths can be animated to perform tasks such as
grasp, look at, stand up, sit down etc.
The idea of interacting with such animated agents by means of NL instructions stems
from the observation that, given such model-based animation, it makes sense to envision a
system where agents are given goals to achieve, or instructions to perform. Such a system
could be used, among other things, to instruct human agents on how to perform a task, or
as an aid to designers, e.g. to check that the product is designed correctly for maintenance
and repair. Given the wide variety of possible users and applications for such a system,
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the most suitable and exible language for interacting with the animated agent is Natural
Language Webber et al., 1992].
Animating actions, namely, executing them in a simulated environment, requires some
kind of reference semantics , as has been advocated in di erent areas of research, including Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976 Jackendo , 1983 Fillmore, 1985 Herskovits, 1986
Suppes and Crangle, 1988 Schirra, 1990]. As Chapman, 1991] mentions,
these researchers] argue for grounding pragmatics, semantics, and some syntactic phenomena in perception, bodily space, and activity. They propose,
for instance, that the meanings of many words and perhaps some syntactic
constructions ground out in spatial reasoning and representation.
Also Suchman, 1987] notes that
instructions rely upon the recipient's ability to do the implicit work of anchoring
descriptions to concrete objects and action.
This kind of semantics is termed reference semantics , and it is particularly appealing for
computer systems which focus on agents, such as robots or, in our case, animated gures,
that perform tasks either in the world or in a simulated environment: in such systems
perception and vision play an important role.
To take a concrete example, Suppes and Crangle, 1988] describes an approach to the
interpretation of NL commands in which the context of the utterance is brought to bear
on the interpretation of words used in the command. The aspects of context they stress
are: the perceptual situation in which a command is given, the cognitive and perceptual
functioning of the agent being addressed, and the immediate linguistic surround.
They contrast result and process semantics, which are both untenable, although for di erent reasons p.321]:
When Susan says to an agent \Bring me the book on the table", we naturally
tend to think that the command's satisfaction is evaluated just in terms of
the result ... No context to worry about. No ambiguity. The same is true of
the command \Bring me the book" if only the 'result-semantics' consisting of
the pair (brought the book, did not bring the book) is considered. An ideal
'process-semantics' of this command should ... consist of all possible acceptable
paths of movement to the table and back, together with a probabilistic measure
of their likelihood of occurrence. But this is hard enough to do for the simple,
idealized models of classical statistical mechanics.
They conclude that procedural or operational denotations are most appropriate for the
language of actions: this is not a conclusion I necessarily agree with, but I certainly share
their concern that result-semantics, namely, model-theoretic semantics, doesn't seem to
tell you much if you want to account for action execution.
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Clearly, looking for a reference semantics should not be taken as meaning that there is a
1:1 mapping between an instruction and a speci c sequence of actions that corresponds
to its execution. Again, the correspondence between instructions and sequences of actions
that implement them is m:n : a given instruction may be mapped onto zero, one or more
sequences of actions conversely, any sequence of actions can be expressed by means of an
in nite number of NL instructions.
Negative imperatives are a type of instructions that doesn't directly map onto a sequence
of actions. Consider Ex. (2.13), repeated here for convenience:
(2.15) To hang the border, begin at the least conspicuous corner. The work will go much
faster if you have someone hold the folded section while you apply the border to the
wall. Take care not to drip paste to the wall.
S expects H not to realize that there are di erent ways of performing the action hanging the
border , some of which result in the side e ect of dripping paste on the wall and therefore
S alerts H to take steps in order to prevent that from happening. Take care not to drip
paste onto the wall is not mapped onto an independent action, but rather, it constrains
the whole process of hanging the border.

2.4 Summary
To conclude, my point of view on understanding instructions is as follows:
1. The actions an agent has to perform when he is given instructions have to be computed
from the descriptions given in the instructions themselves, as opposed to simply
extracted from such descriptions. Examples such as (2.2b), (2.3a) and (2.3b) show
that the logical form produced by the parser must be further constrained. Such
inferences can be seen as accommodation processes.
2. The goals that an agent is trying to achieve guide accommodation many of these
goals are explicitly stated in the instructions themselves. (2.1b) and (2.2b) in particular are evidence for the constraining task that goals perform.
Clearly, if one attributes such an important role to goals , one should rst de ne what
a goal is: in Sec. 2.1.2, I have presented various approaches to such thorny issue, and
my own perspective on it.
3. The necessity of computing action descriptions also relates to the need of developing
a reference semantics for instructions.
In the next chapter, I will relate my own work to various areas of investigation, such as
psychology, plan inference and computational systems for understanding instructions: I
will report on relevant literature from the various elds, with particular prominence given
to plan recognition work on the one hand, and to computational theories of instructions
on the other.
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Chapter 3

Literature review
In this chapter, I would like to explore the two areas of research closely related to my
own, namely, work on plan inference, and on computational approaches to understanding
instructions. I will examine such work in light of the following three tenets that underlie
my own work, and that I repeat here for the reader's convenience:
1. The actions agents have to perform when they are given instructions have to be
computed from the descriptions given in the instructions themselves, as opposed to
simply extracted from such descriptions. Borrowing the term from Lewis, 1979], I
collectively call these inference processes accommodation .
2. The goals that an agent is trying to achieve guide accommodation many of these
goals are explicitly stated in the instructions themselves. (2.1b) and (2.2b) in particular are evidence for the constraining task that goals perform.
3. Action descriptions found in instructions can't be expected to exactly match the
knowledge that an agent has about actions and their characteristics. Therefore, to
model an agent interpreting instructions we need a exible action representation,
and inference mechanisms that can deal with action descriptions at various levels of
speci city.
Before describing work on plan inference, and on computational approaches to understanding instructions, I will briey report on some psychological experiments that support the
idea that goals help constrain the interpretation of the actions to be performed.

3.1 Psychological evidence
The point of view that goals a ect action interpretation and execution is supported by some
psychological evidence. Although I haven't done an in-depth research of the psychological
literature, I did nd some interesting results in Dixon, 1987a Dixon, 1987b Dixon et al.,
1988].
18

In 1987a], Dixon distinguishes two di erent kinds of information contained in directions
for carrying out tasks: component step information, namely, the speci c enumeration of
actions needed to perform the task, and organizational information, that indicates how
the component steps are related to each other. His examples are of drawing tasks such
as You can make a wagon by drawing a long rectangle with two circles underneath: the
organizational information concerns the object that will be obtained as a result of drawing,
while the component step information describes the individual gures to be drawn.
Dixon's rst nding is that single sentence directions are read faster when they begin
with organizational rather than with component information. This is consistent with his
assumption that the role of organizational information is to provide a framework or schema
for interpreting and relating the component step information. The most natural way of
constructing a mental plan would be rst to use the organizational information to set up a
plan schema, and then to incorporate the component steps in the plan. Dixon suggests two
possible explanations for the slow-down observed when the component step is presented
rst:
1. Guessing strategy: readers try to guess how the component steps are organized
and related, rather than wait for the organizational information in the sentence.
These guesses might be based on conjectures about what the overall con guration
is supposed to look like, or default assumptions about how the components should
be drawn. Presumably, these guesses can be corrected later if they turn out to be
incorrect.
2. Bu ering strategy: the component step information would be retained in a relatively
uninterpreted form until the organizational information is found | where relatively
uninterpreted means that decisions about features such as the relative size, placement,
and orientation of the components have not been made.
The two accounts make di erent predictions about whether the extra time involved in processing components- rst sentences is due to added diculty in processing the component
step information, or added diculty in processing the organizational information. If the
guessing account is right, the extra time would be due to processing the component step
information, because that would be when the guessing process is taking place if the bu ering account is right, then the extra time would be due to processing the organizational
component.
Recall that preliminary results show that single sentence directions are read faster when
they begin with organizational rather than with component information. Dixon presents
three experiments to examine when the slow down occurs, namely, while processing the
component step or the organizational information, and as a consequence, whether the
guessing or the bu ering account seems correct. The results in general show that the
slower reading rates occur primarily with the component information, suggesting that
subjects need extra time to guess the relationship of the components when they are not
told the object at the outset. In the rst experiment, the component information and the
organizational information are contained in two separate sentences, such as This will be
a picture of a wagon. Draw a long rectangle with two circles underneath. In the second
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experiment, the two di erent kinds of information are contained in a single sentence which
is composed of a main clause and either a Purpose Clause or a Means Clause 1 | To make
a wagon draw a long rectangle with two circles underneath or You can make a wagon by
drawing a long rectangle with two circles underneath. In the rst experiment, there are
two di erent orders in which sentences can be presented in the second experiment, there
are four variations, according to whether the organizational information or the component
information is contained in a subordinate clause, and to whether the subordinate clause is
preposed or postposed. Finally, in the third experiment, no organizational information is
present | the rationale for this will be explained shortly.
Subjects were asked to press a button each time they were done with the di erent parts of
the sentence: in the rst experiment, the rst sentence would disappear after the subject
had pressed the button, and only then the second sentence would appear likewise in the
second experiment, where subjects were presented only one sentence, the two parts of the
sentence would not be present on the screen at the same time. Subjects were also asked
to actually execute the instructions. Errors were recorded: in the rst experiment, there
were signi cantly more errors when the components information was presented rst p.28]:
The pattern of error rates supports the hypothesis that subjects generated
guesses when the components sentences were presented rst. There were no
di erences between the two sentence orders in subjects' ability to carry out the
component steps. However, there was a signi cant di erence in how well the
drawing resembled the intended object. These object errors might occur if subjects failed to correct an erroneous guess about the nature of the drawing. The
drawing would then reect the initial faulty interpretation of the components
sentence.
For example, a correct interpretation of This will be a picture of a wine glass. Draw a
triangle on top of an upside down T will result in an \upside down" triangle on top of the
T. Instead, some subjects who read the directions in reverse order Draw a triangle on top
of an upside-down T. This will be the picture of a wine glass. produced a drawing in which
the triangle is in its \canonical" orientation on top of the T | see Fig. 3.1. According to
Dixon, presumably the triangle was drawn that way because the subject had no indication
that the triangle should deviate from the typical orientation when the components sentence
was rst read. From my point of view, this is a very revealing kind of mistake, as it shows
how the goal to be achieved (the organizational information) does indeed constrain the
interpretation of the action to be performed, by providing the information about features
that the surface form leaves unspeci ed | similar to my claim for (2.2b) above.
The results of the second experiment, in which the subjects were presented with one single
sentence, were consistent with those of the rst as far as reading times are concerned.
However, there were far fewer errors: according to Dixon, the errors in the rst experiment
may have occurred because subjects sometimes may not have retained the speci c wording
and content of an initially presented components sentence, and therefore were not able to
1
Following Balkanski, 1992b], a Means Clause expresses the means by which an action is performed,
and it is in general built out of a by plus a gerund.
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Figure 3.1: Correct and incorrect interpretation of the component step information in
Dixon's experiments

use the object sentence to correct erroneous interpretations. The lack of such an e ect in
Experiment 2 suggests that the speci c wording was more often available when the object
and component steps were in the same sentence.
Finally, no organizational information was provided in the third experiment, which was
meant to test the following: according to the guessing account, the size of the informationorder e ect should be related to how dicult it is to generate guesses about how the
component steps are related. For those sentences with easily interpretable component steps,
the order of the two types of information should not matter much but if the component
steps are dicult to interpret by themselves, having the organizational information rst
should be a great advantage. So in the third experiment subjects were presented only with
the component steps, and told that such drawings should form the picture of a common
object: subjects were asked to draw and identify the object. The hypothesis was borne
out: not surprisingly, the number of object errors in Experiment 3 was substantially larger
than it was in Experiment 1.
In the other two papers 1987b 1988], Dixon and his collaborators present other experiments that support the three assumptions that
1. mental plans consist of a hierarchy of action schemas
2. the hierarchy is built by beginning with the schema at the top of the hierarchy
3. plan construction goes on in parallel with other reading processes.
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3.2 Plan inference
There are several reasons why plan inference is relevant to my work: 2
1. in the same spirit that plan inference has in input an impoverished description of a
certain sequence of events, and tries to infer a richer description of what happened,
so I am trying to account for inferences that provide a richer description of the action
to be performed
2. at a higher level, plan inference can be seen as part of accommodation. As I mentioned in sec. 2.1, Thomason, 1990] expresses the view that accommodation consists
of adjusting the conversational record to eliminate obstacles to the detected plans of
one's interlocutor, therefore supporting the view that plan inference is actually part
of the accommodation process
3. plan inference work stresses the importance of taking into account the goals the agent
is pursuing in order to make sense of his actions: however, I will show that the work
that has addressed this issue has not explored the importance of goals as constraints
on interpretation
4. as will become clearer in Chapters 6 and 7, there are many common points between
my approach to action representation and to the implementation of the required
inferences, and similar issues addressed in plan inference work.
I will start with a general de nition of plan inference, not restricted to understanding NL
Kautz, 1990, p.105]:
One is given a fragmented, impoverished description of the actions performed by
one or more agents, and expected to infer a rich, highly interrelated description.
The new description lls out details of the setting, and relates the actions of the
agents in the scenario to their goals and future actions. The result of the plan
inference process can be used to generate summaries of the situation, to help
(or hinder) the agent(s), and to build up a context for use in disambiguating
further observations.
It is quite uncontroversial that inferring such rich, highly interrelated description is relevant
to understanding NL | from Cohen et al., 1990]:
Much of communication depends about agents' ability to recognize one another's intentions and plans p. 3] ... Researchers in AI were the rst to bring
out clearly the necessity to treat discourse as planned activity, requiring theoretical and empirical treatment of plan structure and plan inference. p. 10]
2
A reminder to the reader that in the literature the terms plan inference and plan recognition are used
interchangeably, and that I will use only the former.
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It is clear that instructional text, like any other form of communication, requires plan
inference as well. In fact, the necessity of performing plan inference also a ects knowledge
representation: we can think of plans as repositories of information about the relation
between a goal to be achieved and the actions that achieve it such knowledge is clearly
relevant to computing how goals constrain the actions that contribute to their achievement.
Therefore, in the following I will give an extensive overview of the plan inference literature
as related to NL understanding: I will rst talk about Allen's general description of plan
inference processes in NL, and then I will turn to examining various extensions and variations to this basic model, as provided by researchers such as Pollack, 1986 Litman and
Allen, 1990 Grosz and Sidner, 1990 Lambert and Carberry, 1991 Schank and Abelson,
1977 Wilensky, 1983].

3.2.1 Plan inference and NL understanding
Allen in his textbook 1987, p. 378] gives the following de nition of a plan-based analysis
of text:
a plan system actually attempts to construct a plan by piecing together the
actions, states and goals that explain the story or conversation. Two pieces of
a plan may be put together by adding an explicit causal relationship between
them. For instance, a system might put two actions together using a substepwhole relation (one is part of the decomposition of the other), or an action and
a state might be put together using a result relation (the state is an e ect of
the action), or an enable relation (the state is a precondition of the action).
The simplest form of plan inference is decomposition chaining , which consists of matching
logical forms to action de nitions when a match has been found, the matching process is
then repeated on the newly derived action description to see if it is part of the decomposition of yet another action. This process continues until either no further actions can be
derived, or the system nds a connection to a previous sentence.
According to Allen, to connect sentences systems must use the analysis of the previous
sentences to a ect the processing of the next sentence. Therefore, plan inference systems
must maintain a set of expectations , which are the plans that have been constructed as
possible explanations of the previous sentences. A new sentence is then analyzed using the
decomposition chaining technique however, at each stage the action introduced is matched
against the expectations to check for a connection.
For example, if a story started with the sentence Jack went to the ticket clerk , the technique
of decomposition chaining would check which actions have GOTO as an action step: in
the domain of taking trips by train, there may be two such actions, TAKE-TRIP and
PURCHASE. The rst possibility is eliminated since the LOC role of the GOTO must be
a location of a train. The GOTO step of the PURCHASE action is consistent with the
input, and an instance of PURCHASE | say, P1 | is created with the proper parameter
bindings. Only one action (TAKE-TRIP) has a PURCHASE action as a step. An instance
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T2 of this action is in turn created, thereby stating that the object being purchased (in
P1) is a ticket for whatever train is being taken (in T2).
The basic decomposition-based techniques can be extended by adding the action-e ectbased reasoning. This involves allowing goal states as expectations, which will be called the
expected goals . The extended plan inference algorithm must not only search from actions
to other actions via decompositions but also search from actions to expected goals via the
actions' e ects, and vice versa. More complex e ects of action-e ect-based reasoning arise
when two actions are related, not by both being steps of some other action, but by one
action enabling the other to occur (that is, one action's e ects satisfy the preconditions of
the other).
Allen describes a plan inference algorithm | see Fig. 3.2 | that I will use as the \base case"
against which other approaches are evaluated. Allen's algorithm is stated in three parts:
one for dealing with sentences describing an action, one dealing with sentences describing
a state, and one dealing with sentences describing a goal.3 The E-plan in Fig. 3.2 is the
plan structure that serves as the expectation. The algorithm assumes that there is only
one E-plan.
Allen notices that the matching process can be helped by syntactic clues, that can prune
the possible relationships between actions that the algorithm checks for. In particular,
he mentions that ACT1 in order to ACT2 suggests that ACT1 is a substep of, or enables
ACT2 and that ACT1 by, or by means of, ACT2 suggests that ACT2 is a substep of,
or enables ACT1. As I will show in Ch. 5, my analysis of purpose clauses supports the
move of exploiting the surface form to restrict the search for possible connections between
actions also, through my analysis the notion of an action being a substep of , or enabling
another can be re ned.
A nal observation. Given that inferring the plans underlying discourse is necessary, a
question arises as regards the kind of plan | the E-plan in Fig. 3.2 | being inferred,
namely, domain or communicative plan. Some of the initial work on plan inference in NL
Cohen and Perrault, 1979 Perrault and Allen, 1980] concentrated on inferring communicative plans, namely, understanding which speech acts a certain utterance realizes later
work Allen, 1983 Sidner, 1985 Carberry, 1985 Litman, 1985] attempts to infer both
the communicative and the domain plans underlying an utterance. In the following, I will
briey discuss work by Litman and Allen 1990] and by Lambert and Carberry 1991 1992],
as representative of the research on inferring di erent kinds of plans I will then review
Pollack, 1986], who challenges some assumptions underlying plan inference in discourse.

3.2.1.1 Domain plans and discourse plans
In Litman, 1985 Litman and Allen, 1990], a plan inference model for task-oriented dialogue understanding is presented, that explicitly separates discourse intentions from commonsense plans that are the objects of such intentions. Two types of commonsense plans
are de ned: domain plans , used to model the tasks, and discourse plans , domain independent plans that can be generated from execution or discussion of domain plans.
3

Allen does not give precise de nitions for what actions, goals, states are.

24

To integrate an action A:
Part 1: Find the possible matches into the E-plan:
1. Match A directly against any actions in the E-plan.
2. If step 1 failed, match the e ects of A against any expected goals in the
E-plan and the preconditions of A against any states in the E-plan.
3. If step 2 failed, match A's preconditions against the e ects of the actions
in the E-plan.
4. If step 3 failed, match A into the decompositions of all actions known to
the system. For each action X for which this succeeds, recursively attempt
to integrate X into the E-plan.
Part 2: Integrate the action:
1. If one of the steps in part 1 succeeded, add the equality assertions | namely,
variable bindings | needed to integrate A into the E-plan, and then add
all the steps of A's decomposition into the E-plan.
2. If none of the preceding steps succeeded, add A to the E-plan without any
connections to other actions in the E-plan.

To integrate a state S:

1. Match S against the e ects and preconditions of each action in the E-plan.
2. If a match was found in the previous step, add the equalities needed to integrate
state S into the E-plan.
3. If no matches were found, add S to the E-plan.

To integrate a goal state G:

1. Match G against the e ects of any actions in the E-plan.
2. If a match was found in the previous step, add the equalities needed to integrate
goal G into the E-plan.
3. If no matches were found, add G to the E-plan.
Figure 3.2: Basic plan inference algorithm for NL understanding
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Our discourse plans represent a new source of commonsense knowledge, mediating between task plans and an important class of discourse intentions. Our approach has several important advantages. First, the incorporation of discourse
plans into a theory of task plan inference allows us to account for a wider variety
of task-oriented dialogues (for instance, dialogues with dynamically generated
subdialogues such as clari cations and corrections) than previously considered.
Second, the discourse plan formulation provides a clear computational model.
Plans are a well de ned method of representation, but, more importantly, the
techniques of plan inference can be adapted to identify appropriate discourse
plans from utterances. Litman and Allen, 1990, p.367]
Discourse intentions are purposes of the speaker, expressed in terms of both the domain
plans used to model the tasks, and the domain independent discourse plans that can be
generated from execution or discussion of domain plans. The discourse intentions underlying an utterance such as (3.1), told by a Person to a Clerk at a ticket booth
(3.1) I'd like to buy a ticket to New York. Here's 5 dollars.
are roughly (1) that Person intends Clerk to believe that Person would like to buy a ticket
to New York (and maybe that Person intends Clerk to believe that (3.1) was a request for
a ticket), and (2) that Person intends Clerk to believe that Person is giving Clerk 5 dollars
to buy the ticket. In contrast, the commonsense knowledge underlying (3.1) corresponds
to the task plans to which these discourse intentions refer, such as BUY-TICKET and
GIVE-MONEY.
Notice that discourse intentions not necessarily refer to any or every step in the associated
commonsense plan.
The task of the plan recognizer is to recognize a domain plan structure, and any discourse
plans generated by this structure, to which the discourse intentions of an input utterance
refer. That is, the plan recognizer's task is not only to infer a domain plan, but also to infer
any plans generated by this domain plan that are relevant to the discourse intentions. The
plan recognizer has at its disposal a library of domain plan schemas varying with the domain
and a library of discourse and speech act plan schemas, as well as the representation of
the parse of the input utterance. The plan recognizer will use this information to associate
each utterance with an intention referring to a domain plan, either directly or through a
series of generated discourse plans. If the interpretation is ambiguous, a discourse intention
and a set of commonsense plans are created for each interpretation.
The ideas put forward by Litman and Allen are extended in Lambert's work 1991 1992].
She distinguishes three levels necessary to model intentions: the domain level (with domain
goals such as traveling by train), the problem-solving level (with plan-construction goals
such as instantiating a parameter in a plan), and the discourse level (with communicative
goals such as expressing surprise). Lambert claims that her process model has three major
advantages over previous approaches Lambert and Carberry, 1991, p.47]:
1. it provides a better representation of user intentions than previous models
and allows the nuances of di erent kinds of goals and processing to be
captured at each level
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2. it enables the incremental recognition of communicative goals that cannot
be recognized from a single utterance alone
3. it di erentiates between illocutionary e ects and desired perlocutionary
e ects.
Other work based on distinguishing between di erent types of plans in understanding
discourse is by Ramshaw 1989a 1989b 1991].

3.2.1.2 Pollack's model of plans as mental phenomena
In her inuential work 1986 1990], Pollack challenges the traditional approach to plan
inference in discourse understanding, which amounts to directly reasoning about the object
of an actor's plan, and to constructing a recipe-for-action using a library of simpler recipes
that are assumed to be mutually known to the actor and to the inferring agent. In fact, if
one considers the algorithm in Fig 3.2, it is clear that there is no explicit representation of
beliefs: basically the observer (the system) attributes its own beliefs to the agent, and the
fact that such beliefs could be incompatible with the agent's is not taken into account.
Pollack's main points are that:
1. It is necessary to specify the internal structure of plans: Pollack argues that plans
should be analyzed as particular con gurations of beliefs and intentions.
2. It is necessary to provide a model that makes it possible to handle situations in
which there are discrepancies between the beliefs of the various agents involved in
the communication situation. She claims that a model of plan inference adequate to
support a theory of cooperative communication must concern itself with the structure
of the complex mental attitude of having a plan, as well as with the structure of the
objects of that attitude.
Pollack's alternative model of plans is composed of beliefs and intentions. The belief
component of plans is necessary because for an agent to have a plan to do  , which
consists in the doing of a collection of acts ", it is not necessary that the performance of
" actually lead to the performance of  . What is necessary is that the agent believes that
its performance will do so.
The intention component of plans is necessary because beliefs by themselves are not sucient to guarantee that doing " is the agent's plan to do  . In particular, for the agent's
plan to do  to consist in the agent's doing ", the agent must intend to execute each of
the acts in ". For example, an agent may believe that calling a friend on the phone would
entail talking to her however, if the agent intends to wait till he sees her face to face,
calling the friend on the phone does not count as a plan for talking to her. Furthermore,
in order for " to count as the agent's plan to  , not only must the agent intend to execute
", he must also intend it as a way of doing  : for example, " may achieve both  and  .
However, if the agent only intends to achieve  , even if as a consequence of executing " 
is achieved, " does not count as a plan of the agent to achieve  .
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De nition P0 1990, p.90] An agent A has a plan to do  that consists in doing
some set of acts ", provided that :
1. A believes that he can execute each act in ".
2. A believes that executing the acts in " will entail the performance of  .
3. A believes that each act in " plays a role in his plan.
4. A intends to execute each act in ".
5. A intends to execute " as a way of doing  .
6. A intends each act in " to play a role in his plan.

The reader is referred to Pollack, 1986 Pollack, 1990] for the reasons justifying the presence
of each component in the previous de nition, and for its formalization. I would just like to
point out that Pollack models the notion of doing one act as a way of doing another by
means of the generation relation, rst introduced in Goldman, 1970]: this formalization
of generation and its usage in modeling actions is one of the major contributions of her
work. I will discuss the notion of generation in depth in Ch. 5 and Ch. 6.
Turning now to invalid plans, an agent has an invalid plan if and only if he has a set of
beliefs and intentions as in P0, and one or more of these beliefs is incorrect | incorrect
with respect to the inferring agent's knowledge, of course. Invalidities can regard clauses
1, 2 and 3 in Def. P0. Finally, in a communicative situation, the inferring agent will have
to attribute to the performing agent an Explanatory Plan , namely, a plan which includes
explanatory beliefs | the inferring agent may then detect that some of these explanatory
beliefs are incorrect.

3.2.1.3 Grosz and Sidner's model of collaborative activity
Grosz and Sidner 1990] approach the problem of plan inference in discourse from the
point of view of modeling collaborative activity. They drop the master-slave assumption,
namely, the assumption that S and H have xed and not equatable roles, and that therefore
only one agent (S) produces utterances, while the other agent (H) attempts to infer from
these utterances S's goals and plans. They also drop the assumption that H's knowledge of
actions and of the relations between them constitutes a correct and complete description
of what agents can do.
To model collaboration, they resort to the notion of SharedPlan , which is based on Pollack's
de nition of simple plan | see def. P0 above. They modify P0 by requiring all beliefs to be
mutual beliefs, and by allowing di erent agents to perform di erent actions. Most relevant
to the plan inference issue is Lochbaum's work 1991a 1991b] on how each agent identi es
the role that a certain Act of type  described in the other agent's utterance plays in the
SharedPlan. The algorithm assumes that: Act is an action of type   Gi is the agent who
communicates Prop(Act) , namely, the utterance in which Act is contained Gj is the other
agent, namely, the one being modeled Gi and Gj have a partial SharedPlan at time T1 to
perform an action of type A at time T2, SharedPlan*(Gi , Gj , A, T1 , T2).
The algorithm is as follows Lochbaum, 1991b, p.4]:
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As a result of the communication, assert MB(Gi , Gj , BEL(Gi ,Prop(Act))).
Search own beliefs for BEL(Gj ,Prop(Act)).
Ascribe BEL(Gi ,Contributes( ,A)).
Search own beliefs for Contributes( ,A) and where possible, more speci c
information as to how  contributes to A.
5. If steps 2. and 4. are successful, signal assent and
MB(Gi ,Gj ,Contributes( ,A)).
6. If step 2. or step 4. is unsuccessful, then query Gi or communicate dissent.
1.
2.
3.
4.

In step 4, Gj is trying to determine why agent Gi has mentioned an Act of type  : given
the action formalism they adopt Balkanski, 1990] this is equivalent to Gj trying to identify
the role Gi believes  will play in their SharedPlan. The algorithm Lochbaum develops
tries to relate  to A, namely, it examines all the known recipes for A that Gj knows, to
see whether  is contained in such recipe. If yes, it computes possible constraints that may
have to hold for the particular relation R between  and A to hold. I will come back to
Lochbaum's algorithm in Sec. 7.3.
The important contribution of Grosz and Sidner's work is that they drop the master-slave
assumption. For the time being, I will hold onto it in my work however, nothing hinges
on it, and it could easily be dropped. Although I assume H has correct knowledge, I
drop the assumption he has complete knowledge: in fact, my accommodation inferences
integrate the knowledge the agent has with that provided by the instructions, for example
by computing expectations about object locations.

3.2.1.4 Scripts and Plans
Another thread of research on plan inference starts with Schank and Abelson, 1977], and
continues with Wilensky, 1983] and Dyer, 1983], among others. In 1977], Schank and
Abelson (S & A for short) present a theory of story understanding based on the usage of
scripts and plans, and in which goals play a prominent part. In terms of the algorithm in
Fig. 3.2, S & A's theory o ers a much richer representation of the knowledge about actions
and how they are organized and attempts to classify all the goals that a rational agent
may have. However, this richer representation makes the inferring processes much more
complicated, and in the end it is not clear how S & A's algorithm really works.
A script is a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that de nes a well-known situation. A script is made up of slots and requirements on what can ll those slots. The
structure is an interconnected whole, and what is in one slot a ects what can be in another. Therefore, a script describes a stereotyped sequence of events, which prescribes
the order in which things happen, and the people and objects participating in the action.
There are scripts for eating in a restaurant, riding a bus, watching and playing a football
game, participating in a birthday party, and so on. Scripts are responsible for lling in the
obvious information that has been left out of a story.
However, scripts are not sucient, as they do not represent intentionality: from a scriptal
point of view, each event occurs next simply because it is the next event in the script.
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Although script-based programs know that characters initiate the restaurant script to
satisfy hunger, they do not know why any speci c event within such script, such as tipping
the waiter , occurs.
Plans are used to encode knowledge about intentionality, and are made up of general
information about how actors achieve goals. They explain how a given state or event
was prerequisite for, or derivative from, another state and event. According to S & A,
people use plans to make sense of seemingly disconnected sentences. By nding a plan,
an understander can make guesses about the intentions of an action in an unfolding story
and use these guesses to make sense of a story.
According to S & A, the process of plan inference has two main parts: rst, understand
the goals of the actors in the story second, understand which particular method is being
used to realize each operating goal.
This implies having a set of methods that we know will realize a goal, or at
least being able to recognize the actions of an individual as a possible method
for realizing a goal. Methods for realizing goals almost always involve chains
of instrumental goals, i.e., necessary partial accomplishments along the path to
the main goal.
Certain goals, called delta goals , or D-goals for short, are general building blocks in many
planning processes, and can be characterized as changes in common states. D-goals have
no value in themselves, but they are subordinate to higher level main goals. Some common
D-goals are d-prox, the goal of going to an intended location , which can be characterized
as a change in the state of proximity (to something) d-cont, the goal of gaining control ,
which means to change physical control of some object from the present holder to the
actor d-know, the goal of acquiring knowledge . D-goals point to the set of possible
actions that can enable the actor to achieve that particular goal: these sets of possible
actions are called planboxes . A planbox includes: a key action that will accomplish the
goals of the planbox di erent kinds of preconditions and a result. For instance, one of
the planboxes for d-know is ask x y q, with x the agent, y the respondent, and q the
proposition whose truth value is being questioned. ask has, among its preconditions, that
y knows q and wants to communicate q to x as act, x communicating q? to y as result,
y communicating q to x.
According to S & A, the process of understanding plan-based stories is as follows:
1. Determine the goal.
2. Determine the D-goals that will satisfy that goal.
3. Check whether the input conceptualizations for realize one of the planboxes that are
called by one of the determined D-goals.
To determine the goal(s) in a story, S & A postulate a goal monitor,
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an interrelated bundle of processes which recognizes when goals are triggered,
interprets their nature, keeps track of their fate, and makes predictions about
goal-related events. ... When the life of a goal is ended, the goal monitor
outputs a history of its fate. Several summaries of a story can be created
by coordinating goal fates: one can look at the interlocking histories of all
goals, all important goals, all the goals pertaining to a particular character,
etc. Summarization devices of this kind we refer to as GOAL FATE GRAPHS.
S & A classify goals as follows:

S-goal (Satisfaction Goal). A recurring strong biological need, which, when satis ed,
becomes extinguished for a time | e.g. s-hunger, s-sex, s-sleep.

E-goal (Enjoyment Goal). An activity which is optionally pursued for enjoyment or
relaxation | e-travel, e-entertainment, e-exercise.

A-goal (Achievement Goal). The realization, often over a long term, of some valued

acquisition or social position. Examples are: a-possessions, a-power position,
a-social relationships.

P-goal (Preservation Goal). Preserving or improving the health, safety, or good conditions of people, position, or property.

I-goal (Instrumental Goal). Any goal which, when achieved, realizes the precondition
in the pursuit of another goal, but does not in and of itself produce satisfaction.
Instrumental goals occur in the service of S-, P-, A-, and E-goals, as well as possibly
being nested such that an I-goal serves another I-goal.
D-goal (Delta Goal). To what was said above one can add that a D-goal is similar to
an I-goal, except that general planning operations instead of scripts are involved in
its pursuit. Under each D-goal is organized a set of planboxes.
On the basis of this theory, a number of computer programs were written: in particular, I
would like to mention PAM, by Wilensky 1982 1983]. PAM processes non-stereotypical
stories by tracing character's goals, plans, and actions. PAM attempts to explain each
input as a goal for some character, as a step in a known plan, or as a substep of some
intermediate plan for a known goal.
According to Norvig Shapiro, 1992, p.1570-1571], PAM su ers from brittleness:
because it had knowledge of the character's goals and reactions, PAM could
handle a simple story like \Pat hit Kim. She cried". But because the story
involves no animate characters and hence no goals, it could not handle a super cially similar story like \The wind blew the vase o the table. It broke".
Again in Norvig's analysis, some of these problems were overcome in BORIS Dyer, 1983]:
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BORIS combined rules for dealing with di erent knowledge structures at the
same time ... BORIS searched for an explanation at each of four levels: scriptal,
goal / plan, thematic, and role. ... BORIS can be seen as an attempt to deal
with all the types of knowledge structures that were proposed by Schank and
Abelson, 1977] as well as several others that were introduced since then.
BORIS's problem is that each knowledge type, and each possible interaction between
knowledge types, was activated by means of rules: the rules were too ad hoc and the
interactions among the rules too complicated to allow the rule base to scale up gracefully.
There is a general comment I would like to make on this approach: although Schank and
Abelson, 1977] is valuable in identifying many important themes, it leaves too much of a
gap between the surface form and the complex Knowledge Base composed of scripts and
plans, so that it is not clear how the former is mapped onto the latter | this mapping
remains obscure, even if both the logical form produced by the parser and the entire
Knowledge Base are expressed in terms of Conceptual Dependency theory Schank, 1975].
The various plans are activated and goals recognized by some more or less re ned form of
pattern matching: in SAM, a routine APPLY takes care of understanding which scripts
to apply by using a pattern matcher between the conceptualization of the input sentence
produced by the parser, and scripts for neither PAM nor its successor FAUSTUS is this
part of the mapping described in much detail in Wilensky, 1983]: frames are invoked
because they have been indexed under a component that occurs as an input, or because
they are explicitly associated with another invoked frame, and then instantiated , and
elaborated , i.e. their empty slots are lled.
As an example, consider an instance of a purpose clause, that is contained in one of the
simple stories for which S & A provide a goal fate graph p. 102]:
(3.2) Professor Sti e came to town to buy a house.
In this example, one of the inferences I am dealing with | namely, developing the plausible
expectation that the house sought by Prof. Sti e is in town 4 | needs to be made: as in
(2.3a), a primary expectation is developed, that the transaction site is the town and on
the basis of that primary one the secondary expectation regarding the house arises too.
In S & A's representation, come is mapped to a ptrans, while buy has a conceptual
representation made up of two conceptualizations that cause each other, one an atrans
of money, the other an atrans of the object being bought.5 After the sentence has been
parsed, and its conceptualization produced, I would assume that it is recognized as an
instance of one of the achievement goals, a-possessions. However, how the program
gets from such A-goal to the proper D-goals, which presumably include d-cont(Stifle,
house) how the proper planbox among those associated to such goal is activated and
how the ptrans representing Professor Sti e came to town is connected to such planbox,
is almost a mystery to me.
Another expectation, that the real estate agent is in town is possible. See below.
ptrans is the primitive act of transferring the physical location of an object atrans is the primitive
act of transferring an abstract relationship such as possession, ownership or control.
4

5
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From the traces of the computer programs at the end of the book, it seems to me that
reference resolution simply amounts to binding a referent to an object in a script as soon
as possible: therefore, I would assume that town is bound to the parameter of a d-prox,
maybe associated to the planbox activated by the goal a-possessions, and house to the
parameter of d-cont, but it is not clear to me how the following inferences are made, if
they are indeed made:
1. there is a relation between the house sought by Prof. Stie and the town, namely,
that the town is where such house is located. 6
2. house in town is simply an expectation, that could be overridden by a continuation
such as The house he wants is in a secluded locality, but the real estate oce is in
town.
To conclude, it seems to me that in all these programs the mapping between the surface
form and KBs is not clear at all, and the di erent expectations that di erent surface forms
raise are totally disregarded: this is actually the reason why di erent surface forms can be
interpreted, not because their similarities and dissimilarities are really accounted for.

3.2.2 Summary
To sum up, there are three issues emerging from plan inference research that are relevant
to my concerns:
1. The importance of goals . Their relevance is emphasized in particular in Schank
and Abelson, 1977] and Wilensky, 1983] however, the hierarchical organization of
actions in Allen's domain plans 1987] can be seen as implicitly relating the sequence
of actions that achieve a goal to the goal itself also in Pollack, 1986] the notion of
intentions , and of doing an action by doing another, is related to goals , as we saw
in the previous chapter when I discussed Hobbs, 1990] and Cohen and Levesque,
1990].
However, even if the importance of goals is stressed, they are still seen as providing
the global context for interpretation, and not also as constraints on computing action
descriptions.
2. The view put forward by Pollack that plans must be seen as collections of beliefs and
intentions, a view then adopted by Grosz and Sidner. Such concepts are sometimes
implicit in others' work however, Pollack was the rst to bring them to the forefront
and explicitly use them in her formalization of plans. I agree with Pollack's point of
view, but I will not explicitly represent the beliefs of the speaker. Notice however
that I do relax the assumption that H has complete knowledge, in that his knowledge
may be augmented by the input instruction.
3. Finally, I will compare my algorithm, described in Ch. 7, to the basic algorithm in
Fig. 3.2.
6
Notice that no distinction is made in their reference resolution process between attributive and referential readings.
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3.3 Computational approaches to instruction understanding
The other body of work relevant to my research concerns computational approaches to instruction understanding, where the emphasis is on the action representation and algorithms
necessary to interpret instructions most of this research has been applied in implemented
systems. The need to have a computer understand instructions | whether the system is
a data base NL query system, a robot or an animated agent | often results in the main
research e ort being spent on the system architecture, that has to integrate many di erent
modules, rather than on a broad coverage of NL phenomena and / or in an interest in the
NL surface form per se. The AnimNL project is di erent, in that it tries to achieve vertical
integration without disregarding the richness of the NL input.
For each approach that I describe, I will try to highlight the following points:
what an instruction is mapped into | a logical form, a procedure, a hierarchical
representation incrementally built on the basis of the previous instructions, etc
how the instruction relates to the goals that the agent may already have, and vice
versa, how such preexisting goals can a ect the interpretation of the instruction itself
whether the instructor has total control over the agent's actions
whether the communicative situation in which an instruction is issued and the performance situation in which it is executed coincide.
The latter two points are not directly related to my concern, but they a ect the theories
of instructions that such system implement, and are therefore worth exploring.
The reader should be aware that there is also a sizable body of literature on instruction
generation, including among others: Dale's EPICURE system, that generates recipes 1989
1992] Vander Linden's work on generating purpose expressions in instructional text 1992a
1992b 1993b], that I will briey describe in Sec. 4.1.2.1.1 Delin, Scott and Hartley's
work on multilingual instructions 1993] generation of instructional text accompanying
graphics or animation, for example the COMET McKeown et al., 1992] and WIP projects
Wahlster et al., 1989 Wahlster et al., 1991]. Although some of the issues addressed by
work on generating instructions are relevant to understanding instructions too, the central
concerns of the former are di erent from those of the latter: therefore I won't discuss this
body of literature in depth, but I will refer to it when the need arises.

3.3.1 Basic approaches
In approaches of this kind, understanding an instruction consists in forming a complete
plan corresponding to the input command: such plan may be complex, in that it may
for example include actions necessary to achieve preconditions of the action described in
the input. Subsequently, the plan is executed by simply traversing its substeps, which
correspond to basic actions .7 In an implementation context, such basic actions may be
7

See Goldman, 1970] and Pollack, 1986] for a discussion of basic actions.
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procedural interpretations of VPs and NPs as in the by now venerable SHRLDU Winograd,
1972] or simple behaviors of animated agents, such as arm reaches and head orientation
changes Esakov and Badler, 1990 Badler et al., 1990].8
I call these approaches basic because they implement a less complex model of an agent:
he has no other goals apart from ful lling the input command, the instructor has total
control over the goals that the agent adopts, and the communicative situation and the
performance situation coincide. Moreover, the world is seen as entirely under the agent's
control. The term basic is not intended to detract from this kind of work, which has indeed
addressed complex facets of the process of instruction interpretation, such as identifying
the referents in the world of complex NPs Winograd, 1972].

3.3.2 The situated approach
Chapman in 1991] proposes a model of instruction interpretation that is concerned with
reacting to the situation at hand, and that heavily relies on perception. The instructor
gives instructions or o ers suggestions, while watching an agent engaged in an activity |
in Chapman's thesis, the activity is playing a video game. Each suggestion can be adopted
as a goal and executed: whether and when the agent takes the suggestion depends on the
current situation, and the decision process is modeled by means of an arbitration network.
Chapman's views instructions as similar to perceptual stimuli:
When Sonja the agent playing the game] is given an instruction, it registers
the entities the instruction refers to and uses the instruction to choose between
courses of action that themselves make sense in the current situation. An
instruction can fail to make sense if it refers to entities that are not present in the
situation in which it is given, or if the activity it recommends is implausible in
its own right. ... Instructions recommend courses of action Sonja's arbitration
network takes account of such recommendations. ... Because instructions can
only inuence arbitration when they make sense in terms of activities Sonja
could engage in autonomously, their role in Sonja is one of management only.
Chapman, 1991, p.76]
An instruction then identi es one action among the ones that belong to the system repertoire, and gives an additional reason why the agent should choose it. There is a repertoire
of 25 or so understandable instructions: each instruction is associated with a bu er whose
valid bu er the instruction sets or resets each bu er may have one or more associated elds
used to register the entities mentioned in the instruction. The contents of the instruction
bu ers, together with other inputs, such as those deriving from perception, are input to
the arbitration network, which will then \decide" what to do next.
The communicative situation and the performance situation coincide as in the \Basic"
approach, modulo making sense of the situation, e.g. turn left does not mean turn left
immediately, but turn left in the rst place where you can do so also notice that the
8

The system described in Esakov and Badler, 1990] is the \ancestor" of AnimNL.
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performance situation is de ned in perceptual terms | for example (from the quote above)
an instruction may fail to make sense if it refers to entities that are not present in the
situation in which it is given. Chapman's approach seems more concerned with making
(immediate) decisions about behavior, than with deriving knowledge from instructions and
then acting.

3.3.3 Vere and Bickmore's Homer system
Vere and Bickmore in 1990] describe the architecture of a complete integrated agent. Their
agent, a little submarine named Homer, is able to navigate in a harbor full of other objects,
to go to places, to deliver objects from one place to another. The submarine can take part
in dialogues that include questions, assertions and commands.
A command is a special case of an INFORM event in which the information
transmitted is that the informer has a goal and wants the informee to achieve it
for him. ... There is a demon in the reective processes which reacts to general
commands by extracting the goals, processing them, and sending them to the
temporal planner for plan synthesis. p.43]
A command is mapped onto a logical form which is an instantiation of a frame-like description of the verb, augmented by a description of the e ects of the action on the world state
| they call such semantics state transition semantics . Such representation is then sent to
the temporal planner for plan synthesis when a temporal plan has been synthesized, it is
passed on to the plan interpreter for execution.
Homer accepts simple commands from the instructor and adopts them as its own goals:
then it reasons about whether it can achieve them. One interesting point is that there
can be time constraints attached to commands, concerning either when they should be
performed | Drop the package at the barge next Sat. at 9 p.m., or when they are relevant
| If you see an animal tomorrow, photograph it: therefore the utterance situation and the
performance situation don't coincide.
The system allows for replanning, which is used to deal with new declarative information which changes the parameters under which a plan had been formulated, and with
additional goals, that may have to be achieved before another goal for which planning
had already taken place. Homer does accept negative commands, which are considered as
global constraints on the activities it can perform. For example, if Homer is told Don't
leave the island today, and later, the same day, Take a picture of the Cod sh, it will say it
cannot comply with the latter instruction, because to do so it would be necessary to leave
the island.
Although Homer's abilities are quite impressive, it is not clear whether replanning and the
capacity of dealing with negative commands amount to something more than propagating
temporal constraints.
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3.3.4 Instructions as a way of solving impasses
A di erent point of view on understanding instructions is advocated in Alterman et al.,
1991]. The stress is on extending stored knowledge to new but similar situations, as for
example when knowledge about using a certain device | a home phone | is applied to
the usage of a new, but similar device | a pay phone.
An agent has a basic set of skills and plans to solve certain problems. Instructions are
used as a resource only when the stored knowledge about plans cannot be adapted to
the situation at hand, namely, when the agent is blocked in mapping the goal to action:
instructions come in to specify the appropriate action(s) that will satisfy the goal in that
particular situation. The agent has to integrate these actions in his knowledge and to
understand how they relate to the goal he was trying to achieve: this is the only paper I
know which assumes a rich relation between the instructions and the preexisting goal(s).
It is crucial that the communicative situation and the performance situation are the same:
communication comes in to repair a breakdown in performance. From a certain point
of view, Chapman's approach is not so di erent, in the sense that for Chapman as well
instructions come in as an additional source of information about the course of action to
follow, when the agent doesn't have enough information to choose one course of action
over another.

3.3.5 Summary
The following table summarizes the approaches outlined above, as well as the one that I
am taking. The column direct mapping refers to whether an instruction is directly mapped
into some kind of logical form, which then is fed to an inference engine that interprets it
the two last columns are included for completeness although I will not be addressing the
corresponding issues any further in this thesis:
direct relation between instructor utterance sit.
mapping instructions and in control necessarily =
other goals
performance sit.
Basic
Y
None
Y
Y
Chapman
NA
Y
N
Y
a
Vere, Bickmore
Y
Limited
Y
N
Alterman
Y
Rich
N
Y
Di Eugenio
N
Rich
Y
N
Approach

a

Apart from negative commands.

The NA in Chapman's entry stays for Not Applicable: in fact, instructions in Sonja are
simply mapped into setting or resetting a bu er, and binding some associated parameters
it is hard to see how setting bu ers could qualify as a logical form.
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One conclusion that can be drawn from this table is that in general researchers have not
worried about computing the description of the action to be performed and that, apart
from Alterman et al., 1991], not much attention is paid to the mutual interaction between
the current instruction and preexisting goals, interaction that can a ect not just planning
as in Vere and Bickmore, 1990], but the action to be performed itself.
The approach I am going to propose instead relies in an active way on such mutual interaction, and tries to make the agent's knowledge exible enough so that the same instruction
uttered in the context of di erent goals will result in di erent behavior.
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Chapter 4

The linguistic data and their
discourse functions
In this chapter, I will discuss the data I have analyzed, Purpose Clauses and Negative
Imperatives , from a pragmatic / discourse processing point of view: for each of the two
classes, I will describe the corpus, talk about some relevant literature, and discuss their
respective discourse functions.
The connection between the two kinds of data is a theoretical one, in that both the goal
expressed in a purpose clause, and a negative imperative can be seen as constraining the
choices that an agent will be faced with when interpreting and / or executing instructions.
Besides, not surprisingly goals a ect the interpretation of negative imperatives as well.
There is also a more direct connection, in that, purpose clauses may describe goals such
as prevent, avoid etc. that bear a direct relation to negation.
As I mentioned in Ch. 2, my analysis of Purpose Clauses is much more developed than the
one of Negative Imperatives in particular, I haven't examined Negative Imperatives from
the point of view of the inferences necessary to understand them yet. In the next chapter,
I will present the rest of my analysis of Purpose Clauses, that regards the computational
issues of action representation and inference.
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4.1 Purpose Clauses
4.1.1 Corpus
First, a note on terminology. In the syntactic literature Hegarty, 1990 Jones, 1991
Green, 1991], the term purpose clause is used to refer to an in nitival to clause attached
as a daughter of VP, such as 1
(4.1) Maryi bought a bookj ] ei

to read ej on the plane]

Here, I use the term purpose clause in a more informal way, to refer to clauses that express
the purpose of the action described in the main clause: besides in nitival to constructions,
other clauses, such as those introduced by so that, such that, so as to, 2 may also perform
the same function. I have concentrated on in nitival clauses the ones I will discuss are
attached as daughters of S, not of VP, and are termed rationale clauses in syntax: all the
data I will discuss belong to a particular subclass of such clauses, subject-gap rationale
clauses. A use of the term purpose clause similar to mine is found in Thompson, 1985].
My analysis is based on one hundred and sixty-four consecutive occurrences of purpose
clauses, which I collected almost entirely from two how-to-do books on placing tiles and
hanging wall covers Hallowell, 1988a Hallowell, 1988b], and from two craft magazines
CC, 1988 CWP, 1989] four derive from opportunistic collection. These data can all be
seen as instantiations of the patterns Do to do  or To do  do , where is an action,
or sequence of actions, and  is an action: as we will see shortly, whether the PC is preor postposed has some impact on interpretation. However, in the following I will often
refer to the pattern underlying purpose clauses only as Do to do   the reader should
keep in mind that both orders are possible, and that sometimes stands for a sequence
1  2  : : : n .
Although purpose clauses can be introduced by in order to , I found no such instances. I
collected seventy-three further instances of in nitival to constructions, but I didn't include
them in my corpus. This set of examples includes:
Fifty-six occurrences of the pattern Use x to do  , 3 such as
(4.3) Use a sponge dipped in lukewarm water to remove excess adhesive before

it dries.

Although such examples can be seen as purpose clauses, as in Thompson, 1985], I
haven't included them in my corpus because = Use x doesn't per se describe an
1
Actually the in nitival clause in (4.1) is ambiguous between a purpose clause, which is daughter of
VP, and an in nitival relative clause, which is daughter of NP: Mary bought a book e to read e on the
plane]].
2
And sometimes even and .
3 To be precise, in three of them the verb need , not use , occurs:
(4.2) You'll need a wide, soft paint roller or pasting brush to apply paste to each strip.
i
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j

i

j

action to do in order to achieve  , but rather the instrument with which to perform
either  , or an action  that generates or enables  .
Seventeen occurrences of miscellaneous in nitival constructions. Most of them are
purpose clauses in the syntactic sense, namely, they are daughters of VP, rather than
of S. An example is 4
(4.4) Before installing the panels, paint a stripei on the wall between the joints ] ei
to blend with the color of the panel groove].
Others are complements of degree phrases, such as
(4.5) Remove any excess backing or adhesive from the oor until the surface is smooth
and deep enough to install the new tile.
And nally, in some of these, the main clause is not in an imperative form:
(4.6) The outer edges of wood tiles in an exterior doorway should be carefully sealed
before the threshold is replaced, to minimize water penetration.
This latter kind of examples could be included in my corpus by simply turning the
main clause into the active voice however, I decided to exclude them for the time
being, as I want to base my analysis on instances in which the main clause is in the
imperative form.5

4.1.2 Purpose Clauses in the literature
Purpose clauses have received attention almost exclusively from a syntactic point of view
{ see for example Hegarty, 1990 Jones, 1991 Green, 1991].
Very little attention has been paid to purpose clauses in the semantics literature. Jones in
1985 1991] gives a syntactic and semantic account of purpose clauses in a government and
binding framework, concerning himself in particular with control and thematic relations
Jackendo in 1990] briey analyzes expressions of purpose, goal, or rationale, normally
encoded as an in nitival, in order to-phrase, or for-phrase . He represents them by means
of a subordinating function FOR, which has the adjunct clause as an argument in turn,
FOR plus its argument is a restrictive modi er of the main clause. However, Jackendo 's
semantic decomposition, as Jones's, doesn't go beyond the construction of the logical form
of a sentence.
In the pragmatics literature, Thompson addresses the problem of the di erence in meaning between pre- and post posed purpose clauses her ndings have been applied to NL
generation in Vander Linden et al., 1992a Vander Linden et al., 1992b Vander Linden,
1993b]. Purpose clauses are among the adjunct clauses generated in the work reported in
Huettner et al., 1987].
(4.4) could also be interpreted as an in nitival relative.
I do include in my corpus examples in which the main clause is not in imperative form in a grammatical
sense but does have imperative force, e.g. because of modals: Within 4 hours of the time the tile was laid,
you must roll it to set the tile fully and to level any pieces that have popped up .
4

5
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In a computational setting, the most extensive work on purpose clauses has been done
by Balkanski 1992a 1992b 1993]: she mainly concentrates on the intentions and beliefs
that an agent adopts after hearing a purpose clause. I will discuss Balkanski's work in
Sec. 4.1.2.2.

4.1.2.1 Thompson's pre- and postposed Purpose Clauses
In 1985], Thompson addresses the problem of whether initial and nal purpose clauses
perform di erent discourse functions her answer is that in fact they are two di erent
constructions, not just the same clause type appearing in two di erent positions. She
claims that the initial purpose clause |IPC| states a problem within the context of the
expectations raised by the preceding discourse, while the nal purpose clause |FPC|
has a much more local role of stating the purpose for which the action named in the
immediately preceding clause is performed.
She counts as purpose clauses in nitival constructions introduced by in order to , or by to
paraphrasable as in order to . 6 In Thompson's analysis, an IPC provides the framework in
which to interpret the main clause, and it does this by its role as a link in an expectation
chain:
1. The environment, including the text itself, as well as the knowledge which the reader
brings to it, creates a set of expectations.
2. Within this set of expectations a problem arises.
3. The purpose clause names this problem and raises further expectations about its
solution.
4. The following material ful lls these expectations by providing the solution.
The FPC instead has simply a local role of stating the purpose for which the action named
in the preceding clause is undertaken. The scope of the FPC is restricted to its immediately
preceding main clause, which must name an action performed by a volitional agent.
An example that nicely supports her analysis is:7
(4.7) Brendan was rushing madly farther and farther out to sea. To slow her down we
streamed a heavy rope in a loop from the stern and let it trail in the water behind us
to act as a brake, and, hopefully, to smooth the worst of the wave crests. From the
stern also dangled a metal bucket only twenty-four hours earlier we had been using
it to cook an excellent meal of Irish crabs. Now it clanked mournfully every
time a wave broke against it.
Thompson's analysis is as follows p. 62]:
6
7

What she means is that she counts only rationale clauses, excluding other in nitival to constructions.
From The Brendan Voyage. Timothy Severin, 1978, New York: McGraw-Hill.
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The text preceding the rst purpose clause to slow her down creates a set of
expectations, namely that the crew are in a dangerous situation ... The initial
purpose clause to slow her down names a problem compatible with this set
of expectations ... Naming the problem in turn raises expectations about its
solution. Providing the solution is the function of the text following the purpose
clause.
For contrast, let us compare the nal purpose clause ... to cook an excellent
meal of Irish crabs. Here there is no set of expectations created by the
environment nothing in either the preceding text or the knowledge which the
reader brings to the text suggests anything about cooking Irish crabs. Further,
there is no PROBLEM to be solved ... The clause to cook an excellent meal
of Irish crabs simply provides, in a very local way, the purpose for which the
metal bucket was used.
Thompson's conclusions also make sense from the point of view of given / new information
Clark and Haviland, 1977 Prince, 1981]. Clark and Haviland in 1977] rst observe that
focal stress always falls on an element in the constituent that conveys new information
then they note that in general given comes before new, since simple English sentences with
normal intonation have their focal stress at or near the end of the sentence.
Therefore, the (given) expectations that arose from the preceding text can be expressed
by means of an IPC, while the (new) method to achieve that goal is expressed by means
of postposed main clauses.
Although Thompson's analysis is plausible, I would contend that sometimes an FPC can
also serve as a text organizer, that it may name a problem to be solved, and that it may
encompass more than simply the previous main clause. Consider 8
(4.8) Use premixed vinyl adhesive to install fabrics laminated to paper backing.
Trim all selvages before hanging. Then spread paste on the fabric's backing and
hang, butting edges. To prevent staining, keep adhesive o the fabric surface.
The FPC to install fabrics laminated to paper backing does indeed express the purpose
of using premixed vinyl adhesive however, the rest of the paragraph still belongs to the
subdiscourse referring to the \problem" of installing fabrics laminated to paper backing .
The same holds for the example we are animating in AnimNL, although it is a constructed
one:
(4.9) Go into the kitchen to get me the coee urn. Before you pick it up, be sure it is
unplugged. When you bring it back here, carry it with both hands.
The goal get me the coee urn names the common goal, or problem, in the context of
which the whole paragraph has to be interpreted.
8
I am using here an instance of the construction Use x to do because, although I exclude such examples
from my PC corpus, Thompson does include them in hers.
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It seems to me that the position of the clause in the sentence is a function of both the
given / new distinction and of the relation between and  . I will come back to this topic
in Sec. 4.1.4.
An interesting nding of Thompson's is that in what she calls procedural text | i.e., what
I call instructional text | the ratio of IPC's to FPC's in higher than in narrative text,
being 40% and 12% respectively. I haven't examined non-procedural text however, in my
corpus the percentage of IPCs to FPCs is about 52% (see Table 4.1), thus higher but still
compatible with the percentage reported by Thompson. She explains this by noticing that
procedural texts are more strongly organized in terms of the types of expectation chains
that give rise to initial purpose clauses than are non-procedural texts. That is, when one
is describing the method for accomplishing a certain end, a convenient way to do this is to
state at the outset what the intended goal is, and then describe how one reaches it. She
concludes that this is precisely what the use of initial purpose clauses accomplishes.

4.1.2.1.1 IMAGENE I would like now to spend a few words on Vander Linden's

work on generating purpose expressions 1992a 1992b 1993a] | discussion of his work is
relevant at this point because he relies on Thompson's ndings.
Vander Linden is interested in generating purpose expressions, which include, besides purpose clauses, for nominalizations , as in \Follow the steps in the illustration below, for desk
installation " 1992a, p.185,ex.3b] and for gerunds , as in \The OFF position is primarily
used for charging the batteries " 1992a, p.185,ex.3c]. Purpose expressions are generated
by traversing two decision networks, 9 the Purpose-Slot network, that determines the position of the purpose expression in the sentence, and the Purpose-Form network, that is
concerned with the form of the expression | purpose clause, for nominalization, or for
gerund.
The Purpose-Slot network places the purpose clause / expression in nal position in most
cases, unless
1. There is more than one action that the purpose pertains to | this is consistent with
Thompson's ndings, in that Thompson notes that the initial purpose clause raises
expectations about the solution to the problem it names, and this solution may often
take a number of clauses or even sentences to describe.
2. The purpose is optional | however, I am not sure how optionality is determined, as
Vander Linden leaves this notion as rather vague.
3. The purpose is contrastive with respect to the previous text.
The Purpose-Form network determines the grammatical form of the purpose expression.
Clearly, there are interactions with the Purpose-Slot network: if the purpose expression's
scope includes more than one action, and therefore the Purpose-Slot network has determined that the purpose expression should be preposed, the to in nitive form is used.
9

To be precise, they are system networks from systemic functional grammar.
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The remainder10 of the Purpose-Form sub-network is based on the observation that instructional text is oriented toward reader actions. Because purpose
clauses / phrases are not reader actions, they tend to be demoted to phrase
status whenever possible. Thus, the purpose-nominal-Form system will realize a prepositional phrase with a nominalization as the complement whenever
possible. ...] Even if a nominalization exists, however, it still may not be used
depending upon the determination of the nominal-complexity system. This
system, based on the examples in our corpus, restricts nominalizations to a
single, non-complex argument. 1992b, p.11-12]
Vander Linden has implemented his results, that are derived form a corpus study of instructional text regarding phone installations, in a generation system called IMAGENE.
IMAGENE's goal is to produce an instructional text generation system that is capable of
taking the output of a planner and producing the appropriate text. IMAGENE's focus is
on the construction of realistic rhetorical structures and the generation of the appropriate
syntactic structure corresponding to them.
Some observations on Vander Linden's work:
1. I disagree with the statement quoted above that purpose clauses / phrases are not
reader actions , as all my 164 purpose clauses do express reader actions. This of
course may depend on the di erent corpora we have looked at, but I suspect that
by reader action Vander Linden means basic actions only, namely, those that are
actually physically executed. Also, from his own analysis | Table 1 in Vander
Linden et al., 1992b, p.11] | it results that only in the 40% of the cases a purpose is
expressed by means of a phrase: this makes the statement they tend to be demoted to
phrase status whenever possible not totally convincing, given that for one reason or
the other in the majority of cases, 60%, purposes are not demoted to phrase status.
2. They distinguish the Precondition and Result relations from Purpose , and they don't
use in nitival to constructions to express the former two. This distinction is linked to
the corresponding relations in Rhetorical Structure Theory, but it seems to me that
purpose expressions can also express Precondition and Result . In fact Vander Linden, 1993a, p.141] explicitly identi es purpose with the expression of the generation
relation. However, in Sec. 5.1, I will show that PCs can express relations other than
generation, and that therefore they could be used also to encode the Precondition
and Result relations.
3. Finally, and more importantly for me, they don't address the issues of the purpose
constraining and augmenting the description of the action described in the main
clause: from the point of view of generating instructions, this would amount to
deciding what can be left out of an action description contained in a main clause
because it can be \easily" inferred from the associated purpose clause.
10

\Remainder" in the sense of \what is not dependent on the Purpose-Slot network".
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4.1.2.2 Balkanski's model
Balkanski in 1992a 1992b 1993] examines the Speaker's (S) and the performing agent's
(G) beliefs and intentions concerning means clauses and rationale clauses, and the relations
between actions expressed in such clauses. Means clauses (MeaCs) express the means by
which an action is performed, as in (4.10a)
(4.10a) John dirtied the carpet by walking across the room.
(4.10b) John walked across the room to dirty the carpet.
As I mentioned in Sec. 4.1.1, rationale clauses are a superset of the PCs I have been talking
about, and, to avoid generating confusion, I will talk about PCs in the following | (4.10b)
contains such a clause.
In my opinion, Balkanski's important contribution is her analysis of S's and G's beliefs and
intentions in the presence of this kind of data, which she mainly collects from narrative text
| the bulk of her corpus is derived from Associated Press data. The main claim Balkanski
puts forward in 1993] is that an account of the meaning of complex utterances about
multiple actions requires consideration of mental states and that the meaning of utterances
with rationale clauses and means clauses consists not only of action descriptions, but also
of beliefs and intentions of the agents involved, regarding these actions and relations among
them.
Before reporting her conclusions, some observations on her notation: refers to the generating action and  to the generated action | see the forthcoming discussion of generation
in Sec. 5.1.2. Therefore, utterances containing a MeaC can be schematized as Do  by
doing , namely, the generating action is described in the MeaC, and the generated
action  in the main clause the converse is true for a clause containing a PC, that can be
schematized as Do to do  .
Balkanski, 1992b] notes that:
1. In both types of utterances, S believes that occurred (depending on tense, is occurring, or will occur) | in fact, in both (4.10a) and (4.10b), S believes that John
walked across the room.
2. In utterances with MeaCs, but not necessarily in those with PCs, S believes that 
occurred (is occurring, will occur) | so in (4.10a) S believes that John dirtied the
carpet, but this is not necessarily the case for (4.10b).
3. In utterances with MeaCs, but not necessarily those with PCs, S believes that
generates  . In fact, the relation between and  in an utterance containing a PC
may be the more general contributes , as Balkanski mentions in 1992a], and as I will
show in the following.
4. In utterances with PCs, but not necessarily those with MeaCs, S believes that was
(is, will be) intended on the part of G | in fact, but he didn't even realize it is a
perfectly good continuation for (4.10a), but slightly puzzling for (4.10b).
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5. In utterances with PCs, but not necessarily those with MeaCs, S believes that  was
(is, will be) intended on the part of G.
6. In utterances with PCs, but not necessarily those with MeaCs, S believes that was
(is, will be) intended on the part of G as a way of generating  . In the PC case,
therefore, but not necessarily in the MeaC case, S believes that G expects (at the
start of action time) the relevant generation-enabling conditions to hold.
Balkanski also presents a processing framework composed of
logical forms that reify actions for example, the LF for (4.10a) is
9 x1 x2 dirty(x2) ^ agt(x2,John) ^ obj(x2, carpet) ^ past(x2) ^ walk(x1) ^
loc(x1,Room) ^ by(x2 x1)
standard axioms about beliefs and intentions
interpretation rules that de ne the meaning of PCs and MeaCs, in terms of the beliefs
and intentions of the speaker and actors. For example, the rule for MeaCs is
LF1: BEL(S,t, by( , ) ! GEN( , ) ^ Occur( ))
The LF1 rule maps the LF representation of means clauses to the generation relation, capturing the fact that the speaker of an utterance with a
means clause believes that the occurrence of the main clause action follows
from that of the adjunct clause action. 1992b, p.300]
In my opinion, Balkanski's processing framework is sucient to support her claims, but
not to shed light on the issues that I am mostly interested in, namely, computing the
constraints that  imposes on in an utterance containing a PC. Consider her example
(4.10b): from such an utterance, we would like to infer that John walked across the room
on the carpet this is an inference analogous to constraining the interpretation of between
two ladders in (2.1b). However, nowhere in her framework does she provide the means to
account for this kind of inference.
I will return to her work in Secs. 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, when discussing generation and enablement.

4.1.3 Discourse functions of Purpose Clauses
There are several dimensions along which PCs may be viewed. One is the general functions
they perform in discourse. Another is the kinds of actions they describe still another is
what kind of relations between actions they express.
Regarding the functions that PCs perform in discourse, the reader should by now be
convinced that S uses a purpose clause to explain to H the goal  to whose achievement
the execution of contributes. Thompson nesses this by attributing di erent functions
to purpose clauses according to their position in the sentence. As I showed above, such
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di erent functions are after all not so clear cut besides, I think they fall out of the possible
relation holding between and  , as I will show in Sec. 5.1.4.2.
As I already mentioned in previous chapters, purpose clauses perform another very important function, that of expressing that the goal  constrains the interpretation of .
This e ect is very clear in examples such as (2.1b) | Place a plank between two ladders
to create a simple scaold | and (2.2b) | Cut the square in half along the diagonal to
create two triangles , discussed in Ch. 2. However, it is present in basically every example,
in that the purpose clause often provides the degree or the temporal extent to which
has to be performed, as in (4.11), where the quantity of heat applied and the rate of the
heating process are a ected by the goal to soften the adhesive :
(4.11) If the tiles don't come up easily, warm them up to soften the adhesive.
As far as the actions and  are concerned, given that a purpose clause expresses the goal
to which the action described in the main clause contributes, there is a sense that is in
some kind of hierarchical relation to  . In fact, purpose clauses relate action descriptions
at di erent levels of abstraction, such as a physical action and an abstract process, or two
physical actions, but at di erent levels of granularity in (4.12) 11 vacuum and dust-mop
can be seen as specializations of clean :
(4.12) Vacuum or dust-mop your parquet to clean

it.

Once one has de ned one's corpus to be limited to Do to do  | and of course To do
 , do | where both and  are actions, it is useful to have a closer look at what kinds
of goals can appear as  . Table 4.1 shows the three classes of goals I found.
bring about
event
create others
IPCs
3
63
FPCs
5
46
8
109

prevent
event
7
14
21

a ect
H's knowledge
12
85
14
79
26
164

Table 4.1: Distribution of Purpose Clauses

Bring about event. Most examples |117, namely, 71%| are occurrences of the most
obvious type of goal, namely, causing an event to happen in the world.

11

(4.12) is a constructed example.
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Among the examples of  describing events happening in the world, I singled out
the few (only 8, which amounts to 4% of the total, and 6% of this type) that pertain
to the creation of an object 12 | they are labelled as create in the table. From a
discourse processing point of view, interpreting purpose clauses of this kind a ects
the discourse model by introducing new referents. This happens when the e ect of
is to create a new object, and  identi es it. Verbs frequently used in this context
include create, make, form.
(4.13) Join the short ends of the hat band to form a circle.
Similarly, in Ex. (2.2b) the discourse referent for the triangles created by cutting the
square in half is introduced.

Prevent event. The purpose clause may inform H that the world should not change,

namely, that a given event should be prevented from happening | I have 21 such
examples, corresponding to 12% of the total:
(4.14) Tape raw edges of fabric to prevent threads from raveling as you work.
Verbs used are prevent, avoid . These example are interesting in that they make
possible side-e ects of actions explicit, and are therefore related to certain kinds of
negative imperatives | see Sec. 4.2.

Aect H's knowledge. In 26 examples out of 164 |16% of the total| the PC expresses

a change that will a ect H's knowledge, rather than the world: by executing , H
can change the state of his knowledge with respect either to the value of a certain
entity or of a certain proposition.
There are 17 examples, or 65% of this class, of the rst kind, in which the goal
describes ascertaining the value of an entity:
(4.15) You may want to hang a coordinating border around the room at the top of
the walls. To determine the amount of border, measure the width (in feet)
of all walls to be covered and divide by three. Since borders are sold by the yard,
this will give you the number of yards needed.
Notice that in (4.15) the referent for amount of border is introduced. These examples
have an e ect on the discourse model similar to those belonging to the create subclass:
in fact, although the NP object of determine, establish etc. is generally de nite, in
only one case does it refer to a referent already established in the discourse model.

I found very few examples in which an object is destroyed, and they generally regard stains or spills
to be removed. This may be a characteristic of the kind of instructional text I have examined. Of course
even in examples such as (2.2b) the square doesn't exist any more after the cutting action, but it is still
possible to refer to it.
12
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The 9 examples that concern ascertaining the value of a proposition involve verbs
such as check, make sure etc. followed by a that-complement describing a state .
The use of such verbs has the pragmatic e ect that not only does H check whether
 holds, but, if  doesn't hold, he will also do something so that  comes to hold.
(4.16) To attach the wires to the new switch, use the paper clip to move the spring
type clip aside and slip the wire into place. Tug gently on each wire to make

sure it's secure.

4.1.4 Expressing purpose with dierent connectives
In this section, I will discuss an informal experiment that I ran to get a rst handle on some
questions related to the pragmatic functions of PCs. The results are very preliminary, but
I report them because they suggest some interesting research directions.
A couple of observations that I found in Huettner et al., 1987, p.208-209] seem to me
to deserve further consideration | notice that in the following quote the terms Rationale
Clause and Purpose Clause are used in their syntactic sense:
Easily confused with the purpose clause is the rationale clause (RatC), also
known as an \in order to" clause or result clause. ... A RatC reading may
always be paraphrased with in order ... Finally, RatC are daughters of S, and
not of VP, and may therefore be preposed alone ((4.17b)) or otherwise isolated
from the VP ((4.17c)):13
(4.17a) Helga carries a hat pin to protect herself.
(4.17b) To protect herself, Helga carries a hat pin.
(4.17c) What Helga does to protect herself is carry a hat pin.
The two questions arising from the previous quote are then:
1. Whether it is true that a PC (RatC) can always be paraphrased with in order to .
2. Whether there is any pragmatic di erence between pre- and postposed PCs: the
discussion on Thompson's ndings in Sec. 4.1.2.1 already pointed out that this is the
case, even if syntactically (4.17a) and (4.17b) are both acceptable.
Another hypothesis I wanted to test is the following: it had been brought to my attention
that PCs could be paraphrased with so as to and with in order to , but that not both
paraphrases were always acceptable. This observation is rather surprising, given that for
instance in The American Heritage Electronic Dictionary, 1991, the two are considered
interchangeable: so as to is de ned as in order to , and in order to as for the purpose of
so that .
14

13
14

My numbering.
Mark Steedman, p.c. Sheila Rock, p.c.
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Finally, another question is whether a paraphrase with a Means Clause | MeaC for
short, a gerund introduced by by | is felicitous, modulo Balkanski's observations about
the di erent beliefs and intentions conveyed by the di erent connectives.
I ran an informal experiment in which I asked 11 native speakers to judge the pragmatic
felicity of various possible paraphrases on 10 of my naturally occurring examples the
judgements were on the scale 0-3], with 0 totally unacceptable, and 3 totally felicitous. 8
informants answered, although one of them didn't answer all the questions.
I distinguished nal and initial purpose clauses. As far as FPCs | Do to do  | are
concerned, I proposed 6 examples, each with 4 possible paraphrases: one paraphrase each
for so as to and in order to , as in (4.18b) and (4.18c), and two for the by paraphrase |
one corresponding to the original order, the other that locates the adjunct in the preferred
postposed position | as in (4.18d) and (4.18e). (4.18a) is the naturally occurring example.
(4.18a) Line the tub with cardboard to prevent debris from clogging the drain.

so as to prevent debris from clogging the drain.
(4.18c) Line the tub with cardboard in order to prevent debris from clogging the drain.
(4.18d) By lining the tub with cardboard prevent debris from clogging the drain.
(4.18e) Prevent debris from clogging the drain by lining the tub with cardboard.
(4.18b) Line the tub with cardboard

I proposed 4 examples of initial PC | To do  do
paraphrases:

| and for each of them three

To hang the wallpaper, follow the steps on page 47.
(4.19b) So as to hang the wallpaper, follow the steps on page 47.
(4.19c) In order to hang the wallpaper, follow the steps on page 47.
(4.19d) Hang the wallpaper by following the steps on page 47.

(4.19a)

The results are plotted, by connective, in Figs. 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and by nal / initial PC in
Fig. 4.4. In all plots, each point represents the cumulative number of judgements, summed
across all informants, for that level of judgement: the total number of judgements is 48
for FPCs (actually it is 47 for the paraphrase with a MeaC in initial position), and 29 for
IPCs. The data of the experiment are reported in Appendix B.
Although the numbers here are too small, I would like to point out some suggestive, if not
de nitive, conclusions.
As far as the connectives go, the results suggest:
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of Final and Initial PCs
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So as to. Consider Fig. 4.1. The distributions of judgements for paraphrases with so as

to in the case of FPCs and IPCs are considerably di erent. I split the judgements
into two categories, summing up on the one hand 0's and 1's, and on the other 2's
and 3's: in the case of FPC a paraphrase with so as to is considered acceptable in
70% of the cases, but in the case of IPC only in 24% of the cases. This di erence is
signi cant, as it was con rmed by running the 2 test, which yield p < .001.

In order to. The hypothesis that PCs can always be paraphrased with in order to is basi-

cally borne out. In particular, a paraphrase with in order to is considered acceptable
in 75% of the cases for FPCs, and in 97% of the cases for IPCs. The di erence between these two distributions is signi cant, p < 0.02. Below I will discuss the cases
in which a paraphrase of an FPC with in order to is not considered as good.

By. In FPCs, the acceptability for a paraphrase in which the MeaC is in initial position is

very low, being only 10%. It is much higher for the paraphrase in which the MeaC
is in nal position: 64%. The statistical signi cance is very high, p < .001.
In the case of an initial PC, the acceptability is 79%.

I'll turn now to the distributions of the di erent connectives separately for FPCs and IPCs.
In my opinion, the two graphs in Fig. 4.4 are quite striking.

FPCs The judgement distributions for so as to and in order to are very similar, and in

fact the di erence between these two distributions is not statistically signi cant. The
judgement distribution for a MeaC in nal position doesn't seem to suggest anything
on whether this kind of paraphrase is generally acceptable or not however, there
is a signi cant di erence with the two distributions for so as to and in order to |
p < .001.
Finally, the judgement distribution for MeaC in initial position shows that this is
not an acceptable paraphrase. We already saw that the di erence between such
distribution and the distribution for MeaC in nal position is statistically signi cant
such di erence is also signi cant with respect to the distributions for in order to and
so as to in this graph, p < .001.

IPCs It is so as to that becomes unacceptable, while in order to and MeaCs have very

similar distributions. However, the di erence between the latter two is still statistically signi cant, p < .05. The di erence with the distribution of so as to is vastly
greater, p < .001.

Thus, the answers to the three questions I set up at the beginning appear to be:
1. It is true that PCs can be paraphrased (almost) always with in order to .
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2. There is no signi cant di erence between paraphrases with so as to and in order to
for FPCs however, so as to becomes unacceptable in the case of IPCs. This latter
e ect may actually be due to other factors, such that so as to may require a discourse
context to link into | in Ex. (4.20) so as to seems more acceptable:
(4.20) There are a few problems with washing this fabric: so as to avoid the color
running, wash it in cold water.
3. As far as paraphrases with MeaCs are concerned, those with the MeaC in initial
position are not acceptable. In general it appears that for both IPCs and FPCs the
paraphrase with a MeaC in nal position is acceptable, although it is not judged as
good as the paraphrases with in nitival connectives.
A last remark on a paraphrase with a MeaC in the case of an IPC: often the scope of
an IPC will encompass more than just the following main clause, namely, the pattern
will be: To do  , do 1  do 2  ... do n . The question is then, what should the
paraphrase with a MeaC be, Do  by doing 1  do 2 , ... , do n or Do  by doing
1 , 2, ... , n ? In my experiment, I had one such example, and I proposed both
alternatives to my informants, although the graphs in Figs. 4.3 and 4.4 only include
the former. In any case, the judgements were not enlightening, as informants judged
the two paraphrases exactly in the same way, with 4 considering both unacceptable
and 3 considering both acceptable | see page 193 in Appendix B.
Clearly these results ask for an explanation in terms of the semantics/ pragmatics functions
of the connectives and the actions described | I will try such an analysis in Sec. 5.1.4.2,
after I discuss relations between actions.
Let me conclude by pointing out the two cases of FPC in which the paraphrase with in
order to was considered less acceptable than in other cases. The rst one is
(4.21a) Work to nish half a room at a time .
(4.21b) Work

so as to nish half a room at a time .

(4.21c) Work

in order to nish half a room at a time .

(4.21d)

By working nish half a room at a time.

(4.21e) Finish half a room at a time by working.
I think (4.21a) is an anomalous case, in that 7 informants out of 8 judged the paraphrase
with in order to unacceptable, and 8 out of 8 the one with the nal MeaC unacceptable.
Instead, so as to was judged acceptable by 5 informants out of 8. I think the in nitival to
here really conveys a sense of performing in a certain way , rather than to achieve  .
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The other problematic example is
(4.22a)
(4.22b)
(4.22c)
(4.22d)
(4.22e)

Go into the kitchen to get me the coee urn .
Go into the kitchen so as to get me the coee urn .
Go into the kitchen in order to get me the coee urn .
By going into the kitchen get me the coee urn .
Get me the coee urn by going into the kitchen.

Also in this case basically every paraphrase was poorly judged: 6 unacceptable for so as to ,
4 unacceptable for in order to , 6 unacceptable for a nal MeaC. However, here I think the
results are strongly linked to the relation between actions that is expressed by the purpose
clause, as I will explain in Sec. 5.1.4.2.

4.2 Negative Imperatives
The reader may recollect that negative imperatives, by telling the agent what he should not
do, are one explicit way of identifying and pruning the choices an agent is faced with while
acting. In Sec. 2.2, I put forward the hypotheses that a negative imperative is produced
1. When S expects H to overlook a choice point. The choice point is sometimes identi ed
through a side e ect that the wrong choice will cause.
2. When S expects H to choose the wrong alternative among many, possibly in nite,
ones. Namely, S expects H to be aware of that choice point, or to become aware of
it while executing the instructions.
In this chapter, I will show how such hypotheses are borne out by showing the correlation
between two particular surface forms and the two hypotheses above.

4.2.1 Corpus
I collected data from the same two \how-to-do" books I used for purpose clauses, plus a
few from detergent and toiletry containers. I collected 70 instances of negative imperatives,
that I have divided into two classes: negative imperatives proper, characterized either by
the negative auxiliary don't 15, or by negative polarity items, such as never and nothing the
other class is formed by verbs such as take care, be sure and the like { TC verbs for short
{ followed by a negative in nitival complement, such as \not to ...", or \to ... negative
polarity item ...". I will call the former class of imperatives the DONT type and the latter
the neg-TC type.
The 70 instances are distributed as follows | Table 4.2 summarizes the distribution:
15
I am not distinguishing between don't and do not. See Horn, 1989] for an analysis of the dierences
between the semantics of the contracted and non contracted forms.
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43 instances of the DONT type, of which 39 with the auxiliary don't, and 4 with
never :16
(4.23) Your sheet vinyl oor may be vinyl asbestos, which is no longer on the market.
Don't sand it or tear it up17 because this will put dangerous asbestos bers
into the air. It must be covered over.
(4.24) Never mix cleaners containing acid or ammonia with chlorine bleach.
The chemical reaction releases the chlorine as a poisonous gas.
27 examples of the neg-TC type:
{ 4 with take care
(4.25) To book the strip, fold the bottom third or more of the strip over the
middle of the panel, pasted sides together, taking care not to crease the

wallpaper sharply at the fold.

{ 3 with be sure or make sure:18
{

(4.26) To wash, load clothes into tub, making sure not to over ll it.
20 with be careful
(4.27) If your plans call for replacing the wood base molding with vinyl cove
molding, be careful not to damage the walls as you remove the wood
base.
DONT
Neg-TC
don't never take care make sure be careful
39
4
4
3
20
43
27
Table 4.2: Distribution of Negative Imperatives

4.2.2 Negative Imperatives in the literature
Negation has been the subject of intense study in the semantics and pragmatics literature, as the volume by Horn 1989] shows for some more recent work on the topic, see
Moser, 1992]. However, negative imperatives have not received much attention, neither in
semantics and pragmatics, nor in computational linguistics, for reasons that are in a sense
complementary.
16
There are 3 further instances of DONT imperative that negate the verb forget : I haven't included them
in my analysis, as a verb such as forget is used to tell H to adopt an intention to do , as in Don't forget
to bed these tiles in , rather than to prevent H from doing .
17
Five of the DONT instances are actually disjunctions I counted them as one instance rather than two.
18
I have a further example in which the argument to be sure describes a state, Be sure that no adhesive
has seeped through the joint. I won't consider it in the following.
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In semantics and pragmatics, negation has been studied a lot, but imperatives haven't. As
Merin, 1991] points out, in linguistics the only current monograph on English imperatives
is Davies, 1986], which in fact includes a chapter on negative imperatives other work
on imperatives is Schmerling, 1982]. In philosophy, an extensive study of imperatives is
Hamblin, 1987].
On the contrary, in the computational linguistics literature, positive imperatives have
received lots of attention | Alterman et al., 1991], Chapman, 1991], Cohen and Levesque,
1990], Vere and Bickmore, 1990], Winograd, 1972] | but not so negative imperatives,
with the exception of Vere and Bickmore, 1990]. Besides, to my knowledge not much
work has been done on interpreting negation per se: an exception is Iwanska, 1992], that
represents negation as a complement operator in a Boolean algebra. However, her model
only deals with declarative sentences and it is not clear how it would apply to imperatives.
In the following, I will review Hamblin, 1987 Davies, 1986] Vere and Bickmore, 1990]
was described in Sec. 3.3.3, where I also briey discussed the way negative commands are
dealt with: they are considered as global constraints on the goals the system may adopt.

4.2.2.1 Hamblin
Hamblin includes under imperatives a variety of linguistic constructions, that in some way
convey imperative content, including indirect speech acts Searle, 1975] of the kind
(4.28) Jones, I want you to take charge of Division 4 .
The semantics of imperatives is given in terms of possible worlds:19
Hamblin] adopts a 'possible-world' semantics for propositional content, sorted
into states and state changes (ordered pairs of states), the latter again partitioned into acts causally attributable to agents ('deeds') and mere happenings.
All of these are ultimately de ned as subsets of possible worlds. To distinguish
proper | that is, intended viz. 'intensional' | satisfaction of an imperative
from merely 'extensional', possibly accidental satisfaction, Hamblin introduces
the notion of strategy: a function allocating a deed to each time/context pair.
The interpretation of an imperative | its 'addressee action reduction' | is
given by the weakest partial strategy (the disjunction of all partial strategies)
which keeps the addressee within the set of possible worlds designated by the
propositional content. Merin, 1991, 674-675]
As far as negation is concerned, Hamblin claims that ' ve di erent and independent negations' can apply to imperatives. Without examining all of them, I would just like to point
out that Hamblin draws a di erence between negation applied to a stative predicate, such
as Be here at lunch , whose negation speci es the complementary end-state and negation
19

I will actually rely on Merin, 1991] to discuss Hamblin, 1987].

60

applied to action-specifying predicates, which changes an instruction such as Run from a
request to carry out that action into one to refrain from doing it, Don't run .
Notice the di erence between the two: the stative be here at lunch is understood to mean
roughly Take steps to be here at lunch , whereas Don't be here at lunch does not mean
(roughly) Don't take steps to be here at lunch .
One could thus conclude that Don't be here at lunch is interpreted as Take steps not to
be here at lunch , namely, that negation takes narrow scope: the di erences in meaning
determined by the di erent possible scopes of negation have been an important base for all
the work on the semantics on negation Horn, 1989], and they will become relevant again
in Davies's analysis described in the following.

4.2.2.2 Davies
In her monograph on imperatives 1986], Davies rst of all notices, as Hamblin also does,
that imperatives are not only used to convey commands or requests, but also pleas, exhortation, invitations, o ers, advice, warnings, and instructions. She notices that instructions
seem closer to advice in that they too are not aimed at getting H to do something, but
rather, they tell him how to do something. According to Davies, instructions di er from
advice in suggesting a recognized means to an end, one which will guarantee success.
She also observes that scholars such as Schmerling, 1982] suggest that
all uses of imperatives have in common that they constitute an attempt to bring
about a state of a airs in which the proposition expressed by the imperative
is true. However, de nitions like this seem to make reference, not so much
to the imperative's illocutionary force, but rather to its perlocutionary e ect.
They fail to draw the important distinction between the actual intentions of
the speaker and the intentions of what the imperative utterance constitutes
an expression it is after all possible that a speaker, in using an imperative to
order someone to do something, is in fact attempting to get him to do quite
the opposite, knowing that he is somewhat contrary by nature. p.39]
Davies suggests that the contrast is that while a declarative sentence asserts a proposition,
an imperative sentence merely presents one. According to Davies, there is a convention
governing the utterance of imperatives, similar to the convention of truthfulness underlying the use of declaratives. While the speaker who utters a declarative which asserts a
proposition p is conventionally assumed to accept that p is true, the speaker who utters an
imperative which presents a proposition p is conventionally assumed to accept p's being
made true.
In this context her account of negative imperatives goes as follows. First of all, she notices
that many scholars nd negative imperatives somewhat peculiar, as, while an imperative
puts forward some sort of action for the addressee to perform, the presence of negation is
somehow incompatible with this function.
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She notices that other researchers, while recognizing the di erence between internal and
external negation, don't think that such distinction applies to negative imperatives in
particular Lyons, 1977] questions whether there are two interpretations for negative imperatives, paraphrasable respectively as
(4.29a) I (hereby) impose upon you the obligation not to make it so that

p holds
(4.29b) I (hereby) impose upon you the obligation to make it so that not-p holds.
She reports that Lyons argues that the second of these interpretations is not typical of
negative imperatives, which function as prohibitions, and are used 'not normally ... as
instructions to carry out, but to refrain from carrying out, some course of action'. Lyons
rejects the latter interpretation on the grounds that 'The speaker does not want the addressee to bring about a state-of-a airs of which not-p is true for this state-of-a airs
already exists'. Davies notices that while this is certainly true of the situation Lyons
envisages, in which S wants to forbid H to do something he apparently intends to do, a
prohibition may equally well serve to tell someone to stop doing something he is already
engaged in: Don't be so silly may serve the same purpose as Stop being so silly . In such
cases, S's intention seems to be just that rejected by Lyons, namely that H bring about a
state of a airs where not-p is true, since it is not true at the moment of utterance.
Moreover, it seems to me that the interpretation in (4.29b) is the intended reading for the
interpretation of the stative Don't be here at lunch , as Hamblin suggests.
Davies then suggests that the di erence is rather between cases where S is rejecting as
undesirable a type of behaviour which she thinks H may exhibit, and cases where she is
prescribing a case of behaviour which she considers appropriate for H to exhibit. Davies
notices that negation may be associated either with the presentation constituted by the
imperative, or with the particular proposition which is presented she concludes that the
di erence between the two possible interpretations lies, not in the type of action implied,
whether doing or not-doing, but in S's attitude towards the possible action presented.
When negation is associated with the presentation, its utterance will constitute a rejection
of the possibility rather than an acceptance of it. On the other hand, in case negation is
understood as associated with the proposition that is presented, the presentation is not
a ected by the presence of the negation, and therefore its utterance will still constitute an
expression of the acceptance of a possibility it is simply that the possibility presented as
acceptable will be one of something's not being done.
While the most common interpretation of imperatives is the former, namely, negation
attached to the presentation, the latter explains usages such as the following:
(4.30a) A: I don't think I'll go to the party.
(4.30b) B: All right, don't go then, if you don't want to.
In uttering the imperative in (4.30b), the speaker is clearly expressing, not a rejection of
the possibility of the addressee's going, but rather her acceptance of his not going.
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4.2.3 Dierent uses for dierent Negative Imperatives
The semantic distinctions described above don't seem to be particularly relevant to my
data, where what is negated is always an action.
Therefore, the intended meaning always seems to be (4.29a), I (hereby) impose upon you
the obligation not to make it so that p holds (in Lyons's terms), or a rejection of the
possibility that the proposition becomes true , in Davies's terms. Moreover, it is clear that a
DONT imperative could be used when a neg-TC one is used: an expression like take care
not to do entails don't do .20 In fact, in terse instructions only DONT imperatives are
found.
However, in the instructional text I have examined, there are pragmatic distinctions between the usages of DONT and neg-TC imperative: DONT imperatives are used when
S expects H to choose a wrong alternative, while neg-TC imperatives are used when S
expects H to overlook a choice point. The distinction between di erent scopes of negation
could be relevant to these di erent usages, if the scope of negation is considered with respect to some kind of INTEND operator used to represent the intentions that H adopts |
see Sec. 4.2.3.2.
That there are indeed pragmatic factors a ecting the choice of a surface form versus the
other is shown by the infelicitous usage of a { really occurring! { DONT imperative:
(4.31) # If you must replace a tile, rst cut around the edges with a circular saw. Set the
blade to the depth of the tile and don't damage adjoining tiles.
The previous example is not felicitous because, in the context of an assembly task, damage
is not a choice that an agent has at his disposal, but rather, it is a side e ect that may
derive from certain choices in executing cut edges with a saw : therefore neg-TC would be
more appropriate than DONT.

4.2.3.1 Speaker's expectations and Hearer's choices
DONT imperatives. Don't do appears to be used when S thinks that H is likely to

come to a choice point, and intentionally choose one course of action over another. Some
situations in which this can happen are:
When S provides H with general goals, or with rules of behavior to be always adopted
in certain circumstances, as in (4.23) above another example is

(4.32) You can put parquet down over a variety of surfaces, whether old or new,
if they are rm, clean, smooth, and dry. Don't put parquet down on a

surface that is below ground level because of the moisture problem.

20
It is not clear what entails really means here, given that instructions are dicult to model in the usual
model-theoretic semantics. I am using this term in an intuitive sense.
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Another circumstance in which S may use a DONT imperative is when is an
undesirable alternative to a  that S tells H to do, as in
(4.33) Caring for the oor. A good paste wax - not a water-based wax - will give
added protection to the wood. Bu about twice a year wax about once a year.
Excessive waxing can cause wax to build up, detracting from the oor appearance.
Dust-mop or vacuum your parquet oor as you would carpeting. Do not scrub

or wet-mop the parquet.

Clearly, S thinks that H, after adopting the intention of cleaning the parquet, may
choose to do so in a wrong way. Using a neg-TC verb in this case would be infelicitous,
as it would seem to imply that H could unintentionally choose to perform either scrub
or wet-mop. Notice that in this example the general goal that H has to adopt, namely,
cleaning the parquet , is essential to interpret the negative imperative (and for that
matter the previous sentence too): in fact H has rst to understand that dust-mop,
vacuum, scrub, wet-mop, all achieve cleaning the parquet and that, although the
last two, scrub and wet-mop, may in general be performed to achieve a goal such as
cleaning oor, they are not a viable alternative in this case.
Don't do can be used to tell H that an action  should not be followed by , in
particular if a ects the outcome of  . Consider:
(4.34) Use a vinyl-to-vinyl paste for any type of border you plan to hang over wallpaper. To paste the border for hanging, cover the entire back with paste and book
the strip don't crease the folds.
Actually, in this case it is less clear whether creasing the folds can be seen in terms of
an intentional choice point. Rather, the usage of a DONT imperative seems to imply
that the two actions of booking the strip and creasing the folds are independent: as
we will see in (4.39b), the latter can also be seen as a culmination of the former.

Neg-TC imperatives. In general, neg-TC imperatives are used when S expects H to

overlook a certain choice point such choice point may be identi ed through a possible side
e ect. Moreover, a neg-TC is used when S relates the negated action to another action
 in the discourse. A form like \Do . Take care not to do " appears to be used when
is an undesirable way of performing  . The description of  is always underspeci ed, and therefore H has many degrees of freedom in executing it. Consider

(4.35) To make a piercing cut, rst drill a hole in the waste stock on the interior of
the pattern. The diameter of the hole must be larger than the width of the blade.
If you want to save the waste stock for later use, drill the hole near a corner in
the pattern. Be careful not to drill through the pattern line.
 is drill a hole near a corner in the pattern. The interpretation of near still leaves
H some choices as regards the exact position where to drill: S constrains them by
saying Be careful not to drill through the pattern line.
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is an undesirable e ect of  , which may be under H's control, or under the control
of external laws, as in (2.13), repeated here for convenience:
(4.36) To hang the border, begin at the least conspicuous corner. The work will go
much faster if you have someone hold the folded section while you apply the
border to the wall. Take care not to drip paste onto the wall.
There are in nite ways of executing hanging the border  some of them will have
dripping paste onto the wall as a side e ect. S tells H to take active steps in order to
avoid such a side e ect.

4.2.3.2 Intentionality
So far, I have claimed that S's expectations on H's choice points a ect the surface form of
a negative imperative. S's expectations are reected in whether S sees the actor, namely
H, as an intentional one: which brings me to briey discuss whether the verb expressing
the negated action encodes intentionality in the agent role.
In general, verbs are ambiguous in this respect consider the well-known ambiguity of roll :
(4.37) Bill rolled down the hill
where Bill may or may not be performing the action volitionally.
It seems that any Actor, if animate, is subject to this ambiguity, unless the
verb speci cally selects for a volitional Agent, as do, for instance, buy and look.
Jackendo , 1990, p. 128]
With respect to negative imperatives, consider how roll behaves: if roll is taken in its non
volitional reading, negative imperatives pattern as follows:
(4.38a) # Don't roll down the hill.
(4.38b) f Take care / make sure / be sure / be careful g not to roll down the hill.
However, if we take roll in its volitional interpretation, the judgements seem to be reversed.
From this we could infer that DONT selects for intentional readings of verbs, TC for
unintentional ones.
This is another account for the infelicity of (4.31) above. In the context of assembly
instructions, damage is an action that an agent doesn't perform intentionally | therefore,
there is a conict between what don't selects for and the unintentional reading of damage .
Tying this back to S's expectations on H's choices, notice that an action description can
always be further constrained therefore, even if a verb selects for a volitional agent, its
modi ers can bring in aspects of choice that the agent may not be aware of. Consider
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(4.35) again: while an agent will drill intentionally, what he can do unintentionally is to
overlook the exact location of the drilling site. Contrast (4.35) with (4.33): in the latter,
using a form such as take care not to scrub or wet-mop would be infelicitous, as it seems to
imply that the agent could choose either scrubbing or wet-mopping by accident. Therefore,
the usage of a neg-TC imperative draws H's attention to the possibly unintentional aspects
of the action to be performed.
The e ect of intentionality on the choice of surface form suggests that the two di erent
negative imperatives can be modelled as exhibiting di erent scopes of negation with respect
to some INTEND operator 21 that represents H's intentions: a DONT imperative would
be interpreted as NOT (INTEND (H p)) , a neg-TC one as INTEND(H, NOT(p)) .22
This representation makes clear that, in the case of a DONT imperative, H adopts the
intention to do p independently from the negative imperative itself, either because it has
been inferred from the previous text, or because it is a choice that comes up while executing
the instructions in a sense, the intention is given, already mutually known to both S and
H.
In the case of a neg-TC imperative, instead, the intention of doing p has not arisen yet, and
S communicates to H that in fact a new intention should be adopted, of doing / achieving
NOT(p) .
Clearly this idea is very preliminary. Also the idea that the lexical semantics of verbs
a ects the usage of don't or a negated TC verb requires further investigation, as in certain
cases, the negated verb seems to be at odds with the choice of the negative element: for
example, a verb like forget is by default read in its unintentional meaning. Nevertheless,
the unmarked form is don't forget, while take care not to forget is marked, and means take
active steps | e.g. notes | not to forget.

4.2.3.3 Action relatedness
Another factor that seems to a ect the choice of DONT over neg-TC is whether S sees
the negated action as closely related to another action  in the discourse. Consider the
contrast between
(4.39a) To paste the border for hanging, cover the entire back with paste and book the
strip don't crease the folds.
(4.39b) To book the strip, fold the bottom third or more of the strip over the middle of the
panel, pasted sides together, taking care not to crease the wallpaper sharply

at the fold.

In (4.39a), creasing is seen as an independent action from booking , with the former following
the latter in (4.39b), crease is seen as one possible culmination of fold, and therefore, much
more closely related to it.
21
22

No commitment to any formalism here!
Christine Nakatani, p.c.
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Action relatedness clearly a ects the structure of the discourse: in Ex. (4.39a), crease the
folds is presented as at \the same level" that book the strip is, therefore, in a tree representation of discourse, 23 the nodes representing the two actions would be sisters instead, in
Ex. (4.39b), crease the folds is presented as subordinate to folding , and therefore the node
corresponding to the latter would be in a dominance relation to the node corresponding
to the former.

4.3 Summary
In this chapter, I have presented a pragmatic analysis of purpose clauses and negative
imperatives. I would like to conclude by pointing out some tighter connections between
the two than just the theoretical ones that they are both related to the choices that
the agent adopts, and that they both shed some light on the claim that goals direct the
accommodation process.
The tighter connection between purpose clauses and negative imperatives comes from the
interaction of negation, imperatives and purpose clauses.
1. First of all, we may consider Negative PCs, namely Do not to do  . I have no
examples of a negative purpose clauses per se such examples would seem to require a
semantic analysis like in (4.29b), I (hereby) impose upon you the obligation to make
it so that not-p holds . However, as I mentioned in Sec. 4.1.3, a PC may express
negation, in a sense, by describing a goal of preventing an event from happening. On
the semantics of prevention see for example Ortiz, 1993].
2. We could also have a negative main clause associated with a PC, namely, Don't do
to do  , as in
(4.40) Don't use chemicals to clean your parquet.
The previous example is made up, as I have no natural occurrences of such pattern
however is seems perfectly plausible. Such example raises various possible questions,
including
The presence of negation seems to strongly suggest that the purpose clause is
not used to express a goal, but rather, the circumstances in which a certain
cleaner should not be used. Negation seems to transform the instruction from
a command to do something into a general policy to adopt in certain circumstances. An issue worth exploring is how this a ects the interpretation of the
PC.
Can a neg-TC imperative appear as the main clause associated to a Purpose
Clause? Intuitively it would seem impossible, as the purpose clause expresses
a goal that should become object of H's intentions, while a neg-TC points to
23
On the tree representation of discourse see among others Grosz and Sidner, 1986 Polanyi, 1988 Mann
and Thompson, 1988].
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unintentional aspects of an action. However, analysis of a much bigger corpus
is necessary to check whether this intuition is plausible.
As I already mentioned, my analysis of Purpose Clauses is much more developed than the
one of Negative Imperatives. Therefore, for the rest of this document I will concentrate on
computational issues arising from PCs.
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Chapter 5

Purpose Clauses: computational
consequences
In Chapter 2 I emphasized the role that goals play in the accommodation process as applied
to instruction interpretation. I also claimed that such inferences are exempli ed in a
particularly clear way when the goal is explicitly expressed, as in the case of purpose
clauses. In this chapter, I will use my analysis of purpose clauses to follow up on these
claims, and on the others that I put forward in the introduction. More speci cally, through
my analysis of purpose clauses:
by showing that  constrains , I give support to the claim that there is no direct
mapping between NL action descriptions and stored knowledge
by shedding light on some necessary accommodation inferences, I support the claim
that the mapping between surface form and stored knowledge must be computed ,
and that goals guide this computation
nally, I suggest speci c characteristics for the action representation formalism. In
fact, purpose clauses appear to express generation or enablement, supporting the
proposal, made by Allen, 1984], Pollack, 1986], Grosz and Sidner, 1990], Balkanski,
1993], that these two relations are necessary to model actions.
The main aim of this chapter is to describe the relations between actions that purpose
clauses express, and the inference processes that their interpretation requires. I will conclude by describing the consequences of these data for my computational approach.

5.1 Relations between actions
So far, I have mentioned that contributes to achieving the goal  . The notion of contribution can be made more speci c by examining naturally occurring purpose clauses. They
mainly express generation, in some cases enablement, and in few remaining cases other
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relations that still need to be properly de ned | see Sec. 5.1.4.4. Grosz and Sidner in
1990, p.431] have already observed that
Contribute is a place holder for any relation ... that can hold between actions
when one can be said to contribute (for example, by generating or enabling) to
the performance of the other.

However, Grosz and Sidner don't provide any evidence in terms of naturally occurring data
to support the statement that contribute can be instantiated as generation or enablement .
Analogously, Balkanski 1990 1992a 1993] does use her formalization of generation and
enablement to model rationale and means clauses, but she doesn't present very detailed
evidence from naturally occurring data to justify such choices.

5.1.1 Abstraction
As I mentioned in Sec. 4.1.3, purpose clauses relate actions at di erent levels of abstraction.
One would then expect to nd examples in which and  are simply related by an
abstraction relation, that could be de ned in intuitive terms as
ISA  ] =) OCCURS( ) ;! OCCURS( )]
8    ;!

In Ex. (4.12) | Vacuum or dust-mop your parquet to clean it | vacuum parquet cannot
occur without cleaning parquet occurring too. However, no example in my corpus simply
expresses abstraction | (4.12) is constructed. It seems that abstraction would rather be
expressed with a MeaC:
(5.1) Clean your parquet by vacuuming or dust-mopping it.
Also, an IPC would be more felicitous:
(5.2) To clean your parquet, vacuum or dust-mop it.
It seems that the notions of given and new could be relevant to explaining the fact that
PCs, or at least FPCs, don't generally express abstraction. In fact, notice that if
ISA 
;!

then the information provided by  is already provided by : in Ex. (4.12), the purpose
clause to clean it does not add any new information with respect to the main clause vacuum
or dust-mop your parquet . Instead, in Exs. (5.1) and (5.2), the MeaC and the postposed
main clause respectively describe which of the possible specializations of cleaning should
be performed.
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5.1.2 Generation
Generation is a relation between actions, where by actions here I mean action occurrences.
Generation has been extensively studied, rst in philosophy by Goldman 1970], and then in
discourse analysis by Allen 1984], Pollack 1986], Grosz and Sidner 1986 1990], Balkanski
1990 1993].
According to Goldman, intuitively generation is the relation between actions conveyed by
the preposition by in English { turning on the light by ipping the switch. 1
Goldman distinguishes among four kinds of generation relations. Subsequent work has
been mainly inuenced by conditional generation. In particular, Pollack 1986] and later
Balkanski 1990] formalized the notion of conditional generation , specifying that it has to
hold for act-types . They then used it to de ne the notion of generation between action
occurrences.
(5.3)

conditionally generates  i :
1. and  are simultaneous
2. is not part of doing  
3. when occurs, a set of generation-enabling conditions C hold, such that the
joint occurrence of and C imply the occurrence of  .

As regards the generation-enabling conditions C , in the case of the generation relation
between ipping the switch and turning on the light, C will include that the wire, the
switch and the bulb are working in the case of the generation relation between uttering
the words \do you know the hospital's phone number" and asking one's ocemate what
the hospital's phone number is , C will include, among other conditions, that the ocemate
can hear the question.2
As Balkanski notes, it may be argued that generator and generatee are not exactly simultaneous. For example, the light does not go on until a few milliseconds after the switch
has been ipped. Goldman, however, points out that even if there is a time gap between
ipping the switch and turning on the light, it would still be incorrect to say that an agent
ipped the switch \and then" turned on the light.
Balkanski's version of generation is 1992a, p. 270]:3
(5.4) generates  if and only if
1. and  are actions performed by the same agent at the same time
2. there is a set of conditions, C , such that
(a) these conditions hold during the performance time of and
(b) the act-type of conditionally generates the act-type of  under C .
As Goldman observes in 1970], generation doesn't hold between and  if is part
of a sequence of actions A to do  : however, generation may hold between the whole
We will see in Sec. 5.1.4.2 that, although rarely, a by construction can express other relations.
This latter example is from Pollack, 1986].
3
I have changed her notation to make it consistent with mine.
1

2
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sequence A and  . 4 Therefore, in the following I will introduce the terms direct and
indirect generation : a direct generation relation holds between and  if generates  
an indirect generation relation holds between and  if belongs to a sequence of actions
A which generates . Notice that by sequence I mean a temporally partially, not totally,
ordered set of actions.
Generation is a pervasive relation between action descriptions in naturally occurring data.
However, it appears from my corpus that by clauses are used less frequently than purpose
clauses to express it:5 quite uncontroversially, 84 of the 164 PCs express direct generation
| this is about 50% of the data| while in the same corpus there are only 27 by clauses.
(2.2b) and (2.1b) are examples of purpose clauses that express direct generation another
representative example, picked at random, is
(5.6) Press rmly to bed tile in the bond coat.
Moreover, another 28 examples seem to express indirect generation | see below on the
problem of distinguishing indirect generation from enablement.
Therefore, it does look like generation in instructional text is mainly expressed by means of
purpose clauses. This is consistent with Balkanski's ndings regarding the speaker's beliefs
about the actor(s)'s beliefs and intentions expressed respectively by a purpose clause and
by a means clause. In the former case, the speaker believes: that the actions and relations
between actions are intended on the part of the actor furthermore, that the actor believes
that the actions are about to occur, and that will contribute to  . Not necessarily do
these beliefs hold in the case of a means clause | see Sec. 4.1.2.2 above. These observations
on the di erence in beliefs and intentions in purpose and means clauses make sense in the
context of instructional text, in which the instructor wants the agent to adopt certain
intentions, and certain beliefs about actions and relations between actions: therefore, it is
plausible that S uses purpose clauses rather than means clauses to convey such beliefs and
intentions.

5.1.3 Enablement
Following rst Pollack 1986] and then Balkanski 1990 1992b 1993], enablement holds
between two actions and  if and only if an occurrence of brings about a set of
conditions that are necessary (but not necessarily sucient) for the subsequent performance
of  .
Balkanski, 1990, p.9] formalizes this by means of a complex act-type constructor called sequence.
Generation can also be expressed with a simple free adjunct. In (5.5) \removing the left nger"
generates \transferring loop to needle":
(5.5) Take needle in right hand and insert into loop from underneath. Remove left index nger, transferring loop to needle.
However, this use of free adjuncts is not very common { see Webber and Di Eugenio, 1990].
4

5
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Balkanski in 1993, p.38] distinguishes two types of enablement, gen-enable and exec-enable ,
distinguished because in the former case, the performance of the enabling action brings
about a required generation-enabling condition, while in the latter, it brings about a required executability condition. Balkanski illustrates the di erence by means of the following two examples:
(5.7a) Mary's inserting a diskette \enabled" her to back up her le.
(5.7b) John's looking up Mary's phone number \enabled" him to call her.
According to Balkanski, in (5.7a) inserting a diskette brings about a condition, namely
that the diskette is inserted, that is necessary for the backing up action to be successful . If
the diskette is not inserted, then Mary can still try to back up a le, e.g., by typing \copy
le", but the intended result will not be achieved. On the other hand, in (5.7b) looking
up a number brings about a condition, namely that the telephone number is known, that
is necessary for the calling action to be executable : if the number is not known, then John
cannot even try to call Mary. Thus, in (5.7a), the enabling action | Mary's inserting
a diskette | brings about a condition C i | in(diskette) | belonging to the set C of
generation-enabling conditions on a generation relation between  | Mary's typing \copy
le" | and  | Mary's backing up her le  in the case of (5.7b), instead, there is no such
intervening generation relation.6
Balkanski's de nition of enablement is as follows:7
(5.8)

enables  if and only if

1. the time of is prior to the time of  ,
2. there are a set of conditions, C , such that one of the conditions in C , C i , holds
as a result of the performance of , and either
(a) there is a third action  , and  conditionally generates  under C  or
(b) C are the executability conditions on  .
Schematically, these two kinds of enablement are schematized as in Fig. 5.1| the \/" indicates executability conditions when it is associated to an action, and generation-enabling
conditions when it is associated to a conditional generation relation.8
Given this de nition of enablement, it would seem that only about 7% of my data, namely,
12 examples, express it | I am saying would seem because sometimes it is not clear whether
should be seen as enabling  , or as belonging to a sequence of actions A generating  |
see the discussion below. Among these 12 examples, a couple of the most representative
ones are
(5.9) Unscrew the protective plate to expose the box.
Unscrew the protective plate enables taking the plate o which generates exposing the box .
I will come back to this example below.
This is my paraphrase of her enablement de nition E0 plus enablement axiom 2 Balkanski, 1993, p.42].
8
This is my rendering of Balkanski's schemas 1993, p.41].

6
7

73

β

β/

cgen / {C1, C2, ...,

Ci , ..., Cn}

{C1, C2, ...,

Ci , ..., Cn}

brings-about

brings-about

γ
α
α
gen-enable

exec-enable

Figure 5.1: Gen-enable and Exec-enable
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The other example is
(5.10) To fuse appliques, slip the shaped piece of fusible webbing between the garment
and the applique press the layers together using a warm iron.
Slip the shaped piece of fusible webbing between the garment and the applique brings about
a necessary condition for pressing the layers together using a warm iron to generate fuse
appliques .
To conclude, I would like to point out that I see one major problem with Def. (5.8), and
another problem with Balkanski's analysis of Ex. (5.7b).
The problem with Def. (5.8), that Balkanski herself acknowledges, is as follows: given her
action formalism, condition 1 amounts to requiring that the execution of is over before 
begins. This is too restrictive, in that it may be necessary that continues for the whole
execution of  . Consider a (constructed) example such as:

(5.11) Hold the cup under the spigot

to ll it with coee.

In (5.11), hold has to continue for the whole duration of ll : still, I would contend it is an
example of gen-enable , in that holding the cup under the spigot brings about a condition
|that the cup is in the proper position| necessary for an action such as depressing the
coee urn] lever to generate ll the cup with coee .
I also would like to point out that her analysis of Ex. (5.7b) is not the most natural one,
in that it can be analyzed in quite the same way that Ex. (5.7a) is. In fact, it does seem to
me that there is a third action  = John's dialing Mary's phone number , and a generation
relation holding between  and  = John's calling Mary under the condition John knows
Mary's phone number . The analysis that Balkanski gives of (5.7b) seems to rest on the
assumption that the action G's calling X on the phone is basic by the same token, then,
G's backing up one's le in Ex. (5.7a) could be considered basic as well.
Balkanski herself notices that her notion of exec-enable may raise some criticism 1993,
p.44], in that the exec-enable relation may be deemed not necessary. One could in fact
claim that it is always possible to reason at lower and lower levels of detail, appealing to
further generation relations, until one gets \all the way down" to (unconditional) basic
actions. Given that basic actions cannot have conditions attached to their performance,
all enablement relations at this lowest possible level of description are instances of genenable. Balkanski's response to such criticism is that, although it is theoretically possible
to describe all actions in terms of basic actions, such descriptions are often unintuitive. The
generation relation between saying \hello" and moving one's vocal cords in a particular
way, for example, rests on an awkward description. Rather, she notices that we can decide
on some set of actions that we assume are \basic" in the domain of interest, and not
consider how actions in that set are actually performed. Given such a set of actions,
Balkasnki o ers two options: such actions can either be taken as basic in Goldman's sense,
i.e. executable at will (as Pollack does 1986]), in which case the exec-enable relation is
not necessary or they can be taken to be conditionally executable, in which case both the
exec-enable and the gen-enable relations are necessary.
75

I agree with her observations on basic actions, and on the fact that the set of basic actions
cannot be prede ned, but that it depends on the domain9 . Moreover, I think that her
distinction actually boils down to one's knowledge representation choices: I think the
same action can be seen as either conditionally executable , as she considers G's calling X
on the phone in (5.7b), or as the generated action in a conditional generation pair, as I
have shown G's calling X on the phone can also be considered. Therefore, I suspect that
almost every example can be explained by appealing to further generation relations , but
without necessarily getting down to basic actions. I will come back to my formalization of
enablement in the next chapter.

5.1.4 Issues in action relations
5.1.4.1 Why generation and enablement?
Pollack in her thesis 1986] is particularly vocal in advocating these two relations as the
basis for action representation. Her motivations stem from the need for a perspicuous
representation for an agent's plans, one that can support her view of plans as mental
phenomena, as I discussed in Sec. 3.2.1.2. She notices that in the plan inference literature
plans are generally derived by composing basic planning operators, which are represented
as follows:



Header:
Preconditions:
Body:

P

She criticizes such a representation because the relation between and  is not precisely
de ned: researchers have assumed any of causes, is-a-precondition-of, is-a-way-to . She
then prefers to use a representation based on generation and enablement, which she can
precisely de ne.
A further motivation for using generation and enablement in modeling actions is that
they allow us to draw conclusions about action execution as well { a particularly useful
consequence given the discussion in Sec. 2.3 on the necessity of grounding action in performance, which is in turn partially motivated by the requirement of animating instructions
in AnimNL.
As has already been observed by other researchers, if generates  , two actions are
described, but only , the generator, needs to be performed. In Ex. 2.2, there is no
creating action per se that has to be executed: the physical action to be performed is
cutting, constrained by the goal as explained above.
In contrast to generation, if enables  , after executing ,  still needs to be executed.
has to temporally precede  , in the sense that has to begin, but not necessarily end,
before  .
9

This observation had been already made by Pollack in her thesis 1986, p.59].
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Notice that, in the same way that the generatee a ects the execution of the generator, so
the enabled action a ects the execution of the enabling action. In (5.11) above, the goal
ll the cup] with coee constrains the position in which the agent has to hold the cup,
namely, upright, with the opening facing upwards, and centered under the spigot.
All these observations on generation and enablement are summarized in Table 5.1.

Generation

Enablement

Can 
constrain ?
Y
Y
Temporal
and 
start( ) must
constraints simultaneous precede start( )
Execute
only
(enabling)
(generator)
 (enabled)
Table 5.1: Generation and enablement

5.1.4.2 Generation, enablement and purpose connectives
I would now like to go back to the results in Sec. 4.1.4, and try to correlate them to
generation and enablement. It seems to me that the results in the experiment point to the
following facts:
1. so as to and by are felicitous when the relation between actions is generation
2. in order to is always acceptable, more so when the relation expressed is indirect
generation or enablement
3. the di erence between pre- and postposed purpose clauses discussed by Thompson
can be expressed in terms of indirect generation / enablement on the one hand,
generation on the other. In fact, IPCs, whose scope very often encompasses more
than one clause, tend to express indirect generation or enablement, while FPCs tend
to express direct generation. This would explain why so as to is not acceptable as a
paraphrase of an IPC.
These observations for example explain the distribution of judgements for Ex. (4.22): the
paraphrase with in order to is the one most preferred, while so as to and MeaC are judged
unacceptable by all informants. However, it remains unclear why the judgements on the
acceptability of the paraphrase with in order to are split exactly in the middle.
However, the previous observations are not sucient to explain all the facts. In particular,
they don't explain why
77

1. In an example of FPC that clearly expresses enablement , the paraphrase with so as
to is considered more acceptable | eight totally acceptable judgements | than the
one with in order to | six \3", one \2", one \1":
(5.12a) Slip paper towels between iron and fabric to catch stray wisps of the heated
fusible webbing.
(5.12b) Slip paper towels between iron and fabric so as to catch stray wisps of the
heated fusible webbing.
(5.12c) Slip paper towels between iron and fabric in order to catch stray wisps of
the heated fusible webbing.
It is possible that there is a further component to the meaning of so as to , relating to
the manner of the action this component of the meaning of so as to does not necessarily coincide with the relation between the two actions being generation , although
there is a strong correlation between the two.
2. A by paraphrase is sometimes acceptable for an IPC. After all, if both so as to
and by mainly express generation, they should both be infelicitous in the case of
IPCs: however, by paraphrases are rated as much more acceptable than so as to
paraphrases. This issue deserves further attention.

5.1.4.3 Generation versus enablement
The distinction between generation and enablement appears to be perfectly clear when only
two actions are involved. In fact, mistaking one for the other can indeed have unpleasant
consequences, as Fig. 5.2 shows. In Fig. 5.2, it is clear that Ee interprets the instruction
When you want to turn, either put on your blinker or stick your arm out of the window as
expressing a generation relation between put on your blinker and turn , while the intended
relation is enablement, in that e.g. putting on your blinker brings about executability
conditions to achieve a (proper ) turn. To Ee's excuse, one should notice that the rst
two instructions | When you want to go, you step on the gas and When you want to stop,
you step on the brake | are indeed interpreted as expressing generation as a side remark,
notice that a when clause is another type of adjunct clause that can express generation.
However, one issue that has to be addressed is the fact that, in the presence of a sequence
of actions A < 1 2 ::: n > that generate another action  , it is not clear what relation
is holding between each single i and  . Consider the following example:
(5.13) To install, use nails or adhesive to fasten gypsum wallboard to existing walls or
studs. Tape corners and cover the nail heads.
In this example, we have three actions, 1 = fasten gypsum wallboard , 2 = tape corners , 3 = cover the nail heads , whose sequence 10 generates  = install . What is the
10
Actually 2 and 3 can be executed in either order or even interleaved. In fact, remember that by
sequence I mean a temporally partially ordered set.
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Figure 5.2: Generation or enablement?
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individual relation between say 1 and  ? Intuitively it doesn't seem that it should be
analyzed as an enablement relation. However, also (5.10), that was analyzed as expressing
enablement, could be analyzed in this way: we could say that the sequence < slip applique, press rmly > generates fusing appliques .
Schematically, this situation is represented in Fig. 5.3.

β

cgen / {C1, C2, ..., Cn}
enable?

A = {α1, α2, ... }

Figure 5.3: Indirect generation or enablement?
The reader may wonder why the question is relevant after all: its relevance comes from
the fact that I am using these relations to both analyze naturally occurring examples, and
to express the knowledge necessary to analyze them. Therefore we may have knowledge
such that A = < 1  2 ::: n > generates  , but the surface PC is of the form 1 to  :
intuitively we could consider it as 1 enabling  , while according to the stored knowledge
1 enables some j belonging to A, and the whole sequence generates  . Notice that I
found no example in which the surface form was Do i to do  with i > 1: namely, a case
in which there is a sequence generating  , but there has been no mention of 1  ::: i;1.
However, this may be parasitic on my stored knowledge, rather than on the naturally
occurring data.
In conclusion, I would like to point out that basically I will use the term enablement in
two ways, one descriptive, the other formal. I have used it descriptively so far in my
data analysis, which has been done independently from the formal representation of the
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knowledge necessary to interpret them. The term enablement will instead be used more
precisely in the next two chapters: in cases in which the algorithm discovers that i belongs
to a sequence A generating an action  , where the actions in the sequence may be related to
each other by enablement relations, I will reserve the term enablement only to the relation
holding between any pair < i , k > belonging to A the relation between each i and 
will be termed instead indirect generation, as mentioned at the end of Sec. 5.1.2.

5.1.4.4 Other relations
The de nitions of generation and enablement given above | (5.4) and (5.8) respectively
| don't seem to adequately account for all examples.
Reconsider the de nition of enablement in (5.8), and in particular, the temporal constraint
that the starting time of is before the starting time of  . In general, (5.8) is interpreted
as meaning that  is executed as soon as all executability conditions become true however,
the execution times of and  could be actually separated by a considerable amount of
time, even years, as shown by examples such as the following
(5.14) Save wallpaper and leftover adhesive to repair areas that may be damaged.
While (5.8) would indeed account for (5.14), it is an issue left for further research whether
more precise relations between the perfomance time intervals of and  should be explicitly
included in the representation of an enablement relation between and  .
In other cases, the relation between and  does not seem to t into the de nition of
generation or enablement at all. Consider 11
(5.15) Build this simple but elegant corner shelf

pieces found in this issue.

to display all the other decorative

It is clear that building this simple but elegant corner shelf is not necessary12 to display all
the other decorative pieces found in this issue. I think various factors are playing a role in
examples such as (5.14) and (5.15).
First of all, so far I have presented instructions as commands according to which H
adopts certain intentions and acts. However, instructional text also provides general
rules of behavior, or advice on how to act in particular situations etc: in these cases, a
PC provides, not so much a goal to achieve, but a description of the situation in which
a certain behavior is appropriate, where by appropriate I mean that the behavior is
e ective, but not necessary. This seems to be the intended interpretations for both
(5.14) and (5.15): for the former, we have Save wallpaper and leftover adhesive in
case you want to repair areas that may be damaged  for the latter, Build this simple
(5.15) could also be interpreted as a PC in syntactic terms.
The de nition of enablement (5.8) doesn't explicitly enforce that the condition C brought about by 
is necessary its necessity derives from the fact that C belongs either to the executability conditions on ,
or to the generation enabling conditions between  and .
11
12

i
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but elegant corner shelf in case you want to display all the other decorative pieces
found in this issue . With respect to Balkanski's formalization of the Speaker's beliefs
about the agent's beliefs and intentions, it seems that her nding that in utterances
with PCs S believes that  will be intended on the part of the agent needs some
re nement.

In (5.14), the temporal e ect also depends on the fact that describes a maintenance
action, namely, an action that brings about a state of the world that has to hold for
a certain time . Notice the di erence with achievement actions, whose importance
is in achieving the change in the state of the world, not in the time that this new
state has to hold for. As usual, the di erence between the two types of action is not
so clear-cut, but it makes intuitive sense. A crisper distinction could probably be
obtained by looking at examples of maintenance actions | this is an issue left for
future work.
The other factor coming into play is whether brings about necessary executability
or generation-enabling conditions. In fact, the condition that brings about may
not be necessary, but simply facilitate or improve execution.
Balkanski in 1990, p.27] mentions the facilitate relation between actions:
The data13 also included instances of one action facilitating another action.
For example, the utterance \you can tell by the fact that it's a little easier
if we turn the whole thing upside down " is describing a situation where
one agent believes that turning the structure upside down will facilitate
the subsequent task of inserting screws. An activity ;1 facilitates another
activity ;2 when the occurrence of ;1 brings about conditions that make
the subsequent performance of ;2 \easier". The diculty here is in formalizing a notion of \easier" that is relevant to such situations in particular,
there seems to be the need for a way of measuring the relative diculty of
a task.
Again, the boundary between enablement and facilitation is not so clear-cut. First
of all, facilitation could just be seen as enabling an underspeci ed  : Turning upside down facilitates inserting screws because Turning upside down enables inserting
screws without having to hold them while screwing .14 Second, it is not clear whether
executability conditions are always necessary: it depends on one's perspective, which
in turn depends on one's utilities :
The central idea of mathematical decision theory is that a numerical utility
function can be used to evaluate decisions ... A single numerical value is
used to summarize the advantages of a set of actions. A typical utility function would be the pro ts realized from a particular investment outcome.
Feldman and Sproull, 1977, p.159]
13
14

Her data is a videotape of two people building a piece of furniture (a swing glider).
Charlie Ortiz, p.c.
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The advantages of a certain action may also include that the resulting state makes
it easier to do something else. Consider for example
(5.16)

To tile bathroom walls, remove wall-mounted basins or toilets.

Is this enablement or facilitation? in a sense, it depends on H's perspective and
on the situation at hand: in fact, it may be that in one's particular bathroom it is
possible to tile the walls even without removing xtures. Analogous considerations
seem to hold for
(5.17)

To cool, place on rack.15

It may be the case that it is not necessary to place the object in question on a rack
to have it cool, but that doing so simply accelerates the cooling process.
In my opinion, a richer notion of actions and their relations, and of plans, e.g. including
utility functions, is needed to address these issues.

5.2 Inference Processes
In Chapter 2, I talked about two kinds of inferences that I am interested in: one concerns
how adjuncts constrain the interpretation of the action to be performed, as in (2.1b) and
(2.2b) the other regards computing expectations about the location of  |the action
described in the PC| and as a consequence, about the location of certain objects that 
manipulates.
In the following, I will go into more detail as regards such inferences. A disclaimer before
doing so: as I mentioned in Chapter 1, the focus of my work is not on learning. The problem
I am addressing is understanding how the input logical form, that does not necessarily
match the stored knowledge, is related to such knowledge, rather than discovering as yet
unknown methods to achieve a certain goal.
Notice that all inferences stem from the same process: H tries to nd the connection
between and  , by exploiting the fact that  describes the goal to be achieved. In
computational terms, this amounts to using  as an index into the Knowledge Base, nding
a collection of methods Mi that achieve  , and trying to relate to an action that appears
in one or more Mi . During this process, we may found out that is more or less speci c
than the stored action i j that appears in a Mi , or even incompatible with it or that the
connection between and  holds, but only under certain expectations.
This is very much in the spirit of Allen's plan inference algorithm presented in Fig. 3.2:
what is innovative in my work is the way the match is computed, and the inferences that
are carried out in the process.
15

This example is a variation of one in Thompson, 1985].
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5.2.1 Computing structural compatibility
The inferences I will discuss here are in a sense structural: namely, they are based on the
fact that the action descriptions dealt with can be compared one to the other, and ordered
according to some partial order, that in the next chapter I will identify with subsumption.
Moreover, when a more exible match between two action descriptions than simply one
being an instance of the other is allowed, there must be some evidence that the match is
tenable: so far, I have been talking about goals guiding the accommodation process, and
therefore supporting the match between and i j . This is the type of inference that I have
studied in depth and that I will describe in the next section. However, one could foresee
another kind of accommodation, in which the roles of and  are in a sense switched: a
goal  may not be speci c enough to identify methods Mi that achieve it. However, some
methods may be selected if they achieve a i which is a subtype of  : can then be used
to select the correct Mi . I will discuss this in Sec. 5.2.1.2.

5.2.1.1 Compatibility between and i j , under 
Suppose H has knowledge of the form 16
(5.18)

M37 =

GENERATES(cut(agent,square,in-half,along-diagonal)]37 ,
create(agent,two-triangles)]37 )

and he gets input instructions such as:
(5.19a)
(5.19b)
(5.19c)
(5.19d)

Cut the square in half along the diagonal with scissors]1 to create two triangles] .
Cut the square in half]2 to create two triangles] .
Cut the square in half with scissors]3 to create two triangles] .
Cut the square in half along a perpendicular axis]4 to create two triangles] .

In each example, the same relevant knowledge, namely (5.18), is retrieved by means of the
goal  , which exactly matches 37 . After (5.18) has been retrieved, the algorithm compares
i with 37.17
1. In (5.19a), 1 is more speci c than 37. The inference is that 1 is in fact the
action to be executed, which is possible because the added modi er with scissors is
compatible with 37.
2. In (5.19b), 2 is less speci c than 37: in this case, the inference to be computed is
that the action to be performed is 37 | this inference is illustrated in Fig. 5.4.
16
17

In the next chapter, I will lay down all the details of the representation.

37 should actually be referred to as 37 1 . I will keep the simpler notation.
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3. (5.19c) has the characteristics of both (5.19a) and (5.19b), given that 3 , when
compared with 37, lacks the modi er regarding the position where to cut, but adds
the instrument modi er with scissors  in this case, the inference to be computed
is that the action to be performed is 37 augmented with the added modi er with
scissors .
4. Finally, in (5.19d), 4 is incompatible with 37. At the least, the agent needs to be
able to recognize such incompatibility.

β

[create (agent, two-triangles)]

generates
α [cut (agent, square, in-half)]
2

α [cut (agent, square, in-half, along-diagonal)]
Figure 5.4: Computing more speci c action descriptions
Analogously, in (5.11) we have to infer a richer description of = holding the cup in
order for to enable ll cup with coee . However, in this case the inference is more
complicated because the augmented description of hold is not already available as part of
the stored knowledge, as for cut square in half along the diagonal , but derives from some
of the conditions on the generation relation between depress the lever and ll cup with
coee . Schematically it could be represented as shown in Fig. 5.5. I won't implement this
inference explicitly, but extending my algorithm to deal with it would be possible.
Notice that all these inferences require that we are able to understand the relation between
di erent linguistic descriptions: to do so, in Ch. 6 I propose an action representation formalism based on a taxonomy of action descriptions, which crucially exploits the classi cation algorithm provided by hybrid systems in the KRYPTON tradition Brachman et al.,
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Fill (agt,cup,coffee)

cgen

/ {C1, C2, ..., Ci, ..., Cn}
Ci = under-spigot(cup)
Cj = upright(cup)

Depress(agt,lever)

Hold(agt, cup, upright, under-spigot)

Figure 5.5: Inferring a more complete description for hold
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1983b].

5.2.1.2 Compatibility between  and i, under
As mentioned above, one could consider a di erent kind of accommodation, where the
match between input instruction and knowledge is supported by rather than by the goal
 : that is, one could allow  to retrieve the Mi 's that achieve subtypes i of  , and exploit
to select the correct Mi('s).
Suppose that H, in addition to the knowledge about obtaining triangles from squares
in (5.18), has some further knowledge that cutting squares in half, this time along a
perpendicular axis, results in creating two rectangles:
(5.20)

M38 =

GENERATES(cut(agent,square,in-half,along-perp-axis)]38 ,
create(agent,two-rectangles)]38 )

Consider now the possible input instructions in (5.21), instructions that parallel the ones
in (5.19):
(5.21a) Cut the square in half along the diagonal]1 to create two polygons] .
(5.21b) Cut the square in half]2 to create two polygons] .
(5.21c) Cut the square in half with scissors]3 to create two polygons] .
(5.21d) Cut the square in half along a perpendicular axis]4 to create two polygons] .
For all the cases in (5.21),  would retrieve both (5.18) and (5.20), as 37 and 38 are both
subtypes of  . Then
As regards (5.21a) and (5.21d), both 1 and 4 are speci c enough to select the right
method, as each is consistent only with 37 and 38 respectively. This has the side
e ect of further specifying the goal, by identifying the two polygons mentioned in 
as triangles and rectangles respectively.
On the other hand, in (5.21b) and (5.21c), neither
discriminate between the two methods.

2

nor

3

is speci c enough to

I will get back to possible implementations of these inferences in Sec. 7.2.1.3.
87

5.2.2 Computing expectations about object locations
As is reported in a paper about AnimNL Webber et al., 1993, p.2],
The expectations that instructions lead agents to form serve as an inuence
on behavior | what they do and what they look for | over and beyond
their current perceptions. As such, expectations from instructions complement
information from the world in guiding an agent's behavior.
Some expectations that arise from instructions may regard duration of processes, or consequences of actions, or locations of objects | this latter type is the one I will discuss.
Expectations regarding locations of objects are quite common in scenarios where an action
changes the perceptual space an agent has access to, clearly under the (reasonable) assumption that agents only have limited perception: they cannot have up-to-date knowledge of
any part of their environment which is outside their direct perception. In the instruction
(5.22) Open the safe and hand over the money.
one expects the money to be found inside the safe. Analogously in
(5.23) Remove access cover A. Raise handle on cartridge and turn to unlock position.
the action of removing the cover opens up a new space, inside which the agent will nd
the cartridge.
Further, notice that the inferences about object locations are in a sense secondary, the
primary inference being as follows: if H executes an action that changes H's perceptual
space and/or the space that is accessible to H, and is executed for the purpose of doing
 , then expect the new perceptual space to be the site either of  , or, if belongs to a
sequence A generating  , of the rest of the actions belonging to A. In particular, when
results in the agent going to a place with the purpose of doing  , one can infer to be
the site of  .
This can be seen by reconsidering (2.3a) and (2.3b), repeated here for convenience:
(5.24a) Go into the kitchen to get me the coee urn.
(5.24b) Go into the kitchen to wash the coee urn.
In both cases, H goes to the kitchen, which is then expected to be the location of the (rest)
of the actions belonging to the plan to achieve  . As I mentioned in Ch. 2, in (5.24a) the
expectation E 1 that the referent of the co ee urn is in the kitchen is developed, while this
does not happen in (5.24b).
What I will argue is that it is the relation R between and  , combined with the speci c
knowledge about both and  , that gives rise to the expectations about the location of
objects involved in an action. Notice in fact that such expectations don't derive simply
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from knowledge about the action to be performed. For example, neither (5.25a) nor (5.25b)
convey much information about the locations of the co ee urn or of the washing materials.
(5.25a) Get me the coee urn.
(5.25b) Wash the coee urn.
Moreover, such expectations can't simply be attributed to world knowledge. For example,
one explanation of the oddness of (5.26) is that one doesn't normally nd washing equipment in the living room. As such, (5.26) indeed appears to convey the expectation E2 that
the washing materials are in the living room, which goes against world knowledge.
(5.26) Go into the living room to wash the coee urn.
The di erence between the two may be explained by appealing to a notion deriving from the
planning literature and called, alternatively, quali ers, applicability conditions Schoppers,
1988], constraints Litman and Allen, 1990], or usewhen conditions Tate, 1987]: these are
conditions that must hold for an action to be relevant, and are not meant to be achieved.
If  has among its applicability conditions that an argument be at for  to even be
relevant, then a locational expectation develops as in (5.24a). If not, a weaker expectation
arises, as in (5.24b).18
What usage does an agent make of such expectations? They can be used in the process
of reference grounding, namely, of binding the referring expressions in the instructions to
objects in the world. Expectations may have a pruning e ect on possible referents: in
(5.24a), even if there is a co ee urn right in front of the agent, he won't assume that that
is the urn he is supposed to get. Expectations can also guide the agent's behavior: if the
agent steps into the kitchen and there is no visible co ee urn, he will start searching for
one, for example opening cabinet doors etc.
A di erent behavior will result if the agent can interpret some features of the kitchen
environment as evidence against E 1 . For example, there may be a note laying around the
urn is not here but in the living room, or a person who looks like they're in charge of things.
Schematically, one could represent this kind of inference as in Fig. 5.6 {  is the goal,
the instruction to accommodate, Ak the actions belonging to the plan to achieve  , C the
expectations computed while deriving the relation R between and  . 19
18
Notice that this occurs even within a single clause: Get me the co ee urn in the kitchen leads to the
same expectation as (5.24a), while Wash the co ee urn in the kitchen doesn't.
19
Balkanski in 1993, p.101] has the following comment on this kind of inference: \assumptions" would
no longer be needed in addition to conditions on generation relations because the di erence between these
two types of conditions appear to rest on a di erence between the beliefs of the speaker and that of the actor.
I think she is mistaken in interpreting my claim as that there are dierent kinds of conditions involved.
Expectations (which I used to call assumptions in previous work) are not necessarily further conditions, as
they may regard one or more pre-de ned generation-enabling conditions. Rather, an expectation singles
out one of these conditions as particularly relevant to the current situation, for example because it gives
rise to a particular kind of behavior | in Ex. (5.24a), if the agent goes into the kitchen and doesn't see
a coee urn, he will start looking for one. Besides, expectations don't stem from a di erence between the
beliefs of the speaker and that of the actor. In uttering (5.24a), S has exactly the same belief that H will
derive from it, namely, that the co ee urn is in the kitchen  it is during the process of H's understanding
the relation R between  and that expectations arises.
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β

[Get (agent, coffee-urn, to(S)]

is-substep

[Go(agent, location(coffee-urn))]

A

generates
C = In(coffee-urn, kitchen)
α [Go(agent, into(kitchen))]

Figure 5.6: Computing expectations
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5.3 Summary
In this chapter, I have analyzed Purpose Clauses from a computational point of view.
First, I described which relations between actions are expressed in an instruction like Do
to do  : I focussed on generation and enablement, and on some problems related to using
them. Then I discussed some accommodation inferences that are necessary to deal with
purpose clauses.
The inferences necessary to understand PCs impose not only processing constraints, but
also requirements on the action representation system: more speci cally, it is necessary
to represent actions descriptions both from a linguistic point of view, which among others
requires representing them at di erent levels of abstractions, and from a planning point of
view. In the next chapter, I will describe the representation formalism in full details.
In Sec. 5.2 I sketched two kinds of accommodation inferences that directly derive from
purpose clauses, namely, computing the relation between the input and the stored action
descriptions and inferring the expectations under which a certain instruction makes sense.
Both kinds of inferences are derived by exploiting the constraints deriving from the goal.
The algorithm that implements them is described in Ch. 7.
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Chapter 6

The Action Representation
Formalism
The formalism I will present addresses the di erent demands posed by the need to represent
both linguistic and planning knowledge about actions.
I will present a hybrid system whose taxonomy is expressed by means of Conceptual Structure primitives Jackendo , 1990] the taxonomy is augmented by means of an action library, containing commonsense plans about actions.
I will start by summarizing the observations I made in previous chapters on the features
that an action representation formalism should include to be adequate to model NL descriptions of actions { these observations mainly rest on the analysis of purpose clauses that
I presented in the previous two chapters, on the analysis of negative imperatives presented
in Ch. 4, and on a less detailed analysis of other constructions, such as free adjuncts and
check constructions , on which I report elsewhere Webber and Di Eugenio, 1990]. Notice
that in the whole discussion by action I mean action type , and by action description ,
action type description .
1.

Linguistic knowledge about action descriptions.
(a) It has probably become obvious by now, but let me reiterate that, like individuals, sets of individuals, propositions Quantz and Kindermann, 1990] etc.
actions should be part of the underlying ontology of the representation formalism. This has also been advocated by Jackendo , who justi es it through our
ability to refer to an action { I did it, or to ask questions about them { What
did you do? Jackendo , 1983].
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(b) Action descriptions can always be further speci ed. Consider:
(6.1a) Apply paste to the wall.
(6.1b) Using a paint roller or brush, apply paste to the wall.
(6.1c) Using a paint roller or brush, apply paste to the wall, starting at the
ceiling line and pasting down a few feet and covering an area a few inches
wider than the width of the fabric.
Therefore the formalism must be able to represent action description at various
levels of speci city, and to represent not just the usual participants in an action
such as agent or patient, but also means, manner, direction, extent etc.
(c) The formalism must be able to support computations that involve actions that
do not exactly correspond to its stored knowledge in fact, as I showed in
Sec. 5.2.1.1, it must be able to understand the relation between the input action
descriptions and the stored ones.
2. Planning knowledge about actions.
(a) The formalism must be able to represent various relations among actions, such
as at least temporal relations, generation and enablement.
(b) To reason about complex instructions, the formalism must include notions of
action decomposition into substeps, of applicability conditions, of eects expected to occur when an action of a given type is performed: all these notions
are typical of knowledge used by planning and plan inference systems | see for
example Fikes and Nilsson, 1971 Schoppers, 1988 Litman and Allen, 1990].
To address these issues, I propose a formalism composed of two KBs. The rst one stores
linguistic knowledge about actions, implemented by means of the T-Box of a hybrid system:
the semantic primitives of the T-Box representation are those de ned by Jackendo in his
work on Conceptual Structures 1983 1990].
The terms de ned in the ontology of the hybrid system are used in the action library ,
which contains commonsense planning knowledge about actions, expressed by means of
recipes or plans : these could include simple information such as to loosen a screw, you
have to turn it counterclockwise, up to more complex procedures, such as how to assemble
a piece of furniture.
The value of a hybrid KR system to this enterprise is in associating di erent inference
mechanisms with di erent kinds of knowledge. Consider Ex. (5.19d), repeated here for
convenience:
(6.2) Cut the square along a perpendicular axis to create two triangles.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the relation between cut the square along a perpendicular axis and create two triangles is at least odd, if not ill-formed, because cutting a
square along an axis won't create two triangles | it is inconsistent with the stored knowledge. However, the two action descriptions by themselves are perfectly well-formed. In
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order to track down the ill-formedness above, a homogeneous representation system that
does not support distinguishing between di erent kinds of knowledge could e.g. try to
prove that cut the square along a perpendicular axis is not a well-formed description, a
clearly undesirable behavior.
In the following, I will rst describe hybrid systems, and the reasons why the classi cation algorithm they are endowed with is necessary to perform the inferences described in
Sec. 5.2.1.1. I will then describe Jackendo 's Conceptual Structures (CS for short), and
show how the CS primitives can be used to express knowledge about actions in the context
of a T-Box. I will then turn to describing the recipes in the action library.

6.1 The action taxonomy
6.1.1 Hybrid Systems
Hybrid Knowledge Representation systems, such as KRYPTON Brachman et al., 1983b],
KL-TWO Vilain, 1985], LOOM Mac Gregor, 1988], BACK Quantz and Kindermann,
1990] and CLASSIC Brachman et al., 1991], stemmed from the KL-ONE formalism Brachman and Schmolze, 1985].
According to Mac Gregor, 1991, p.386]
KL-ONE and its descendants share a commitment to the following architectural
features:
They are logic-based (i.e., they appeal to rst-order logic for their semantics).
They draw a distinction between terminological and assertional knowledge, and each system implements its own specialized term-forming language.
They include a classi er that organizes terms (concepts) into a taxonomy,
based on subsumption relationships between terms.
Hybrid systems are composed of two parts: a terminological part, or T-Box, that is used
to de ne terms, and an assertional part, or A-Box, used to assert facts or beliefs.
The terminological language is designed to facilitate the construction of expressions that
describe classes of individuals. The formal constructs in a terminological language are
called terms or concepts .
The purpose of an assertion language is to state constraints or facts that apply to a particular domain or world. In general, the A-Box language employs a somewhat restricted
rst-order logic, for example function-free, in order to make theorem proving computationally tractable.
All T-Box information is de nitional in nature. The T-box language has two main categories, concepts and roles, roughly corresponding to frames and slots. Concepts are organized in a hierarchy of structured terms. The relation between terms in the hierarchy
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is subsumption. In the following, I will take advantage of the very clear introduction to
subsumption found in Woods, 1991]. To start with, Woods notices that in virtually every
semantic network formalism, there is at least one link that relates more speci c concepts
to more general concepts (from which generic information can be inherited). Such links
have been variously named \is a", \kind of", \subset of", \member of", \subconcept of",
\subkind of", \superconcept", \ako", etc. Such links are used to organize concepts into a
hierarchy or some other partial ordering. Woods calls this structure a \taxonomy". The
taxonomy is used for storing information at appropriate levels of generality and automatically making it available to more speci c concepts by means of a mechanism of inheritance.
More general concepts in such a partial order are said to subsume more speci c concepts,
and a more speci c concept is said to inherit information from its subsumers. Classi cation is the operation of assimilating a new description in a taxonomy of existing concepts
by automatically linking it directly to its most speci c subsumers and to the most general
concepts that it in turn subsumes. Most other semantic networks, as well as frame-based
representations and object-oriented programming systems, provide such inheritance only
for concepts that are directly placed by their designers (or by speci c programs) at the
correct position in the taxonomy to inherit what is intended.
Later in the same article Woods gives a more detailed de nition of taxonomic structure
p.79-81]. He notes that the structure that results from organizing conceptual descriptions
on the basis of subsumption is a partial ordering, and that, depending on the conceptforming operators involved, the structure may be a formal lattice with respect to subsumption (that is, a partial ordering in which each pair of concepts has a unique least
upper bound in the form of a most speci c joint subsumer and a unique greatest lower
bound in the form of a single most general common subsumee). For any collection of
relations and taxonomic concepts, there is a rather large and combinatoric space of all
possible composite descriptions that can be formed from them. This space of all descriptions, organized by the collection of all such subsumption relations, has been referred to
as the \virtual taxonomy", because, although its structure is important, one never wants
to make it explicit in the memory of a computer (or a person).
Woods continues by observing that, whenever a reasoning agent constructs an explicit
collection of concept nodes and computes and records the subsumption relationships among
those concepts, the result is a subgraph of the virtual taxonomy. All of the operations of
classi cation and deduction operate on the explicit taxonomy, and every description that
is added to it is in some sense already in the virtual taxonomy (except when adding a
new primitive concept or relation). Thus, classifying a new concept is, in a sense, merely
making explicit a concept that already exists in the virtual taxonomy.
Finally, Woods de nes classi cation as follows p.82]:
Classi cation is ... the process by which new concepts are added to an existing
taxonomy and linked in at the appropriate position or by which a collection
of concepts linked by some recorded subsumption relationships is expanded to
include all direct subsumption relationships that can be inferred by means of
the structural subsumption rule. Note that this operation is an operation on
a system of concepts, unlike subsumption, which is an operation on a pair of
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concepts.
To sum up:

T-Box. It has its own term-de nition language , which provides primitives to de ne con-

cepts and roles | the latter are used to express relations between concepts. It is a
virtual lattice determined by the subsumption relation between concepts. It uses a
concept classi er , which takes a new concept and determines the subsumption relations between it and all the other concepts in a given Knowledge Base. By means of
the classi er, a new concept can be automatically assimilated into the taxonomy by
\placing it in the right place", i.e. linking it to its most speci c subsumers and its
most general subsumees.

A-Box. As Mac Gregor, 1991, p.389] notices, while there is considerable agreement within

the hybrid systems community on what terminological capabilities should be provided, there is no comparable consensus on what the assertional component should
look like. However, there are two features, each of which appears in the assertional
component of the more recent hybrid systems, that may eventually become established characteristics of classi cation-based technology. The rst feature is a general
capability for specifying the attachment of constraints to concepts, e.g. by specifying
rules attached to a concept, and the second is an object-centered approach to the
assertional reasoning component.
Finally, the concept of recognizer will be relevant to the inferences I will discuss:
The set of concepts that an individual in a knowledge base belongs to is
called the type of that individual. ... Each of the above three systems1
implements an assertional reasoner called a recognizer 2 whose function is
to maintain current values for the types of all individuals in the knowledge
base. Mac Gregor, 1991, p.389]

I will assume from now on that my ontology in the T-Box includes action descriptions
besides the usual hierarchies about \entities". I would like now to again pose the question:
why use a hybrid KR system, with the added complexity that classi cation involves, instead
of using a simpler representation augmented with an inheritance mechanism? The answer
lies in two crucial characteristics of a T-Box: the facts that the taxonomy is a virtual
lattice, and that it can be extended by means of the classi er.
In Sec. 5.2.1.1 I showed that it is necessary to understand the relation between the various
possible logical forms i and the stored . I have found subsumption to be both powerful
enough and restrictive enough to capture all relations of interest. For example, in (5.19d)
the classi er is crucial: the action descriptions cut the square in half along the diagonal
and cut the square in half along a perpendicular axis are structurally exactly the same,
but the incompatibility is detected when examining the llers of the role along on the two
1
2

BACK Quantz and Kindermann, 1990], LOOM Mac Gregor, 1988], CLASSIC Brachman et al., 1991].
Called realizer elsewhere, e.g. in Nebel, 1990].
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di erent concepts.3 Notice that computing subsumption doesn't per se yield incompatibilities between two concepts. However, all hybrid systems augment the basic mechanism
so that various queries can be posed to the KB: one of these is whether two concepts are
disjoint, which is answered by and ing the two concepts and checking whether the resulting
concept is inconsistent.
Moreover, notice the importance of having a virtual lattice. Suppose we have a certain
description of an action, such as the stored 37 in (5.18): even keeping the names of
predicate, arguments and modi ers xed, it is always possible to envision a surface string
that does not exactly correspond to 37 therefore it is important to be able to understand
the relation between stored knowledge and input description as the need arises.
Many researchers have mentioned that taxonomies of actions are necessary, especially
for plan inference. However, they have either focussed on their use in representing only
planning, and not also linguistic knowledge | Devanbu and Litman, 1991], Wellman,
1988], described in Sec. 6.2.2, Kautz, 1990], Tenenberg, 1989], described in Sec. 7.3 or,
as in Balkanski, 1993], just noted that action descriptions form a lattice, but not exploited
the power of the virtual lattice, as I have here, to capture di erences between the input
and the stored action descriptions.
Before describing the features of the hybrid system CLASSIC Brachman et al., 1991], I
will summarize how I use it.
1. First of all, actions are full edged entities in my formalism namely, a subtaxonomy of the general taxonomy will comprise action description concepts. In practice,
verb phrases will be mapped to concepts in the T-Box, decomposed according to
Jackendo 's Conceptual Structures | see Sec. 6.1.3.
2. The A-Box as usual contains assertions about individuals however, the individuals
in this case will include both individuals in the traditional sense, and action description instances | notice that individual action descriptions are not action tokens.
In practice, this corresponds to reifying action descriptions, just as propositional
descriptions were rei ed in PSI-KLONE Brachman et al., 1979].
3. The parser produces a logical form which relates one or more action descriptions
according to the connectives contained in the input utterance. The recognizer with
which the A-Box is equipped will therefore compute the set of types of which such
logical forms are instances.
4. Finally, those individuals that play the role of goals will be used as indexes to retrieve
relevant recipes from the action library if they are not goals, they will be matched
with the substeps of the recipe(s) found in the retrieval step.
The interplay between the various parts will become clearer in Secs. 6.1.3 and 6.2.2, and
in the next chapter.
3
There is actually no real role along : this is just an approximation, see Sec. 6.1.3 for the full details of
the formalism.
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6.1.1.1 The CLASSIC system
Here I will describe the CLASSIC system that I use in my implementation Borgida et
al., 1989 Brachman et al., 1991]. Woods and Schmolze, 1991, p.38] gives the following
introduction to CLASSIC:
Here in CLASSIC], we nd that certain traits of KRYPTON have remained:
CLASSIC was designed to have tractable subsumption but with greater expressibility. We also nd that some traits are gone: there is no physical separation
of the T and A boxes. In CLASSIC, the language for describing terms is the
same as the language for describing individuals. The de nition versus assertion distinction remains, but it is less clear than in KRYPTON given the lack
of separate T and A boxes. The classi er only pays attention to de nitional
operators. ... Overall, the goals of CLASSIC appear to be more pragmatic
than those of KRYPTON. CLASSIC's designers have taken advantage of their
experience regarding user needs, implementational methods, complexity measures, and the importance of certain distinctions. The result is a tractable and
reasonably expressive KR system.
CLASSIC's language is described as follows in Brachman et al., 1991, p.407-409]:

Concept Forming Operators.
PRIMITIVE, DISJOINT-PRIMITIVE. They allow a user to form concepts that cannot be fully speci ed by necessary and sucient conditions. A
DISJOINT-PRIMITIVE concept is just like a PRIMITIVE concept, ex-

cept that any concepts within the same \disjoint grouping" are known to be
disjoint from each other.
AND. The AND operator creates a new concept that is the conjunction of the
concepts given as arguments. For example, if WHITE-WINE and
FULL-BODIED-WINE are two concepts that have been previously de ned, their
conjunction is de ned as
(AND WHITE-WINE FULL-BODIED-WINE)
ONE-OF. A ONE-OF concept (or enumerated concept) enumerates a set of
individuals, which are the only instances of the concept. For example, a wine
whose body could be either full or medium would have the restriction
(ALL body (ONE-OF Full Medium))
Role Restrictions. The ve operators ALL, AT-LEAST, AT-MOST, FILLS, and
SAME-AS form expressions known as role restrictions .
A universal value restriction, or ALL restriction, speci es that all the llers of a
particular role must be individuals described by a particular concept expression. For
example, a CALIFORNIA-WINE might be de ned as a wine whose region is a California
region, where the California regions are Napa Valley, Sonoma Valley, etc. The region
role restriction would be written
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(ALL region

CALIFORNIA-REGION)

AT-LEAST and AT-MOST restrictions restrict the minimum and maximum num-

ber of llers allowed for a given role on a concept or individual. For example, part
of the de nition of a wine might be that it is made from at least one kind of grape,
which would be written
(AT-LEAST 1

grape)

where grape is a role.
The FILLS operator speci es that a role is lled by some speci ed individuals (although the role may have additional llers). For example, we might de ne the concept
CHARDONNAY-WINE as a wine whose grapes include chardonnay the restriction would
be written as
(FILLS grape

Chardonnay)

A SAME-AS restriction requires that the individual found by following one attribute path is the same individual as that found by following a second attribute
path.4 For example, suppose that there is a food and a drink associated with each
course at a meal. Then the concept REGIONAL-COURSE might be de ned as a course
where the food's region is the same as the drink's region. This would be written as
(AND MEAL-COURSE (SAME-AS (food region) (drink region)))
Moreover, it is possible to use procedures in specifying concepts, by means of the TEST-C
/ TEST-H operators. Finally, one can express rules of the form A ) B where A and B
are concepts. Rules are not considered by the classi er and are thus considered assertional.
Brachman et al., 1991, p.405] describes the deductive inferences that CLASSIC provides:
Completion: Logical consequences of assertions about individuals and descriptions
of concepts are computed there are a number of \completion" inferences CLASSIC
can make:
{ Inheritance: Restrictions that apply to instances of a concept must also apply
to instances of specializations of that concept. In a sense, then, properties are
\inherited" by more speci c concepts from those that they specialize.
{ Combination: Restrictions on concepts and individuals can be logically combined to make narrower restrictions.
{ Propagation: When an assertion is made about an individual, it may hold logical
consequences for some other, related individuals. CLASSIC \propagates" this
information forward when an assertion is made.5

Attributes express 1:1 relations.
For example suppose we know that Sue drinks Chateau d'Yquem Sauterne, and we tell CLASSIC that Sue drinks only dry wines. The information is then propagated that the individual
Chateau-d-Yquem-Sauterne must be a dry wine. Brachman et al., 1991, p.411].
4
5
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{ Contradiction detection: It is possible to accidentally assert two facts about an
{

individual that are logically impossible to conjoin. CLASSIC detects this kind
of contradiction.
Incoherent concept detection: It is possible to accidentally give a concept some
restrictions that combine to make a logical impossibility, thereby not allowing
any instances of the concept to be possible. CLASSIC detects this kind of
inconsistent description.

Classi cation and subsumption:

{ Concept classi cation: All concepts more general than a concept and all con{
{

cepts more speci c than a concept are found.6
Individual classi cation: All concepts that an individual satis es are determined.7
Subsumption: Questions about whether or not one concept is more general than
another concept are answered.

Rule application: Simple forward-chaining rules have concepts as antecedents and
consequences. When an individual is determined to satisfy the antecedent of a rule,
it is asserted to satisfy the consequent as well.

6.1.2 Conceptual Structure representation
One of my criticisms of action representation formalisms for plan inference in NL is that
they too often neglect the linguistic side of the input description. The issue is then to nd
a representation that is both linguistically motivated, and that is also useful with respect
to the representation of planning knowledge. I think that work done in lexical semantics,
and in particular in its sub eld of lexical decomposition, answers these two requirements.
In Shapiro, 1992, p.812-813], Pustejovski characterizes lexical semantics as follows:
The study of natural language semantics is the investigation of how and what
linguistic utterances denote. The subdiscipline of lexical semantics, then, can
be seen as the study of how and what the words in a language denote. We
can partition the concerns of lexical semantics into the two issues of meaning
(the how ) and reference (the what ). Some lexical semantics theories actually
have little if anything to say about the problem of reference, and concentrate
on the structural properties of word meaning,8 while those providing for modes
of reference often have nothing to contribute to the structural aspects of word
meaning.
According to Levin and Pinker, 1991, p.2-3]
Note that object-oriented programming languages usually have inheritance, but not classi cation.
This was called recognition or realization in Sec. 6.1.1.
8
For example Jackendo, 1990].

6

7
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The assumption underlying much of this current linguistic research | that
syntactic properties of phrases reect, in large part, the meanings of the words
that head them | also provides a powerful new methodology for studying word
meaning. ... When the technique of searching for syntax-relevant distinctions is
applied to many words and many constructions, a small set of semantic elements
tends to recur. ... Jackendo 's paper introduces the notion of \conceptual
semantics" | a characterization of the conceptual elements by which a person
understands words and sentences, to be distinguished from much of formal
linguistic semantics which characterize the abstract relation between words
and sentences and the external world.
Within lexical semantics, work on lexical decomposition is the closest to my concern of
providing a principled representation for action verbs. Fass and Pustejovsky in Shapiro,
1992, p.806] note that lexical decomposition is that branch of lexical semantics concerned
with the internal semantic structure of lexical and conceptual items within a lexicon. They
observe that the focus of lexical decomposition is on how the lexical items are semantically
similar and distinct by virtue of shared knowledge structures containing semantic primitives, while its goal is to provide the necessary and sucient conditions for the meaning of
every lexical item in a subject domain or language. If primitives and structures are taken
as an exhaustive set on top of which all expressions in the language are expressed, then
the meaning of any lexical item in the language must be derived from these terms.
Jackendo 's Conceptual Structures 1990] seems to provide a good foundation for lexical
decomposition. In particular, there are two reasons that make it appropriate for my purposes, and that I will illustrate in the following: rst, the primitives of his decompositional
theory capture important generalizations about action descriptions and their relationships
to one another, and second, they reveal where information may be missing from an utterance and may have to be provided by inference. Given that one of my concerns, and the
concerns in AnimNL, is that of interpreting a NL instruction from the surface down to its
(simulated) execution, it is clear that this latter characteristics is particularly important.
A comment before introducing the notation and some minor modi cations to the theory
as presented in White, 1992], and applying it to the representation of the clause Go into
the kitchen . According to Fass and Pustejovski in Shapiro, 1992, p.808-809], Jackendo
believes in the cognitive primacy of the primitives used within his system, and the role of
these primitives in performing inferences. They point out that it is important to realize
that Jackendo sees semantic representation in general as a subset of conceptual structure,
where conceptual structure is a term for the language of mental representation. Finally,
they observe that much of Jackendo 's approach begins with an analysis of spatial relations
and how they are realized in the language.
Coming now to Jackendo 's theory proper, an entity may be of ontological type Thing,
Place, Path, Event, State, Manner or Property . The conceptual structure for a kitchen
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is shown in (6.3a) below:
(6.3a) Thing kitchen]
(6.3b) Thing room]
Square brackets indicate an entity of type Thing meeting the enclosed featural description.
Small caps indicate atoms in conceptual structure, which serve as links to other systems
of representation for example, the conceptual structure for a room (6.3b) di ers from
that of a kitchen only in its choice of constant. Jackendo leaves the determination of
their similarities and di erences to a system of representation better suited to the task,
able to address perceptual distinctions: for example, in AnimNL this would correspond to
the graphics simulation system. Moreover, some of these distinctions can be captured by
means of a taxonomy | see Sec. 6.1.3.
To distinguish instances of a type, Zwarts and Verkuyl, 1993] augment Conceptual Structures with an index, as in (6.4):
(6.4) Thing room]1
Conceptual structures may also contain complex features generated by conceptual functions
over other conceptual structures. For example, the conceptual function IN: Thing ! Place
may be used to represent the location in the kitchen as shown in (6.5a) below. Likewise,
the function TO: Place ! Path describes a path that ends in the speci ed place, as shown
in (6.5b):
(6.5a) Place IN(Thing kitchen]k )]l
(6.5b) Path TO(Place IN(Thing kitchen]k )]l)]m
(6.5c) Path TO(l)]m
(6.5c) is an equivalent representation of (6.5b), where the index l stands for the entire
Place constituent. This move considerably lessens the complexity of representing large
conceptual structures to further lessen this complexity, indices and ontological types will
often be left out.
To complete the representation of Go into the kitchen , it remains only to add the conceptual
function GO: Thing  Path ! Event:
GO(you]i , m)]
(6.6) Event
Path TO(IN(kitchen])])]m
To distinguish Walk into the other room from (6.6), White, 1992] adds an indication of
manner to the basic representation:9
(6.7)

"

GO(i m)
Manner walking]

#

White's nal addition to Jackendo 's theory is a new semantic eld. Semantic elds, such
9

Though this is clearly intended, Jackendo never explicitly represents such a distinction.
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as Spatial and Possessional, are intended to capture the similarities between sentences like
Jack went into the kitchen and The gift went to Bill , as shown in (6.8) below:
(6.8a) GOSp(jack], TO(IN(kitchen])])])]
(6.8b) GOPoss (gift], TO(AT(bill])])])]
In fact, in Fass and Pustejovsky's words Shapiro, 1992, p.809]
Jackendo ... explores the idea that the predicates within the spatial domain
may be used to analyze concepts within other semantic domains. The basic
idea here is that for di erent semantic elds such as possession, identi cation,
circumstantial, and temporal, a verb from the spatial eld can acquire a new
meaning using the same primitives because it is being evaluated relative to a
new eld.
Verbs like go leave the semantic eld underspeci ed, whereas verbs like donate specify a
particular eld. White's new semantic eld is called Control. It is intended to represent the
functional notion of having control over some object. For example, in sports, the meanings
of having the ball , keeping the ball , getting the ball , and losing the ball embody this notion,
and are clearly quite distinct from their Spatial and Possessional counterparts: Control
captures these additional similarities in an analogous way. The similarity between Jack
has the money and Jack has the ball , for instance, is shown in (6.9):
(6.9a) BEPoss(money], AT(jack])])]
(6.9b) BECtrl (ball], AT(jack])])]
Notice that the notion of Control is very relevant to AnimNL's domain, given that any
action involving direct physical manipulation requires that the agent have the object to be
manipulated under his control.
An important CS primitive that will play a role in the following is CAUSE | Jackendo ,
1990, p.44]:
An Event can be elaborated] as the Event-function CAUSE plus two arguments. The rst argument, if a Thing, is the agent if an Event, is Cause. The
second argument, an Event, is the E ect.
Schematically
(6.10) Event CAUSE(Thing=Event]i , Event ]j )]
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Later, Jackendo notes a confusion between two tiers into which conceptual roles fall:
a thematic tier dealing with motion and location, and the related notions of Goal and
Theme  and an action tier dealing with Actor and Patient relations. For example, in
(6.11) Bill is both Theme and Actor, but the room is only the Goal, not also the Patient:
in fact, in (6.11) there is no Patient.
(6.11) Bill entered the room.
According to Jackendo , 1990, p.128]
The action tier enables us to dissect the traditional notion of Agent into a
number of independent parts ... One sense of Agent, \extrinsic instigator of
action", is captured by the role \ rst argument of CAUSE", an element in the
thematic tier. However, a second sense is \volitional actor". This appears, for
instance, in the well-known ambiguity of Bill rolled down the hill , where Bill
may or may not be performing the action willfully. Generally, it seems that
any Actor, if animate, is subject to this ambiguity, unless the verb speci cally
selects for a volitional Agent, as do, for instance, buy and look .
To sum up, the Event functions described so far, and in particular CAUSE, capture only
the notions of Theme, Source, and Goal. To capture the notions of Actor and Patient,
Jackendo adds a new dimension to all such functions, which is
(6.12) AFF(Thing]i , Thing ]j )
Without going into all the details that Jackendo examines, (6.13b), which represents
(6.13a), illustrates the usage of the two tiers:
(6.13a) Harry gave Sam a book
(6.13b)
"
#
2
FROM
(
harry
])
)]
6 CAUSE (harry] GOPoss (book]
TO (sam])
4
AFF (harry] sam])

3
7
5

As I mentioned above, it makes sense to use Jackendo 's Conceptual Structures in this
work for two reasons:
1. the primitives of the theory capture important generalizations about action descriptions and their relationships to one another
2. a logical form expressed in terms of CS highlights where information may be missing
from an utterance and needs to be provided by inference. For example, the input
utterance
(6.14) Remove the fuel cap to ll the tank.
is mapped into the following representation:
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2
6
4

3

CAUSE (you] INCH (BE (fuel-cap] k)])])
7
AFF (you] fuel-cap])
5
FOR( )


h
2
6
4

i

AT ; END ; OF (FROM (AT (fuel-cap])])]) k
"

INCH (BE ( ]j  IN (tank])])])])
CAUSE (you] FILL
AFF (you] tank])

# 3
7
5



This can be glossed as the agent causes the fuel cap to be away from where it is
now, for the purpose of the agent causing something to be in the tank. Notice the
purpose clause in the example: the function FOR is used in Jackendo , 1990] to
encode the subordinating function for purpose clauses. Another CS primitive that
I haven't mentioned so far is INCH, which is used to encode inchoative readings of
verb phrases. Jackendo notes that apparently INCH introduces a redundancy, as
(6.15a) and (6.15b) appear to encode the same event.
(6.15a) GO (X], Path TO (Place Y])])]
(6.15b) INCH(BE (X], Place Y])])]
I refer the reader to Jackendo , 1990, p.93-95] as regards the reasons why this is not
the case.
The conceptual atom fill, introduced by White, 1992], serves as a pointer to semantic information not captured by the decomposition.10 Finally, AT-END-OF is
another Place function introduced in Jackendo , 1990].
This representation makes evident features that are not explicit in the given sentence,
such as where the fuel cap has to be removed from. The representation nesses this
as AT(fuel-cap]), namely, where the fuel cap is now. Similarly, there is no explicit
mention of the liquid to be put into the tank, so that its place in the representation
is left unspeci ed. (If the utterance were to ll the tank with fuel , then fuel would
occupy that position.)

6.1.3 Integrating Hybrid Systems and Conceptual Structures
Both the formalisms I have discussed so far respond to some of the desiderata I listed
earlier: in particular, a hybrid system provides the exibility required in dealing with action
descriptions that don't exactly match the stored knowledge a semantic representation such
as Jackendo 's is linguistically motivated and manages to capture generalizations, such as
that carry is a move action augmented with a speci c physical means of moving the object.
10

Such atoms will be the llers for the role lex-item discussed in Sec. 7.2.1.
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Given that the two formalisms both show promise, the next natural step is to integrate
them. Both will bene t from this integration.
De ning terms in the T-Box by means of linguistically sound primitives will transform
the T-Box into a real lexicon, or at least, into a Knowledge Base onto which the logical
form produced by the parser can be easily mapped to | see White, 1992] on the reasons
why CS is particularly suitable as the logical form produced by a parser based on the
Combinatory Categorial Grammar formalism Steedman, 1990 Steedman, 1991].
On the other hand, a KL-ONE style representation will make it possible to use Conceptual
Structures in a computational framework, by endowing it with a hierarchical organization
and with the possibility of extending the lexicon. A avor of hierarchical organization is
present in Jackendo , 1990] itself. Consider (6.3), repeated here for convenience:
(6.16a) Thing kitchen]
(6.16b) Thing room]
room and kitchen are atoms in Conceptual Structures, and so are many other entities,
such as liquid and wine. Jackendo postulates a type Thing which is a collection of
all atoms, with no further structure imposed. Although he mentions that e.g. there are
rules to determine that wine satis es the feature liquid, he never goes into the algorithm
for performing such computation. This can of course be done by means of a taxonomy
rooted in the concept Thing . Liquid will be de ned as a subconcept of Thing , and wine
as a subconcept of liquid , e.g. by adding to liquid the restrictions made from grapes and
fermented .
Jackendo de nes all these concepts as atoms because they cannot be de ned at the level of
Conceptual Structures: this is readily captured in terminological systems by de ning them
as primitive concepts, namely, concepts for which necessary but not sucient conditions
can be stipulated { apart maybe from wine , as made from grapes can be considered as a
de ning condition.
In Figs. 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, I present part of the T-Box that I have implemented in CLASSIC
Brachman et al., 1991] and whose complete CLASSIC version the reader can nd in
Appendix C.
The graphical conventions are as follows (adapted from Woods and Schmolze, 1991, p.9].
Concepts are represented by ellipses and roles are represented by small circles containing
inscribed squares. Attached to roles are value restrictions and other role \facets" (e.g.,
names and number restrictions), and attached to concepts are roles and structural conditions, i.e. SAME-AS constraints. Value restrictions on roles are indicated by directed
arrows pointing from the role to a concept that constrains possible llers. Structural conditions are indicated by diamond shaped lozenges enclosing an equal sign. Furthermore, in
my gures thick lines correspond to subsumption relations, and thick dashed lines to the
transitive closure of the subsumption relation thin dashed lines connect the relevant roles
to the SAME-AS map shaded ellipses indicate individuals.
There are six subtaxonomies of the topmost concept classic-thing which is not shown in
the gure. They are rooted respectively in entity | equivalent to Jackendo 's Thing |
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place, path, event, property and state . Fig. 6.1 shows parts of the entity , place and path
hierarchies, while Figs. 6.2 and 6.3 focus on the action hierarchy, in particular the former on
the go subhierarchy, the latter on the representation of cause and act-on | move-sth-swh
is an acronym for move something somewhere .
place

entity

inanimate

animate

spatialplace

path

source
(1,1)
destination
(1,1)

control-path
at-role

spatial-path

(1,1)

geometric
concept

at-sp-place

to-path-sp

from-path-sp

geometric
figure
from-to-path-sp
triangle

square

to-path-control

from(at)-to-path-sp

circular-path

SAME-AS

circular-path-sp

Figure 6.1: The path hierarchy

Entity. The taxonomy rooted in entity is very straightforward here only the subconcepts
animate and a small part of the subhierarchy rooted in inanimate are shown.

Place. The concepts belonging to this hierarchy correspond to conceptual functions of the

form F: Thing ! Place. Some such functions are AT, IN, ON. In Fig. 6.1, I show
only the concept spatial-place , and its subordinate at-sp-place , corresponding to the
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place

entity

source
(1,1)

path

event

at-role
(1,1)

animate

inanimate

(1,1)
destination

caused-role

at-sp-place

act-type

(1,1)

(1,1)

(1,1)

go
experiencer

path-role

from-to-path-sp

go-spatial

go-control

from(at)-to-path-sp
go-sp-from(at)-to
go-sp-to

agent
SAME-AS

subsumption
transitive closure

(1,1)

Figure 6.2: The go hierarchy
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cause

entity

event

animate

inanimate
caused-role

act-type

cause

(1,1)

(1,1)
experiencer
agent
(1,1)

intentional-act

act-on

patient
(1,1)

cause-and-acton

restricts
caused-role
go-sp-from-to

SAME-AS

move-sth-swh

subsumption
transitive closure

Figure 6.3: The action hierarchy
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AT conceptual function. at-sp-place has a single role at-role with exactly one ller,
of type Entity .
Path. The concepts belonging to this hierarchy represent functions yielding Path s. There
are di erent kinds of paths, corresponding to the di erent semantic elds: in the gure only two of them, spatial-path and control-path , are represented. In Appendix C
the reader can see that also comp-path , corresponding to the semantic eld composition , and ident-path , corresponding to the semantic eld identi cational , have been
de ned. The same distinctions apply to Place s. In CLASSIC the semantic eld is
represented by de ning a role semfield-role | not shown in the gures | whose
value restriction is the concept sem eld de ned by enumeration:
(cl-define-concept 'semfield
'(one-of spatial control ident contact composition))

Fig. 6.1 shows the subhierarchy rooted in the spatial-path concept. Note in particular:
1. from-to-path-sp is de ned by means of multiple inheritance, being a daughter of
both to-path-sp and from-path-sp  so is circular-path-sp , daughter of circularpath and from-to-path-sp .
2. The from-to-path-sp concept has two roles, source and destination, each of
which has a ller place . from-to-path-sp corresponds to the complex Conceptual
Structure:
"

FROM(Place])
TO(Place])

#

The concept from(at)-to-path-sp restricts the role source inherited from fromto-path-sp to be lled by at-place . It therefore corresponds to
"

FROM(AT(Thing])])
TO(Place])

#

3. The concept circular-path imposes on its two roles destination and source the
structural constraint that their llers be equal | expressed by the construct
SAME-AS in CLASSIC.
Event. Subtypes of event are cause and act-type , as shown in both Figs. 6.2 and 6.3.
The reader may wonder why cause is not de ned as an act-type : this is to maintain
the distinction between the thematic and action tiers that Jackendo argues for and
that I discussed in Sec. 6.1.2.
cause has two roles, the agent, restricted to be animate , and the caused-role,
restricted to be an act-type. This introduces three further restrictions with respect
to Jackendo 's de nition of CAUSE in (6.10): (6.10) allows the agent11 to be a
11

In Jackendo's terms, agent would be \source" or \theme", and the caused-role \theme" or \goal".
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Thing, therefore also an inanimate entity, or an Event the caused-role an Event,
here instead restricted to be an act-type. I don't think these restrictions are too
severe, as they reect the characteristics of my application domain, and they could
easily be removed.
Fig. 6.2 shows part of the hierarchy rooted in go , which corresponds to the conceptual
function GO: Thing  Path ! Event. The concept go has as roles experiencer, inherited from act-type , and path-role. Actually there is a third role, semfield-role,
which is not shown in the gure. The requirement is that the path ller on the
role path-role on the various more specialized go 's | go-spatial , go-control etc |
has the same semantic eld as go . The concept go-sp-from(at)-to restricts the role
path-role of go to be a from(at)-to-path-sp .
Fig. 6.3 shows the part of the hierarchy more related to actions in the intuitive sense
of the term, namely, to intentional act s that may a ect other entities, as in act-on
| notice that go in Fig. 6.2, intentional-act and act-on are siblings.12 The two
thematic and action tiers discussed on Pag. 103 are kept distinct, and included in
the de nition of actions by de ning cause-and-acton as daughter of both cause and
act-on . Notice the following two requirements on cause-and-acton :
1. The ller of the experiencer role inherited from act-on , and of the agent role
inherited from cause must be the same. In CLASSIC, this is expressed by means
of the following SAME-AS restriction:
(6.17) (SAME-AS (experiencer) (agent))
It should be read as: the ller of the role experiencer inherited from act-on is
the SAME-AS the ller of the role agent inherited from cause . As mentioned
in Sec. 6.1.1.1, SAME-AS is a very restricted form of structural condition , as
it requires all the roles belonging to the two paths to be attributes, and the
relation between the two llers at the end of the paths to be equality.
2. The ller of the patient role inherited from act-on , and the ller of the
experiencer role of the act-type which is in turn the ller of caused-role
inherited from cause must be the same. The relevant SAME-AS restriction is:
(6.18) (SAME-AS (patient) (caused-role experiencer))
Again, this de nition of cause-and-acton is not as general as it should be. For
example, the verb give , as presented in (6.13), does not respect this restriction,
and therefore could not be a descendant of cause-and-acton : in fact, the ller of
caused-role is a go-poss , whose experiencer is the book however, the ller
of patient is Sam . This de nition of cause-and-acton is in any case sucient
for my purposes, and could be easily modi ed to accommodate other verbs.
Finally, the concept move-sth-swh | for move something somewhere | is de ned
as a subconcept of cause-and-acton by imposing the restriction that the ller of the
Of course the de nition of intentional-act as an act-type whose experiencer is animate is an oversimpli cation, especially in light of the discussion in Sec. 4.2.3.2. However, it wouldn't be dicult to nesse
the representation and to give a more accurate account of volitionality, along the lines of Jackendo, 1990,
p. 128-129].
12
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be go-sp-from-to . Notice that this de nition of move-sth-swh exactly
captures its Conceptual Structure de nition shown in the header of the action recipe
in Fig. 6.4, which will be discussed in Sec. 6.2:
caused-role

2
6
6
4

3

CAUSE(agent]i GOSp(j k)])]
7
"
#
7
FROM(m)
5
TO(l)
k

To conclude, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that the hierarchies
in Figs. 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 only show the subsumption links that are explicitly expressed
in the initial de nition of the TBox. When such de nitions are processed, additional
subsumption links are computed by the classi er: for example, cause-and-acton is recognized as a descendant of intentional-act . In fact, cause-and-acton inherits the restriction
(ALL agent animate) from cause  given the SAME-AS requirement in (6.17), this restriction is propagated to the role experiencer inherited from act-type through act-on :
however, an act-type with an animate agent is an intentional-act , therefore act-on is recognized as a descendant of intentional-act as well.

6.2 The action library
The action library contains simple commonsense plans about actions. Following Pollack,
1986 Balkanski, 1993] I will call such plans recipes .
In the abstract, the syntax of recipes could be described as follows in a BNF form:

RECIPE BNF
RECIPE
BASIC-RECIPE
NON-BASIC-RECIPE
BASIC-HEADER
HEADER
BODY
ANNOTATION
QUALIFIER
EFFECT
TEMP-REL

!
!
!
!
!
!
!

BASIC-RECIPE j NON-BASIC-RECIPE
BASIC-HEADER QUALIFIER EFFECT+
HEADER BODY QUALIFIER EFFECT+
basic-act-type
act-type
act-type+ ANNOTATION
act-type1 enab act-type2 j
act-type1 TEMP-REL act-type2
! state
! state
! before j meets j overlaps ...

One instance of a recipe, which illustrates a method for moving-sth-swh , is shown in
Fig. 6.4.
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The distinction between BASIC-RECIPE and NON-BASIC-RECIPE is due to the fact
that basic-act-types are considered as primitives at this level of representation, and they
don't have hierarchical decomposition | I take here advantage of the AnimNL system,
that will provide the necessary decomposition in lower level actions Webber et al., 1992
Levison, 1993].
It is a notorious dicult problem to de ne what a basic act-type is, as I already mentioned
in Sec. 5.1.3. From Pollack, 1986, p.59]
Basic actions are, essentially, actions that can be performed at will typical
examples in the literature are an agent's raising his arm, or turning his head.
But there is a second important condition on basic actions: they are not performed by doing another action. ... Intuitively, when we model some domain
of action and consider executability in that domain, we do not reason \all the
way" to the level of bodily actions. Instead we decide, perhaps arbitrarily, on
some set of actions that we assume executable at will, and do not consider how
actions in that set are actually performed. So, for instance, within the domain
of computer mail, we might assume that all actions that consist in typing a
command are executable at will.
For the purpose of this thesis, I will assume that CS Event functions that don't have another
event as argument are basic: this implies that all the act-types which are descendants of
GO are basic. Also other action types, that, as Jackendo says, just serve as links to
other systems of representation better suited to determine their properties, are basic | cf.
PHYSICAL-WASH in Fig. 7.10.
Notice that both the act-type and the state appearing in the de nition are the corresponding T-Box concepts | a small portion of the state hierarchy is shown in Fig. 6.6. However,
in Fig. 6.4 the act-types and the states are expressed in the original CS formalism, not to
clutter the gure too much, especially given the high number of SAME-AS restrictions
necessary to express coreference. Also notice that in certain recipes, as in Fig. 7.10, the
operator ACHIEVE is used ACHIEVE is de ned as a function from states to actions
Pollack, 1986]. The CLASSIC de nition for ACHIEVE can be found in Appendix C.
As we can see from the BNF, individual action entries have a header , body , quali ers and
eects . The terminology, especially header and body , is reminiscent of STRIPS Fikes and
Nilsson, 1971] however the relations between these components are expressed in terms of
enablement and generation |for example the body generates its header.
The representation does not employ preconditions, because it is very dicult to draw the
line between what is a precondition and what is part of the body of the action. One could
say that the body of a move-sth-swh simply consists of a transfer of an object from one
place to another and that a precondition for a move-sth-swh is having control over that
object. However, consider a heavy object: the agent will start exerting force to lift it, and
then carry it to the other location. It is not obvious whether the lifting action is still part
of achieving the precondition, or already part of the body of the action.
The choice of not having preconditions has been motivated elsewhere in AnimNL with
more extensive arguments | Geib, 1992]. Summarizing, Geib's main argument is that
113

Header
CAUSE(agent]i  GOSp(j k)])]
"
#
FROM(m)
TO(l)
k

Body
- GOSp(i, TO(m)])]1
- CAUSE(i, GOCtrl(j , TO(AT(i)])])])]2
"

#

Sp(i k)
- GO
WITH(j )] 3

Annotations

- 1 enables 2
- 2 enables 3

Quali ers
- BESp(j , m)]

Eects
- BESp(j , l)]
Figure 6.4: A Move Something Somewhere action
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Finally ... an agent might be using an action to accomplish more than one
intention. For example, suppose an agent has three goals: clearing a block,
having the robot's hand at table level, and having the robot's hand empty.
While a successful unstack operation will accomplish all three of these tasks,
it is not necessary that each of the unstack subactions be successful in order
to achieve all of these goals: the block might slip out of the robot's hand and
break. However, since this is unrelated to the system's goals, preconditions
that would prevent it would not need to be enforced before taking the action.
In summary, the preconditions of an action depend crucially on the environment
in which the action is undertaken and the goals it is invoked to achieve.
Therefore, the view that is embodied in the action recipes is to express what is traditionally expressed by means of preconditions by means of actions, which may be substeps in
executing another action | namely, they may belong to a sequence that generates the
header. As in previous chapters, the term sequence should not be interpreted as meaning
that there is a total temporal order holding between the actions belonging to the sequence:
the order may be partial, and actions in a body may have other relations holding between
them, such as enablement in Fig. 6.4. The annotations on the body specify the relations
between the subactions.
From the planning tradition I retain the notions of quali ers and eects . Quali ers, alternatively called applicability conditions Schoppers, 1988], constraints Litman and Allen,
1990], or usewhen conditions Tate, 1987], express conditions that must hold for an action
to be relevant, and are not meant to be achieved. For example, unplug x is relevant only
if x is plugged in. In Fig. 6.4, there is one quali er, that requires j to be at m.13
Eects are what must be true after an action has been executed.
The CS representation is also useful for computing quali ers and e ects in a systematic
way: some of them can be precompiled from the representation itself. For example, for
every action including a component  of j moving from where it is to l in its header, i.e.
"

GOSp

 "

m)
j FROM(
TO(l)

#!#



that after  , j must be at l, therefore we can include this in the e ects of the action. Given
the further restriction that j cannot be in two di erent places at once,14 we may infer that
j cannot be at l now, and thus precompute the quali er that j should be at m | where
l 6= m.
A nal disclaimer. First of all, notice that clearly the recipe for move-sth-swh in Fig. 6.4 is
not the only one possible: for example an object could be moved by means of an electronic
device, or by asking someone else to perform the action, etc. This would simply imply
Notice that the quali ers in a sense apply to the subactions, in that the one in the example makes 1
relevant.
14
Note that there are semantic ieds, such as Poss , to which this restriction does not apply.
13
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adding another recipe to the Action Library. Given the hierarchical organization for the
Action Library, described in Sec. 6.2.2, and the way the algorithm retrieves recipes and
matches them to the input description, this is not a problem.
A more important concern is that the recipe for move-sth-swh is not complete. More
speci cally, neither the quali er nor the e ect list is exhaustive: they both merely list
some necessary conditions. The problem of listing all necessary and sucient conditions
plagues AI systems: for example, well-known are the quali cation and the frame problems.
The rst arises with regard to universally quanti ed sentences, such as \All birds y".
Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987, p.117] notes that we might express this as
8x Bird(x) ) Flies(x). This sentence might be useful for certain limited purposes, but
we would soon be confronted by the fact that ostriches, which are birds, do not y. The
axiom could be changed as follows:

8x

Bird(x)

^ :Ostrich(x) )

Flies(x)

Even this sentence does not accurately capture the real world, however, because several
other kinds of birds do not y: baby birds, dead birds, wingless birds, and so on. The
list of such quali cations is very long if not endless: most universally quanti ed sentences
would have to include an in nite number of quali cations if they were to be interpreted as
accurate statements about the world. Work on default reasoning addresses this problem.
On the other hand, the frame problem is the problem of characterizing the aspects of a
state that are not changed by an action, and it arises for example in the context of de ning
planning operators Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987, p.271-2]. These operator descriptions
are not complete, as they describe the facts that become true as a result of executing instances of each operator, and indirectly they describe the facts that become false. However,
they do not specify anything about the facts that were true beforehand and that remain
true afterward or about the facts that were false beforehand and that remain false afterward. The frame problem is to write frame axioms that indicate the properties that remain
unchanged after each action. Typically, the number of frame axioms is proportional to the
product of the number of relations and the number of operators in our conceptualization:
what makes the frame problem a problem is that, in worlds of realistic complexity, there
are many more actions and relations, and so many more axioms are necessary.
The connection between the fact I don't list all the quali ers / e ects and the quali cation
/ frame problem is clear: how is it possible to list all relevant conditions? Consider for
example any action of physical manipulation. At a minimum it requires that the agent can
physically perform it: which may span an in nite number of conditions, for example that
the agent is not paralyzed, or that he is strong enough to lift the object to be manipulated.
Some of these conditions appear to be quali ers | if the object is too heavy for the agent to
lift, and the agent knows it, there is no point in trying to perform the action on the other
hand, if the agent is tied up, getting untied may accomplish an executability condition,
namely, that the agent is free to perform the action. This problem is often bypassed in
action representation formalisms | e.g. in Goldman, 1970 Pollack, 1986 Balkanski,
1993] | by requiring that the agent be in standard conditions with respect to the action
to be performed.
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I am mentioning all this in order to justify my representation: the quali ers and e ects
I list are merely a part of the required list of conditions, and I make no claim about the
exhaustiveness of the condition lists I provide.

6.2.1 Relations between actions
Generation. I adopt the de nition of generation provided by Balkanski in her dissertation
1993], and modify it to include the case of a sequence A of actions generating another
action | cf. Sec. 5.1.2:

(6.19) A generates  if and only if
1. A is a sequence of actions, and  is an action performed by the same agent
at the same time15
2. there is a set of conditions, C , such that
(a) these conditions hold during the performance time of A and
(b) A 16 conditionally generates  under C .

Enablement. Again, the de nition of enablement is very similar to Balkanski's with
respect to (5.8) I modify the rst clause of the de nition so as to include cases in
which only has to start, but not necessarily to nish, before   and I also modify
clause 2(b) to reect the fact that I don't have preconditions in my recipes.
(6.20)

enables  if and only if

1. the start time of is prior to the start time of  ,
2. there is a third action  , such that
(a) either  conditionally generates  under C , and one of the conditions in
C , C i, holds as a result of the performance of  or
(b) there is a recipe for  in which  appears as a substep, and conditionally generates  .

Consider once more the question asked at the end of Sec. 5.1.4.3: what relation is
holding between each single i and  , in the presence of a sequence of actions A
< 1  2 ::: n > that generate another action . I had answered that question
by deciding to reserve the term enablement only to the relation holding between
pairs < i , k > belonging to A the relation between each i and  will be termed
instead indirect generation, as mentioned at the end of Sec. 5.1.2. In the context of
recipes then, this is equivalent to allow enablement relations within the body of an
action, and to implicitly assume that the relation between body and header is in fact
generation, even if the relative conditions are not explicitly spelled out | after all,
certain conditions, such as the standard ones, are implicitly always present.
15
This should be interpreted as meaning that the temporal extents of all the actions belonging to A and
of coincide.
16
Meaning, the sequence composed of the act-types 1  2  :::  belonging to A. Once again, I remind
the reader that sequence does not mean total temporal order.
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n

Temporal Relations. I assume the temporal relations between time intervals de ned in

Allen, 1984]: there are thirteen of them, including
BEFORE(t1 , t2 ) | time interval t1 is before time interval t2 , and they do not
overlap in any way
MEETS(t1 , t2 ) | t1 is before t2 , and t1 ends where t2 starts.
Allen's work has had an enormous impact on research on temporal issues in Arti cial
Intelligence and Computational Linguistics for example the predicates HOLDS and
OCCURS used in Pollack, 1986] and Balkanski, 1993] derive from Allen's formalization. Given that temporal relations are not the focus of my work, I won't have
anything else to contribute about them | in fact they won't play any particular role
in the examples I will present in the next chapter. With a somewhat sloppy notation,
I will write BEFORE( ,  ), with the understanding that the actions are coerced to
their corresponding time intervals.

6.2.2 Hybrid Systems and Recipes
Given that I implement action concepts in the terminological language of a hybrid system,
the next step is to also implement the Action Library by means of the same language.
In fact, this allows me to use the same or similar mechanisms of classi cation to keep an
organized KB of action recipes. The idea of having plan abstraction hierarchies is not new
in plan inference / planning work, as it is present in di erent forms in various systems, for
example Kautz, 1990 Tenenberg, 1989], that will both be described in Sec. 7.3. However,
there are only few systems known to me that exploit subsumption to perform reasoning
about plans: SUDO-PLANNER Wellman, 1988], CLASP Devanbu and Litman, 1991]
and T-REX Weida and Litman, 1992]. 17
In SUDO-PLANNER actions | those events controllable by the planner | are de ned by
means of the T-Box of NIKL Moser et al., 1983]. Actions are (simpli ed descriptions of)
medical procedures, such as (from Wellman, 1988, p. 47])
A surgery is an action
with one route which is an invasive-path-into-body.
Plans are speci cations for a course of action, and are composed of three di erent kinds
of constraints: action constraints , that specify that an action of the speci c type belongs
to the plan action policy constraints , that specify relations between actions and events
conditional constraints , which are action or policy constraints that have e ect only under
some observed conditions. Wellman's representation of plan doesn't include the notion of
substep, and also e ects are dealt with separately.
Plan classi cation extends normal classi cation by computing subsumption among the
di erent kinds of constraints. Wellman's de nitions of action and plan are quite distant
17
A project addressing similar issues is also under way at the German Institute for Arti cial Intelligence
(DFKI), in Saarbrucken: however, as far as I know, no publications are available.
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not only from linguistic considerations, but from the more usual STRIPS de nition of
operator: therefore, I will assume this short description suces, and I will turn to CLASP,
which deals with issues closer to my interests.
CLASP extends the notion of subsumption and classi cation from frame-based languages
to plans. The CLASP representation language provides description-forming operators that
specify temporal and conditional relationships between actions represented in CLASSIC.
Subsumption in CLASP builds on term subsumption in CLASSIC and illustrates how term
subsumption can be exploited to serve special needs. In particular, the CLASP algorithms
for plan subsumption integrate work in automata theory with work in term subsumption.
Plans are built out of action s, whose de nition reproduces the classic STRIPS planning operator de nition, as it includes the roles precondition, add-list, delete-list, goal,
all restricted to be state | Devanbu and Litman, 1991, p.132]:
(DEFINE-CONCEPT
Action
(PRIMITIVE
(AND Classic-Thing
(AT-LEAST 1 ACTOR)
(ALL ACTOR Agent)
(ALL PRECONDITION State)
(ALL ADD-LIST State)
(ALL DELETE-LIST State)
(ALL GOAL State))))

As far as plans are concerned,
plan concept expressions are compositionally de ned from action and state
concepts using the plan description forming operators SEQUENCE, LOOP,
REPEAT, TEST, OR, and SUBPLAN. Devanbu and Litman, 1991, p.132]
The ordinary subsumption algorithm provided by CLASSIC and called o-subsumption ,
where o stays for object , is extended into p-subsumption to deal with plan and scenario
classi cation , where scenario s are individual plans. The details of p-subsumption can be
found in Devanbu and Litman, 1991, p.134-135].
Finally, T-REX Weida and Litman, 1992] is similar in spirit to CLASP, but is able to
capture ner temporal relations, and integrates terminological reasoning with constraint
network reasoning to classify plans.
CLASP (and T-REX) therefore takes the rst step toward building and managing a hierarchy of plans | however, CLASP doesn't go beyond a representation of actions based
on STRIPS operators. As I have shown, a much richer representation of actions is necessary, and here I will show how these richer descriptions of actions will be used to build
recipes. Notice however that I haven't dealt with extending subsumption. As the reader
will see, this part of my representation language leaves many questions open, due to the fact
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that the CLASSIC language is fairly constrained, and that therefore many representation
choices are a ected by its limitations. Such limitations could be overcome by extending
the CLASSIC language however, studying these extensions was not the main focus of my
thesis, and therefore it is left for future work.
Before describing the action library, I would like to spend a few words on why the CLASSIC
language is expressively limited. In the literature on hybrid systems, there is a constant
debate on the trade-o between expressive power of the terminological and / or assertional
languages and the computational tractability of the relevant algorithms. Woods and
Schmolze, 1991, p.34-35] notes that Brachman et al., 1983a] made initial arguments, and
Brachman and Levesque, 1984] later made stronger arguments that the answers given
by a KR system should be fully correct with respect to a formal semantics and that the
operations should be performed in a predictable and reasonable amount of time. A common
interpretation of these arguments was that these algorithms should be sound, complete and
tractable.
However, Woods and Schmolze point out that these requirements can have very severe
consequences for the system's inferential algorithms: the expressive power of each component of a KR system should be limited, since otherwise a system cannot be simultaneously
sound, complete and tractable for classi cation and other inferential algorithms. To meet
these requirements, the expressive power of KRYPTON's T-Box language was speci cally
chosen such that determining subsumption would be tractable.
Finally, Woods and Schmolze observe that, while some researchers followed the KRYPTON
strategy of developing KR systems with limited expressive power and limited inferential
services, others chose instead to explore systems with wide expressive power and expanded
referential services. The researchers decided it was better to have greater expressive and
inferential power, even though it would preclude having both completeness and tractability.
As it turns out, complete and tractable inferential algorithms are nearly impossible to
attain for any but the weakest of languages.18
As far as CLASSIC computational complexity is concerned, it turns out that subsumption
between descriptions in CLASSIC 1 is intractable in the regular semantics because of the
presence of sets (one-of). 19 CLASSIC 1 is CLASSIC version 1 CLASSIC 2 is now available, which introduces a primitive role hierarchy, which is another source of intractability.
Proof of the rst result can be found in Borgida and Patel-Schneider, 1993].

6.2.2.1 Recipes in CLASSIC
The hierarchies that represent recipes are shown in Figs. 6.5 and 6.6. In particular, Fig. 6.5
shows part of the recipe hierarchy, while Fig. 6.6 shows some auxiliary concept de nitions,
such as annotation-type , and a small portion of the state hierarchy. No SAME-AS relation
is shown. The corresponding CLASSIC de nitions can be found in Appendix C.
Woods, 1991, Sec. 5.4, p.45-47] presents more details on complexity results: particularly interesting is
Table 2, which summarizes worst case complexity results for a variety of terminological languages.
19
Peter Patel-Schneider, p.c.
18
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header
(1,1)

recipe

intentional-act

substep1

gsp-enab-getc

(1,1)

recipe-1-step

annot1
(1,1)

substep2
(1,1)

getc-enab-gospw
annot2

recipe-3-steps
substep3
(1,1)

go-spatial

(1,1)

qualif1

be-spatial

(1,1)
effect1

get-control

move-recipe

(1,1)

move-sth-swh
go-spatial-with

Figure 6.5: The recipe hierarchy
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ann-rel
(1,1)

ann-arg1

annotation-type

(1,1)

act-type
ann-arg2
(1,1)

poss-relation

state
enab-annot
(1,1)

enables
gsp-enab-getc

be-spatial

getc-enab-gospw
experiencer

restricts
ann-arg1

location
(1,1)

restricts
ann-arg2

go-spatial

restricts
ann-arg1

get-control

individual

restricts
ann-arg2

(1,1)

entity
spatialplace

go-spatial-with

instance-of

Figure 6.6: The annotation hierarchy
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As a preliminary remark, notice that the most natural way of translating the BNF for
recipe into CLASSIC would be by de ning a topmost concept recipe , with roles header,
substeps, annotations, qualifiers and effects, properly restricted. However, as I
will show below, this is impossible because of the lack of role di erentiation in CLASSIC.
I have however de ned a simple interface, so that a user can input a recipe in a way corresponding to the BNF the input de nition is then translated into the CLASSIC de nition
| see Pag. 124.
The issues I want to draw the reader's attention to are:
1. The recipe concept is simply de ned as having a header , while the substeps appear
only on the subconcepts of recipe , namely, recipe-1-step , with its descendant createtriangles , not shown here, and recipe-3-steps , with its descendant move-recipe . This
is the rst choice the reader may nd puzzling. In fact, a more natural way of de ning recipe would be to attach to it a role substeps with the following restrictions:
(ALL substeps intentional-act) (AT-LEAST 1 substeps)
Unfortunately CLASSIC doesn't provide the dierentiation operator on roles: therefore, it is impossible to express that e.g. move-recipe has 3 substeps, each of which
has a di erent value restriction, go-spatial , get-control and go-spatial-with respectively. Clearly, this way of de ning substeps, by introducing a role each, implies that
if we have a recipe with n substeps, then the corresponding concept recipe-n-steps
needs to be de ned.
Notice that in the CLASP de nition of Action all the required roles, such as
precondition, can be describe in a compact way because the ller is a single state,
e.g.
(AND Off-Hook-State

Idle-State)

This is clearly impossible to do with substep, which describes actions whose descriptions are mutually exclusive, e.g. go-spatial and get-control .
2. A concept annotation-type is de ned with three roles. The rst one is ann-rel, which
is restricted to the concept poss-relation de ned by enumeration as enables, precedes,
during ... | only the individual enables is shown in Fig. 6.6. The other two roles
on annotation-type are ann-arg1 and ann-arg2, that specify the two actions to be
related: both are restricted to be act-type s the actual llers will have to corefer with
the substeps of the recipe | as usual, structural conditions are not shown in the
gures, but the corresponding SAME-AS restrictions can be found in Appendix C.
As in the case of substeps, each annotation is de ned as a role on the corresponding
recipe | move-recipe has two, expressed by means of the two roles annot1 and
annot2.
3. move-recipe has one quali er and one e ect, both expressed by means of a role,
restricted to be be-spatial in both cases. Part of the state hierarchy is shown in
Fig. 6.6.
123

A last observation: as I said, I use the action library as a repository of information on
recipes, rather than to exploit the classi cation mechanism. Nevertheless, classi cation
does come into play when more speci c recipes are de ned: for example, a move-recipe2
concept with further quali ers, or with a more speci c substep1 , would be correctly classi ed as a descendant of move-recipe . However, no reasoning of the kind described in
CLASP is performed. For example, the move-recipe in Fig. 6.5 imposes a total order on
its substeps through the annotations. Suppose I were to de ne move-recipe2 in which the
temporal order of the substeps were BEFORE(1, 3) and BEFORE(2, 3), without any
explicit ordering given on 1 and 2. move-recipe2 should be recognized as subsuming
move-recipe , and in fact this is one of the subsumption inferences CLASP performs. Such
extensions are left for future work.

6.2.2.1.1 Recipe interface. As I mentioned above, the CLASSIC de nition of a recipe

does not directly correspond to its BNF de nition therefore, I have de ned a very simple
interface that allows the user to input a recipe in a more natural way, without having
to worry about expressing it in a precise CLASSIC format, e.g. about specifying value
restrictions by means of the operator all.
In the interface, the input format for a recipe is as a LISP structure, as follows:
(defstruct recipe
(name nil :type symbol)
(header nil :type symbol)
(body nil :type list)
(same-as-restrs nil :type list)
(annotations nil :type list)
(qualifiers nil :type list)
(effects nil :type list)
)

The user will give the following command:
(make-recipe :name 'move-recipe :header 'move-sth-swh
:body '((substep1 go-spatial)
(substep2 get-control)
(substep3 go-spatial-with))
:annotations '((annot1 gsp-enab-getc)
(annot2 getc-enab-gospw))
:qualifiers '((qualif1 be-spatial))
:effects '((effect1 be-spatial))
:same-as-restrs '(((header agent)(substep1 agent))
((header agent)(substep2 agent))
((header agent)(substep3 agent))
((header patient)(substep2 patient))
((header patient)(substep3 with-role))
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((header caused-role path-role destination)
(substep3 path-role destination))
((header caused-role path-role source)
(substep1 path-role destination))
(substep1 (annot1 ann-arg1))
(substep2 (annot1 ann-arg2))
(substep2 (annot2 ann-arg1))
(substep3 (annot2 ann-arg2))
((qualif1 experiencer)
(header patient))
((effect1 experiencer)
(header patient))
((qualif1 location)
(substep1 path-role destination))
((effect1 location)
(substep3 path-role destination))))

The function parse-recipe will rst build a CLASSIC concept-expression corresponding
to this input, for example by inserting the necessary CLASSIC operators such as all and
same-as then it will call (cl-define-concept name conc-expr): in this example name
is move-recipe, and the move-recipe found in Appendix C is added to the Action Library.

6.3 Summary
In this chapter, I have presented the action representation formalism I have devised. I
have discussed its three main components, the underlying hybrid system, the semantic
primitives derived from Jackendo 's Conceptual Structure, and the action library.
The TBox stores the linguistic knowledge about action descriptions, expressed by means of
CS primitives the terms de ned in the TBox, which represent action types, are then used
as building blocks in the recipes stored in the Action Library. Also the Action Library
is expressed by means of the CLASSIC language: however, the CLASSIC language is too
weak to properly represent recipes, and should be suitably extended. This is left for future
work.
In the next chapter, I will describe the algorithm that uses the described Knowledge Bases
and that implements the inferences schematically described in Sec. 5.2.
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Chapter 7

The algorithm
In this chapter, I will describe the algorithm that takes the logical form produced by
the parser, and builds an initial plan graph , representing the structure of the beliefs,
expectations and intentions the agent adopts on the basis of the instruction alone. The
algorithm is embedded in the AnimNL system described in Appendix D Webber et al.,
1991 Webber et al., 1992 Webber et al., 1993], and assumes the existence of separate
AnimNL modules for
1. parsing the input and providing a logical form expressed in terms of Conceptual
Structures primitives White, 1992]
2. managing the discourse model and solving anaphora. 1
The plan graph , whose data structure I will describe in Sec. 7.1.7, should be thought as
representing the structure of H's beliefs and intentions. I am fully aware that, given the
master-slave assumption underlying my work, what I am really representing is S's beliefs
on H's beliefs and intentions | a reminder to the reader that S stands for Speaker and
H for Hearer. I am also fully aware that such representation is not sucient to account
for miscommunication, as Pollack showed in her thesis 1986] moreover, that a fuller
representation could bene t from Balkanski's ndings about beliefs and intentions in PCs
and in Means Clauses Balkanski, 1993]. However, rst of all, the representation I adopt is
sucient to support my claims second, representing di erences in Speaker's and Hearer's
beliefs was not the focus of my thesis: I do plan to address this issue in future work though,
as it also bears on the interpretation of negative imperatives, as discussed in Sec. 4.2.
Notice that the algorithm produces only the initial plan graph, namely, it tries to model
what intentions the agent adopts simply based on the input instruction and the stored
knowledge: the current situation is not taken into account. As an example, consider the
instruction Go into the kitchen to get me the coee urn . The algorithm will build the plan
graph shown in Fig. 7.9 however, this plan may need to be expanded with a step open the
door if the door to the kitchen is closed | these expansion steps are performed by other
AnimNL modules, in particular by the box plan expansion in Fig. D.1.
1

While the parser is indeed working, the other modules are either being implemented or being designed.
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Fig. 7.1 gives a top level description of the algorithm. Comparing it to Allen's algorithm
in Fig. 3.2, my algorithm addresses in more detail the steps of matching the new action
into the E-plan , which corresponds to one of the Recipes that are retrieved by means of
the goal | notice that Allen's algorithm takes the E-plan for granted, while my algorithm
nds the relevant Recipes. What my algorithm lacks is the recursive step of matching an
action with the decomposition of the substeps of the Recipe, if no direct match between
the action and any of the substeps is found. This recursive match would be useful for
dealing with a greater variety of input instructions, however it would not add anything
either to computing the match between the input and the stored action description, or to
computing expectations.
In the following, I will discuss the various steps of the algorithm one at a time, and after
that, I will illustrate how it implements the inferences presented schematically in Figs. 5.4
and 5.6.

7.1 The algorithm steps
7.1.1 Input / Output
1. The Logical Form of the input sentence is produced by the parser described in White,
1992], and expressed in terms of Conceptual Structures. The content of each clause,
which I take to be an action description, is rei ed therefore there is one \major" CS
component for each clause expressed in the sentence, plus the necessary connectives.
Ex. (5.24a), Go into the kitchen to get me the coee urn , is mapped into
(7.1)

"

#

GOSp(you]r  TO(IN(kitchen])])])
FOR( )


CAUSE(r GOSp(urn-of-coffee]s  w)])]
"
#
FROM(t)
TO(AT(me])]) w
The FOR-function is derived from the to -phrase and encodes the purpose relation
holding between the go -action and the get -action  .2 In the algorithm in g. 7.1 I
refer to these major subcomponents, and  , as i .
2. In the context of understanding a complex instructional text, it is clear that the
algorithm should take into account the PlanGraph built so far. This introduces
problems of both understanding how the di erent sentences relate to one another,
and of building the discourse structure. Both problems have already been tackled
in the literature, in particular in work on theories of discourse structure Grosz and
2

The FOR-function is introduced by Jackendo to represent purpose clauses, as I noted in Sec. 4.1.2.
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INPUT:
1. Logical form of input sentence, composed of one action description i per clause,
plus connectives.
2. The preexisting PlanGraph and the list of active nodes.
OUTPUT: Updated PlanGraph.
1.

(PREPROCESSING)
(a) Add each i to the A-Box.
(b) Choose Goal 2 f ig according to the surface structure.

2.

(RETRIEVAL)

Retrieve the list fRecipelg indexed by Goal, i.e. those recipes whose header is
instantiated by Goal.
3. FOR each Recipel DO
(a) FOR each i 2 f i g, i 6= Goal, DO
FOR each l j 2 Body(Recipel) DO
i. (COMPUTING COMPATIBILITY)
Check the compatibility of i and l j .
ii. (COMPUTING EXPECTATIONS)
IF i and l j are compatible
THEN compute set of expectations fEg.
iii. IF there is no l j such that i and l j are compatible
THEN Failurel .
4. IF 8 l Failurel
THEN Signal user Can't process instruction. (SIGNAL)
ELSE Choose best interpretation. Update PG. (UPDATE)
Figure 7.1: The algorithm top level
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Sidner, 1986 Grosz and Sidner, 1990 Webber, 1991] and of plan inference applied
to discourse Litman and Allen, 1990 Lambert and Carberry, 1992].
What I propose here is to keep track of active nodes , namely, those nodes that are
open for expansion: they will minimally include the goal currently in focus and the
nodes just added to the tree. I suspect building this list of active nodes would obey
the same constraint Webber introduces to account for discourse deixis 1991, p.124]:
Integration of the discourse meaning of the next clause only takes place at
the right frontier of the discourse structure.
Note that I make the same assumption made in AnimNL, namely, that instructional
text is processed in steps Webber et al., 1992, p.5]:
Instructions are given to AnimNL in steps consisting of one or more utterances. ... While there are no rm guidelines as to what a single instruction
step should encompass, often steps are organized around small coherent
substasks (such as adjusting a switch). Such a step may specify several
actions that need to be performed together (possibly in some partially
speci ed order) to accomplish a single subtask, or several aspects of a single complex action (e.g. its purpose, manner, things to watch out for,
appropriate termination conditions, etc.). The agent must develop some
degree of understanding of the whole step before starting to act.
For the moment, I haven't implemented any active node management schema, and the
algorithm assumes that there is no preexisting PlanGraph. Devising the management
of the active node list is left for future work.

7.1.2 Preprocessing
1. The various i are mapped into CLASSIC de nitions, according to the knowledge
encoded in the TBox, and then added to the ABox as individuals. As an example, the
CS representation of in (7.1) is mapped into the following representation (assuming
that you and kitchen have already been created as individuals):
(7.2) (cl-create-ind 'ink '(and in-sp-place
(fills in-role kitchen)))

(cl-create-ind 'tok '(and to-path-sp
(fills destination ink)))
(cl-create-ind 'go-kitchen '(and go-spatial
(fills experiencer you)
(fills path-role tok)))

is the CLASSIC construct that creates an individual with the required speci cations. The creation of an individual activates all the relevant inference
mechanisms | cf. Sec. 6.1.1.1.
cl-create-ind
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Actually, the current state of the implementation is such that the parser is detached
from the algorithm, which receives directly in input expressions such as those shown
in (7.2). However, it wouldn't be dicult to write a simple interface that translates
the output of the parser into CLASSIC de nitions, given that the format of the
parser output is
you,o9],kitchen,o10],definite_ref,o10],to,s10,s9],in,o10,s10],
act,o9,e11],go,o9,s9,e11],spatial_field,e11],
imperative_mood,e11], for,e12,e11],
urn,o11],container_for,o12,o11],coffee,o12],definite_ref,o11],
me,o13],act_on,o9,o11,e12],cause,o9,e13,e12],go,o11,s11,e13],
spatial_field,e13],from,s12,s11],to,s13,s11],at,o13,s13]
]]

2. One of the i 's is designated as Goal, and used as the anchor to retrieve recipes
from the Action Library. The choice of Goal depends on the surface form: clearly, if
the input instruction only includes a main clause, Goal will be the action description
corresponding to the main clause for Do to do  , Goal is   for Do by doing  ,
. Other cases, e.g. when clauses, still require a pragmatic analysis to understand
whether one of the action descriptions can always be designated as Goal it seems
clear that for cases such as conjunctions, that can express various relations between
actions, it may be impossible to establish this a priori.

7.1.3 Retrieval
is used to index into the Action Library. In Sec. 5.2.1.1 I mentioned that the goal 
should exactly match the header of the recipe the algorithm actually allows the match to
succeed as long as the goal is an instance of the header of the recipe. Clearly if Goal is an
instance of a header  , then it will be an instance of all concepts  sup , where  sup subsumes
 . Therefore any recipe whose header is one of the sup 's will be retrieved. So far, I have
adopted a simple ltering mechanism that lters the resulting set of recipes to keep only
the bottom-most ones among them.

Goal

7.1.4 Computing compatibility
This is the step where the classi cation mechanism is mainly used. I will describe it fully
in Sec. 7.2.1.
It may happen that i matches more than one l j : if i matches more than one, but not
every l j 2 Body(Recipel), then the algorithm chooses the rst matched l j | \ rst"
according to the order imposed by the relations expressed in the annotations on Recipel.
This is consistent with the pragmatic analysis of PCs, that showed that, if in Do to do
 belongs to a sequence A that generates , then corresponds to the rst i 2 A.
If by any chance i matches every substep in Recipel, then the hypothesis is that the
action description i is so general that it can match the whole recipe, as in an input
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instruction like Do something to do  | therefore the resulting PlanGraph will simply
result in the expansion of the chosen Recipel, without i being added to it, as it doesn't
add any further information.

7.1.5 Computing expectations
Again, I refer the reader to the full description in Sec. 7.2.2 below.

7.1.6 Signal
The user is noti ed of the fact that the instruction can't be processed, because no recipe
has been found to be compatible with the input instruction. Notice that Failure can be
caused by di erent factors, some of which don't actually amount to real failures. Such
factors include at least
1. There is no Recipe whose header is instantiated by Goal | this can be due to the
fact that the Action Library is not complete.
2. Goal has selected at least one Recipel, but there is no l j such that i and l j
match. This can be due to an incoherent instruction, or to the fact that the search
mechanism should be extended. Consider
(7.3) Go into the kitchen to get me the suitcase from the car.
In this case, my algorithm would signal failure, as it would compute that Go into the
kitchen contributes to get me the suitcase from the car under the expectation that
the car is in the kitchen , which is untenable | see Sec. 7.2.2. However, it is certainly
possible to think of scenarios where (7.3) makes sense, for example, the car keys are
in the kitchen.
This requires having more sophisticated search mechanisms, in particular recursion,
and taking knowledge about the current situation into account. For example, in
Ex. 7.3, the recursive step could nd that | Go into the kitchen | matches a
substep of the decomposition of 2 | get control over the object to be moved | from
the body of the move -action in Fig. 6.4.
3. The input instruction is incompatible with the stored knowledge. This can be a real
failure, such as in the case of Cut the square in half along the perpendicular axis to
create two triangles , or possibly a failure of a default assumption, such as Turn the
screw clockwise to loosen | it is possible that the screw is left-handed, so that the
instruction is in fact correct.
Some of these \failures" should trigger corrective behavior on the part of the instructor,
others reactive and / or learning behavior on the part of the agent. How the system should
behave in case of failure is a whole research issue in itself, that I haven't addressed in my
thesis at all, and that is in general not central to my main research interests.
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7.1.7 Update
If in the end there is more than one Recipel which successfully matches, then heuristics
should be applied to check whether one of them has the \best t" with the input instruction:
presumably, this would be the Recipe whose header and body have the best match with
respectively Goal and f ig. Clearly this evaluation function should take into account
various factors, including the discourse context, represented by the PlanGraph built so far.
Notice also that my hypothesis is that the whole expansion of Recipel is added to the
PlanGraph.
The update step creates the nodes corresponding to the Goal, to the i , i 6= Goal, and
to the l j  and the edges either deriving from the Body and Annotations on the Recipe,
or computed during steps 3(a)i and 3(a)ii in Fig. 7.1. All these structures are then added
to PlanGraph. It may happen that the algorithm nds out that some i and l j can be
collapsed, in this case only one node, corresponding to the action description (and i l j ),
is created.
Now is the time to give a few more details on the PlanGraph data structure: it is composed
of nodes that contain descriptions of individual actions, and edges that denote relations
between these actions.
The plan graph is a labelled directed graph - i.e. a triple (N, E, L) with E N  N  L
and L RelNames  P (E ), where N are the nodes, E the edges, RelNames the names of
the possible relations between the actions represented in the nodes, and P (E ) the power
set of the possible expectations | the set E corresponds to all the possible individuals of
type state , according to the de nitions in the TBox. I am using the power set of E because
the set of possible expectations associated with an edge can have any cardinality, including
zero.

Nodes. A node contains an individual action description, i.e. a CLASSIC individual ex-

pressed in the CLASSIC language and using CS primitives, as described in Sec. 6.1.3.
Besides, the node is annotated with the e ects of the action, which are described in
the relevant recipe, and possibly with the expectations deriving from the quali ers
in the recipe | see below.
Edges. The edges represent various relations between actions. The label on an edge
minimally includes the name of the relation holding between the actions described
in the nodes the edge links, and possibly some expectations. The possible relations
between actions are:
1. Temporal , such as before and meets , discussed in Sec. 6.2.1. Also, in future
extensions to the plan graph in which states are represented, an edge to link
an action and a state will have to be introduced: its meaning is that the action
has to start when a given state comes to hold | this would model instructions
such as turn the gas o when the tofu has turned golden.
2. Generation and is-substep . An edge is-substep links two nodes containing action
descriptions and  if  corresponds to the header of a Recipe and to one
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of Recipe's substeps | namely, as discussed in Ch. 5, if indirectly generates

. If the body is composed by a single action, is-substep reduces to generation.
3. Enablement .
4. And, or . These edges are not included in the implementation, but may be
needed to represent actions belonging to a certain set: and will link two actions
that both have to be performed, but that are totally unrelated to one another,
such as Prepare a dessert and do laundry 3  two actions are linked by an or edge
if they are in alternative, such as vacuum or dust-mop the parquet .
5. Avoid. Some of my future work will concern how to integrate in this framework
the analysis of negative imperatives proposed in Sec. 4.2 . A di erent kind of
edge may be needed to indicate that an action should be avoided in the context
of executing another action.

Expectations. Some of the expectations associated with the plan graph derive from the

accommodation process in this case, an expectation is associated to a relation between two actions, and therefore, to the corresponding edge in the plan graph:
BEsp (urn], IN(kitchen])]) will be associated to the is-substep edge relating go
into the kitchen and get the coee urn | see Fig. 7.9.

Other expectations directly derive from the quali ers associated with an action, and
are associated with the node describing that action. For example, in continuing
Ex. (5.24a) the instructor could say Before you pick up the urn, be sure it is unplugged . A quali er associated to the recipe for plug is that the object to be unplugged is plugged in | the corresponding expectation BEident (urn], plugged-in)
will be associated to the node corresponding to UNPLUG(urn).

7.2 Interpreting Do to do 
I would like now to go back to the form of data that the algorithm is mainly intended to
handle, namely, Do to do  . With respect to the algorithm, this implies that in step 1
in Fig. 7.1, Goal is chosen to be  . The only i left is . In the following I will describe
steps 3(a)i and 3(a)ii: Goal, i and l j from the algorithm are respectively renamed  ,
and  .
The fact that they are unrelated may hold only at the understanding level when execution time
comes, the agent will possibly have to make choices, for example which action to execute rst, or even
which subactions to interleave.
3
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7.2.1 Checking compatibility between and 
The issue at this point is to infer the structural relation between and  , namely, to check
whether one of the two action descriptions subsumes the other, or in case this doesn't hold,
make sure that the two descriptions are consistent with each other. At an abstract level,
the matching step can be concisely described as checking the characteristics of the concept
(and
 ), and in particular as posing the following queries | the next query is posed
only if the answer to the previous one is negative:
(7.4a)

(and

 ) =? , i.e., does  subsume ?

(7.4b)

(and

 ) =?  , i.e., does subsume  ?

(7.4c)

(coherent (and

 ))?

Various issues deserve more consideration:
1. The rst thing to notice with respect to the queries in (7.4) is that is not a concept,
but an individual therefore the concept (and  ) can't be directly built. I will
discuss this issue in the next section.
2. A second problem is that some concepts represent types of spatial locations, for which
this notion of structural compatibility is too restrictive. For example, while neither
of the i 's in (7.5) subsumes the other, and (and 1 2 ) is incoherent, they can be
considered compatible if table1 is in kitchen1 :
(7.5a) Place IN(kitchen1])]1
(7.5b) Place AT(table1])]2
To really understand such compatibilities, a geometric reasoner would be necessary:
we are planning to develop one for AnimNL, but for the moment I have included
only some simple notions of compatibility in the algorithm. One such notion is that
concepts that are both of type place are compatible with each other, barring any
knowledge to the contrary, as in the case we know table1 is in dining-room2 . As
we will see, this notion of compatibility of locations will play a role when computing
expectations, discussed in Sec. 7.2.2.
Also paths are considered compatible, unless various conditions obtain. One such
condition is that it is not acceptable to have a path whose start and end points are
the same, unless it is an instance of circular-path therefore the algorithm would
nd (7.6a) and (7.6b) to be incompatible:
(7.6a) Path TO(s )]
(7.6b) Path FROM(s )]
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3. The mechanisms that compute the compatibility between and the various i are
always active, therefore they are used also to recognize whether Goal is an instance
of a certain header: in this case compatibility is restricted to instance , and no other
relations between Goal and header are accepted. However in Sec. 7.2.1.3 I will discuss
possible relaxations of this requirement.
4. Finally, as we will see when discussing Ex. (7.10b), sometimes the descriptions to be
matched are not of actions, but of states | e ects of an action or arguments to an
ACHIEVE operator. The same mechanisms discussed here apply to state descriptions
as well.

7.2.1.1 Implementation of the queries
As mentioned above, is not a concept, but an individual therefore the concept (and  )
can't be directly built. Before discussing how the queries are implemented, some de nitions
are necessary.
1. If is an individual,
conc

= (and (cl-ind-parents )
(further-restrictions

(cl-ind-parents

)))

namely, conc is the most speci c, possibly virtual concept of which is an instance.4
(further-restrictions
(cl-ind-parents )) checks whether has further
roles that are not inherited from its parents. For example, refer to Fig. 7.2 and
consider a like
(and cause-and-acton
(fills agent you)
(fills patient sq1)
(fills lex-item cut)
(fills caused-role go-comp-inhalf1)
(fills location along-diagonal1)
(fills instrument scissors1))

This will be recognized as an instance of the concept
 = cut-sq-inhalf-along-diagonal however, also adds to  the role instrument.
This is possible in CLASSIC, as roles, that have to be \declared" before being used,
can possibly be on any concept or individual. Therefore
(further-restrictions
(cl-ind-parents )) checks whether
has roles Ri
that are not inherited from its parents, and computes a virtual concept that includes
the Ri 's too. To do this, further-restrictions and 's 's parents with restrictions
For those who know CLASSIC: some of these de nitions are slightly simpli ed with respect to the
implementation, that has to take into account the speci c input / output requirements of the CLASSIC
functions.
4
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such as

(all Ri (and (cl-ind-parents (cl-ind-role-filler ))))
Ri is a role that either does not appear on any of the parents or

that appears on
at least one parent, but whose ller on is of a more speci c type than the value
restriction on Ri on the parent.

2. If is a concept, ind is an instance of .
3. perf is the action instance to be performed.
Now let's consider the queries in (7.4).
(7.4a), (and  ) =? , can be directly implemented by means of the CLASSIC predicate
cl-instance?, namely as (cl-instance?
 ). In this case perf = .
The other two queries in (7.4b) and (7.4c) | (and  ) =?   (coherent(and  )) |
are answered by (check-real-comp  ), described below. Given the more exible notion
of compatibility necessary to account for spatial concepts it is not possible to simply use
CLASSIC queries, such as (cl-disjoint?  conc ) to answer (coherent(and  )),
as for example 1 and 2 in (7.5) above would be found to be incoherent.
The two queries are collapsed because in both cases perf = (and conc  )ind: the role
llers on perf are computed by (check-real-comp  ). However, not to lose the conceptual distinction between the two cases in (7.4b) and (7.4c), the algorithm also checks
whether (member conc (cl-concept-ancestors  )): a positive answer means that
is an instance of an ancestor of  , namely, that (and conc  ) =  . In this latter case, a
simpli ed version of check-real-comp is used.
check-real-comp does the following:5
1. for each role Ri common to and  :
(a) if Ri is lled both on and  , the ller must be the same, modulo spatial
concepts like Path, Place , for which the primitive geometric reasoner discussed
above takes over
(b) if Ri is lled on but not on  , the ller on must be compatible with the
restrictions on the role on  
(c) if Ri is lled only on  , the ller on  must be compatible with the restrictions
that inherits from its parents: notice that this happens when inherits Ri from
conc without lling it, e.g. may be de ned as an an instance of cut-location
without specifying the ller for the location role
(d) if Ri is lled on neither, then the respective value restrictions must be compatible.
2. If a role Ri appears only on one of either or  , I make the simplifying assumption
that it doesn't a ect compatibility. This clearly does not hold in general.
5
Notice that also
footnote 8.

SAME-AS

restrictions have to checked. This is done by check-same-as, mentioned in
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If one or both of the llers of Ri is in turn a complex concept, compatibility is recursively
checked. Notice that a simpli ed verson of check-real-comp is used when conc is an
ancestor of  , as in this case roles are either common to and  , or they appear only on
.
It is clear that this procedure partly mimics classi cation. However, classi cation could
not be used directly as: rst, is an instance and not a concept second, as mentioned
above with regard to Ex. (7.5), classi cation would consider inconsistent concepts that are
compatible on geometric grounds.

7.2.1.2 Variations on \Cut the square in half"
Let's go back to my main example about cutting squares in half, discussed in Sec. 5.2.1.1,
and let's consider again Exs. (5.19a) through (5.19d), repeated here for convenience:
(7.7a) Cut the square in half along the diagonal with scissors]1 to create two triangles] .
(7.7b) Cut the square in half]2 to create two triangles] .
(7.7c) Cut the square in half with scissors]3 to create two triangles] .
(7.7d) Cut the square in half along a perpendicular axis]4 to create two triangles] .
Part of the knowledge necessary to deal with these examples is represented by the CLASSIC
de nitions shown in Figs. 7.2 and 7.3 a graphical representation of those de nitions is
shown in Fig. 7.4 | as usual, to keep the network readable, some roles are not shown.
Comp is the Composition semantic eld. The lex-item role is meant to store the actual
verb used in the input instruction | as mentioned in Sec. 6.1.2, the CS decomposition does
not capture all the semantic information associated with a lexical item the role lex-item
is a crude solution to the problem of retrieving this missing semantic information, as it
keeps track of what was actually said in input.
Before discussing how the examples (7.7a) through (7.7d) are dealt with, notice that
The de nition of the recipe for creating two triangles from a square is 6
(cl-define-concept 'create-two-triangles
'(and recipe-1-step
(all header create-parts-from-whole)
(all substep1 cut-sq-inhalf-alongaxis)
(all effect1 be-comp-sq-tr)))

 from the recipe is cut-sq-inhalf-alongdiag, de ned as follows in Fig. 7.2
6
With respect to the recipe in App. C, same-as restrictions are missing. Moreover, the problem of how
to represent the cardinality of the resulting set of triangles is left unsolved.
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(cl-define-concept 'diagonal
'(disj-prim geometric-concept type diagonal))
(cl-define-concept 'perp-axis
'(disj-prim geometric-concept type perp-axis))
(cl-define-concept 'along-sp-place
'(and spatial-place (all along-role entity)))
(cl-define-concept 'along-diagonal
'(and along-sp-place (all along-role diagonal)))
(cl-define-concept 'along-perp-axis
'(and along-sp-place (all along-role perp-axis)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-comp
'(and go
(fills semfield-role composition)
(all path-role comp-path)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-comp-plus
'(and go-comp (fills polarity yes)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-comp-minus
'(and go-comp (fills polarity no)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-comp-inhalf
'(and go-comp-plus
(all path-role to-path-comp-inhalf)))

Figure 7.2: The cut hierarchy in CLASSIC | Part A
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(cl-define-concept 'reduce-to-pieces
'(and cause-and-acton
(all caused-role go-comp-plus
(all lex-item (one-of cut break))))
(cl-define-concept 'cut-location
'(and reduce-to-pieces
(fills lex-item cut)
(all location spatial-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'cut-sq-inhalf-alongdiag
'(and cut-location
(all patient square)
(all caused-role go-comp-inhalf)
(all location along-diagonal)))
(cl-define-concept 'create-act
'(and cause-and-acton
(all caused-role go-comp)
(all lex-item (one-of create form))))
(cl-define-concept 'create-whole-from-parts
'(and create-act
(all caused-role go-comp-plus)))
(cl-define-concept 'create-parts-from-whole
'(and create-act
(all caused-role go-comp-minus)))

Figure 7.3: The cut hierarchy in CLASSIC | Part B
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cut-sq-inhalfalongdiag

Figure 7.4: The cut hierarchy in network form
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(cl-define-concept 'cut-sq-inhalf-alongdiag
'(and cut-location
(all patient square)
(all caused-role go-comp-inhalf)
(all location along-diagonal)))

Remember that the logical form for i is added to the ABox as an individual .
Therefore all the arguments that appear below in fills restrictions | you, sq1,
go-comp-inhalf1 | have already been created as individuals of the obvious types
by means of (cl-ind-add-concept <individual> <concept>).
Let's now derive the examples:
1. In (7.7a),

1

is

(and cause-and-acton
(fills agent you)
(fills patient sq1)
(fills lex-item cut)
(fills caused-role go-comp-inhalf1)
(fills location along-diagonal1)
(fills instrument scissors1))

is recognized as an instance of  cut-sq-inhalf-along-diagonal through
(cl-instance? 1  ) | see Fig. 7.5. Notice that 1 is actually an instance of the
virtual conc
:
1
1

(and cut-sq-inhalf-alongdiag
(all instrument entity))

Given that no further restrictions are found by the COMPUTE EXPECTATIONS
step, only the node for 1 , and no node for  , is added to the PlanGraph in the
UPDATE step.
2. In (7.7b), 2 is
(and cause-and-acton
(fills agent you)
(fills patient sq2)
(fills lex-item cut)
(fills caused-role go-comp-inhalf2))

therefore, an instance of the virtual concept
(and reduce-to-pieces
(all patient square)
(fills lex-item cut)
(all caused-role go-comp-inhalf))
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Figure 7.5: A more speci c cut
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Figure 7.6: A less speci c cut
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As shown in Fig. 7.6, conc
is an ancestor of  . Only one node will be added to the
2
PlanGraph, containing perf =  ind , computed as described above, namely, with the
common roles lled with the llers from 2.
3. In (7.7c), 3 is an instance of the virtual concept conc
3
(and reduce-to-pieces
(all patient square)
(fills lex-item cut)
(all caused-role go-comp-inhalf)
(all instrument entity))

Therefore neither one of conc
or  subsumes the other, but they have a common
3
descendant (and conc

)
,
namely
3
(and reduce-to-pieces
(fills lex-item cut)
(all caused-role go-comp-inhalf)
(all location along-diagonal)
(all instrument entity))

The action to be performed is taken to be (and conc
 )ind. See Fig. 7.7.
3
4. Ex. (7.7d) is recognized as inconsistent with the stored knowledge | see Fig. 7.8.
conc is
4
(and reduce-to-pieces
(fills lex-item cut)
(all caused-role go-comp-inhalf)
(all location along-perp-axis))

and perp-axis have been de ned as disjoint concepts (cf. de nitions
in Fig. 7.2) therefore, although along-perp-axis and along-diagonal are both
subtypes of the concept along-place, they are recognized as incompatible. Equivalently, the concept (and conc
 ) would be found to be incoherent by the classi er.
4
A failure is signalled.

diagonal

Another example that I have modelled, where the same kind of reasoning described above
obtains, is
(7.8) Turn screw to loosen.
Given the knowledge that turning screw counterclockwise generates loosening screw , Ex. (7.8)
is dealt with as Ex. (7.7b). Turn screw is recognized as subsuming Turn screw counterclockwise : given the surface form it is the latter action that should in fact be executed |
the reader can nd the relevant action and recipe de nitions in Appendix C. As I already
mentioned, this conclusion may be wrong if the screw is in fact one of those that must be
turned clockwise to be loosened. However, if the system only knows of one type of screw,
the conclusion is correct from its point of view.
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go-comp-plus

cause-and-acton

go-comp-in-half

reduce-to-pieces

cut-location
instrument

cut-sq-inhalfalongdiag

cut-sq-inhalfinstrument

γ

conc

α3

virtual
subsumption

cut-sq-inhalfalongdiag-instr
virtual
concept

instance-of

Figure 7.7: A more and less speci c cut
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α3

place

cause-and-acton

go-comp-plus

caused-role

along-sp-place
reduce-to-pieces

(1,1)

go-comp-in-half

location
(1,1)

cut-location

along-diagonal

alongperp-axis

γ

cut-sq-inhalfalong-axis

conc

α4

restricts
location

virtual
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virtual
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cut-sq-inhalfalongdiag

α4
instance-of

individual

Figure 7.8: An inconsistent cut
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7.2.1.3 Variations on the goal
As I discussed in Sec. 5.2.1.2, a di erent kind of accommodation process could allow  to
vary with respect to the stored knowledge: namely,  could be allowed to retrieve recipes
whose headers are subconcepts of  , and could be used to select among those recipes, if
possible. Let's go back to the examples in (5.21), repeated here for convenience:
(7.9a) Cut the square in half along the diagonal]1 to create two polygons] .
(7.9b) Cut the square in half]2 to create two polygons] .
(7.9c) Cut the square in half with scissors]3 to create two polygons] .
(7.9d) Cut the square in half along a perpendicular axis]4 to create two polygons] .
Also, suppose we have a recipe about cutting squares in half along an axis:7
(cl-define-concept 'create-two-rectangles
'(and recipe-1-step
(all header create-parts-from-whole)
(all substep1 cut-sq-inhalf-alongaxis)
(all effect1 be-comp-sq-rect)))

Now  from (7.9) would select both the previous recipe and the one about creating two
triangles, as both triangles and rectangles are polygons the various i would then be
matched against the unique substep from each of the recipes, and the correct recipe would
then be selected, if i is speci c enough | see Sec. 5.2.1.2.
It is clear that, the more abstract the goal is with respect to the stored knowledge, the less
selective it is, up to the extreme of retrieving every recipe however can still help select
the right one(s) if it is speci c enough. Clearly if both and  are more abstract than
their counterparts from a certain recipe no reasonable inference seems to be possible.

7.2.2 Computing expectations
As I discussed in Sec. 5.2.2, expectations regarding locations of objects are quite common in scenarios where an action changes the perceptual space an agent has access to,
under the assumption that agents only have limited perception: they cannot have up-todate knowledge of any part of their environment which is outside their direct perception.
As mentioned in Sec. 5.2.2, the agent uses such expectations in the process of reference
grounding, namely, of binding the referring expressions in the instructions to objects in the
world. In AnimNL, limited perception is modeled by what is called a portal assumption:
7

With respect to the recipe in App. C, same-as restrictions are missing.
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Portals like doors connect opaquely-bounded three-dimensional subspaces, which
may be adjacent to or embedded within one another (e.g., boxes inside boxes).
Agents can only see into, and hence only know the contents of, spaces that have
a portal open into the space the agent occupies, which we call the active space.
Thus agents have to open doors, lids, etc., to explore other spaces. Within the
active space, we make the simpli ed assumption that agents can see everything
up to closed portals. Webber et al., 1992]
Further, notice that the inferences about object locations are in a sense secondary, the
primary inference being as follows: if one executes an action that changes H's perceptual
space, and / or the space that is accessible to H, and either enables  , or is part of a
sequence A generating   then expect the new perceptual space to be the site either of
 , or of (some of) the remaining actions belonging to A. In particular, when results in
the agent going to a place with the purpose of doing  , one will infer by this that is
the site of  .
The two examples that I will use to illustrate computing expectations are (5.24a) and
(5.24b), repeated here for convenience:
(7.10a) Go into the kitchen to get me the coee urn .
(7.10b) Go into the kitchen to wash the coee urn .

7.2.2.1 Expectations about object locations
I will now show how the algorithm computes E1 , coee urn in kitchen, in the context
of (7.10a). In this section, I will use the CS notation to describe actions and recipes
| as usual, all such descriptions expressed in the CLASSIC language are contained in
Appendix C.
The steps of the algorithm are as follows.

Step 1 and 2. The logical form produced by the parser was shown above in (7.1). Goal is

set to  , which is found to be an instance of the header of the general move -action recipe
shown in Fig. 6.4, and of no other recipe. Therefore, the Recipe move-action is used for
further processing.
Step 3. and the three substeps 1, 2, 3 are checked for compatibility.
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and 1 are as follows:
(7.11a) GOSp(you]r , TO(IN(kitchen])])])]
(7.11b) GOSp(i, TO(m)])]1
They are compatible, since is an instance of 1, with i bound to you and m to
IN(kitchen])]. The algorithm still has to verify whether there is any other information
on i or m in the Recipe that makes i's or m's bindings untenable, such as, for example,
m = outdoors].8 The only other constraint on these parameters comes from the quali er
BESp(j , m)]. Thus we can assume that (7.10a) is really acceptable, and conclude:
(7.12) E1 = BESp(coffee-urn], IN(kitchen])])]
Given that and 1 are compatible, the conclusion is that generates 1 under E1 . I
characterize the relation between the two as generation, because if is executed,  is
executed as well. Notice that even if is an instance of  , I consider the relation between
them to be generation, and not simply abstraction, because of E1 . E1 can be considered as
a condition on the associated conditional generation relation, a condition that the surface
form has singled out. Therefore the two nodes cannot be collapsed: if E1 fails | for example
because there is a note in the kitchen saying The urn is in the basement | another relation
between and  may need to be found, and as a consequence the PlanGraph may have to
be modi ed.
The algorithm still checks whether may be compatible with other substeps of the move recipe. and 2 are incompatible, as is a simple GOsp , while 2 involves CAUSE:
CAUSE(i, GOCtrl (j , TO(AT(i)])])])]2
3 is:
2

(7.13)

6
6
4

"

# 3

m)
GOSp(i FROM(
TO(AT(me])]) ) 775
WITH(j )]
3

The same inferences that yield that
1 is compatible with 3 under

1

is compatible with 1 under E1 , could conclude that

(7.14) E2 = BESp(AT(me])], IN(kitchen])])]
However, and 1 match \better" than and 3. In fact, while is an instance of
1, it is more abstract than 3: 3 restricts the path-role to be from-to-path , while the
corresponding restriction on is to-path  moreover 3 has a role with-role , which doesn't
These veri cations are performed by check-same-as, that checks that the SAME-AS restrictions on
the recipe hold with respect to  and from the input. As SAME-AS restrictions are the way coreference
is expressed in CLASSIC, check-same-as will nd any other constraints on i or m through the SAME-AS
restrictions they appear in.
8
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have. Furthermore, as mentioned in Ch. 5, in naturally occurring examples in general
corresponds to the rst action of a sequence generating  . Therefore, the match between
and 1 is preferred.
Also notice that the lexical items used in the surface form a ect which match is preferred:
if (7.10a) were Come into the kitchen to get me the coee urn , then in fact the match
between and 3 would be preferred. As mentioned above, the CS decomposition doesn't
capture all the semantic information associated to a lexical item, and it is to take into
account these other factors that lex-item can be used.

Step 4. Finally, the various nodes and edges corresponding to the actions and the relations

between them | , 1 , 2 , 3 , the edge labeled generation between and 1 | are
created and added to the preexisting PlanGraph. The is-substep and enables edges deriving
respectively from the body and the annotations of the move -action recipe are also created
and included in the updated PlanGraph. Given that the previous PlanGraph is empty,
we obtain the structure shown in Fig. 7.9, where the labels on the nodes are clearly only
suggestive of their contents. Notice that building the nodes corresponding to primitive
actions such as GOsp (TO(AT(urn))) implies matching them with the corresponding recipe
in the action KB. Being a primitive action, the recipe only lists quali ers and e ects. For
GOsp , the quali er is that the agent is not at the end of the path yet, and the e ect that
he is. The body is not speci ed, as it has to be mapped into the lower level primitives
which are provided by AnimNL.
E1 : BE.sp (urn, IN (kitchen))
β
GET (urn)
is-substep

is-substep
is-substep

γ

1

enables

GO.sp (TO (AT(urn)))

γ2

γ3

enables
GO.ctrl (urn)

GO.sp.with (urn)

generates
(E 1 )
α
GO.sp (TO (IN (kitchen)))

Figure 7.9: PlanGraph for Go into the kitchen to get me the coee urn
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7.2.2.2 Expectations about the action site
It remains to be shown how in (7.10b), the expectation that is built is that it is the washing
site, not the urn, that is in the kitchen.
Fig. 7.10 shows a recipe for wash. Some things to notice about it are:
1. The header can be paraphrased as the agent causes the patient to \go" along the
path whose end point is the property clean. The function GO in this case has the
semantic eld Identi cational.
2. 1 and 2 are both expressed in terms of the ACHIEVE operator discussed in Sec. 6.2.
It seems proper to express the rst two substeps of the wash -action in these terms,
rather than by means of a more speci c action, such as GOsp .
Notice that there is a di erence between (7.15a) and (7.15b)
(7.15a) GOsp(i, TO(AT(j )])])]
(7.15b) ACHIEVE(i, BEsp(i, AT(j )]))]
For (7.15a) we want the agent to perform an action of GOsp  while for (7.15b), we
are only interested in the end result, that the agent is at j .
Given this, expressing 1 in the move -action as (7.15a), while 1 in the wash-action
is expressed as (7.15b), may seem arbitrary. However, the move -action basically
encodes one of the senses of fetch, namely, to go or come after and return with (The
American Heritage Dictionary): therefore, what is encoded is that the agent must
physically go to the location of the object while in the case of wash it is only necessary
that the two conditions of the agent and the patient being at the washing site be
both true before 3 starts.
3. 1 and 2 are left unordered. This enables subsequent planning processes to decide
the right order in which to perform them: this order depends on the knowledge the
agent has on the state of the world, for example where the agent believes the patient
is.
4. 3 is simply denoted as PHYSICAL-WASH: once more, it is left to other processes
to specify a situationally appropriate sense of physical washing.
Referring back to the algorithm in Fig. 7.1, steps 1 and 2 are the same as for (7.10a), apart
that Goal matches the header of the wash-action. For step 3, we try to match with a
substep i of the wash-action. To deal with the ACHIEVE operators, the algorithm rst
retrieves the e ects of GOSp, that are then matched to the state argument to ACHIEVE.
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Header
CAUSE( agent]i GOident ( )])]
TO( AT( clean])]) k
j k

Body
- ACHIEVE( , BESp ( , AT( washing-site])]))] 1
i

i

- ACHIEVE( , BESp ( , AT( washing-site])]))] 2
i

j

- PHYSICAL-WASH( , , AT( washing-site])])] 3
i

-

j

- Annotations 1 enables 3
2 enables 3

Quali ers
- BEIdent ( , AT( dirty]))]
j

Eects
- BEident ( , AT( clean]))]
j

Figure 7.10: A Wash action
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and 1 are respectively:
(7.16a) GOSp(you]r , TO(IN(kitchen])])])]
(7.16b) ACHIEVE(i, BESp (i, AT(washing-site])])])]1
The e ects of (7.16a) are
(7.17) BESp(you]r , IN(kitchen])])]
Therefore, and 1 are found to be compatible under the hypothesis
(7.18) E1 = BESp(AT(washing-site])],IN(kitchen])])]
Given that the only unbound parameter is i, which is no further constrained, and that
IN and AT are both place functions, and therefore compatible with each other, we can
assume that (7.18) is compatible with the rest of the knowledge we have. As mentioned
above, some more detailed geometric reasoning is needed to understand that the place
AT(washing-site])]9 is contained in the place IN(kitchen])]. This same more detailed
geometric reasoner should reject the analogous expectation E2 deriving from Ex. (7.3), Go
into the kitchen to get me the suitcase from the car :
(7.19) E2 = BESp(car, IN(kitchen])])]
Notice that could not directly match 2, that requires the experiencer parameter of
BEsp to be the patient however, could match a substep of the action chosen to expand 2,
such as the move-action in Fig. 6.4. However, the analysis of naturally occurring purpose
clauses in Ch. 5 shows that in general is just part of a top level sequence that achieves
 , rather than of a sequence of actions that achieves a substep of  . Also, in general my
strategy is to look for the match that requires the fewer assumptions, and that postulates
the \simplest" relation between the two actions: intuitively, abstraction is \simpler" than
generation, given that it doesn't involve any conditions and in turn generation is \simpler"
than enablement, given that enablement can involve other actions.
Given that a match between and 1 is found, and no match with 2 and 3, the algorithm
stops. Finally, the PlanGraph is updated similarly to what discussed above, as shown in
Fig. 7.11.

7.3 Structural compatibility: related work
The algorithm that I described and implemented checks for compatibility between the input
action description and the stored one by testing whether the two corresponding complex
9

This representation of washing-site is slightly dierent from the implemented one, in which
de ned directly as an at-sp-place. I retain this representation here for readibility.

washing-site is
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E : BE.sp (AT(washing-site), IN (kitchen))
2
β
WASH (urn)
is-substep

is-substep
γ

is-substep
1

α

ACHIEVE (
BE.sp (agent,
AT(washing-site)))
generates
(E 2 )

γ2

ACHIEVE (
BE.sp (urn,
AT(washing-site)))

γ3

enables
PHYS-WASH (urn)

enables

GO.sp (TO (IN (kitchen)))

Figure 7.11: PlanGraph for Go into the kitchen to wash the coee urn
objects match, or can be taken as matching. The problem of structural matching is obviously not new, and many problems in computer science, from matching actual and formal
parameters in a procedure, to the computation of the most general uni er of two terms in
the uni cation algorithm, could be viewed as performing structure matching. To restrict
the eld somewhat, in the following I will concern myself only with matching of complex
structures moreover, the focus will be on matching that has to occur in the absence of
complete information. I will report on work whose motivations stem either from Natural
Language processing or from plan inference and planning. Obviously, the classi cation algorithm itself performs structure matching. In Sec. 6.2.2, I already discussed two systems
that extend subsumption to actions and plans, Wellman, 1988] and CLASP Devanbu and
Litman, 1991].

7.3.1 Rule systems and pattern matching
It is clear that the problem of structure matching arises for example in rule-based systems.
I will report here on some work by Joshi and Rosenschein 1976 1978], which addresses
the problem of performing matches with only partial information. Joshi and Rosenschein's
system consists of RULES, a small active set of rules (a subset of potentially large set of
rules, LRULES), partially ordered by speci city, and FACTS, a small active set of facts
(a subset of potentially large set of data base facts, LFACTS). The critical feature of their
inference method is that only a partial match of the antecedent of a rule is needed.
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Rules are partially ordered by speci city . 10 Rule Ri is equal to or less than rule Rj if and
only if the antecedent of Ri (represented as a set of forms) is a subset of the antecedent of Rj
(represented as a set of forms).11 Thus R1 : (P Q R) ! E1 is less than R2 : (P Q R S) ! E2,
(R1 is the minimal of the two), but it is not comparable to R3 : (P Q U V) ! E3, since the
antecedent of R1 is not a subset of the antecedent of R3 and vice versa.
Furthermore, if Ri ' is like Ri , except that some unbound variable in Ri is bound in Ri ',
then Ri ' is less than Ri : (P ?X B/?Y) is less than (P ?X ?Y).
The partial order on rules is then exploited to perform partial matches. The notion of
a subset S FACTS identifying a rule R is used: this means that S is a subset of the
antecedent of R. S is maximal if S identi es one or more rule in RULES and for all
S` FACTS and S` S, S' does not identify any rule in RULES. If FACTS is the only
maximal subset then the minimal rule that covers FACTS is chosen. Otherwise, when no
single rule is able to cover FACTS, for each maximal subset the minimal rule that covers
the subset is selected.
As regards the result of the application of a rule (or rules), that will be (the union of) the
instantiated consequent(s) of the rule(s) corresponding to the maximal subset(s). The set
of these instantiated consequent(s) become the new FACTS. The critical feature of this
inference system is that it is not necessary to match the left hand side of the rewrite rule in
its entirety. With suitable variable bindings, the antecedent covers as much of the FACTS
as possible, while covering any item explicitly marked as necessary and containing no more
unneeded items than any other such cover that is comparable to it (in terms of the partial
ordering on RULES).
For example, let RULES be
R1 : (P Q R S M) ! (P Q R S M U)
R2 : (P Q R S T G) ! (P Q R S T G V)
R3 : (P Q R) ! (P Q R W)
If FACTS = (P Q) then the antecedents of R1 , R2 , and R3 all cover FACTS. (P Q) is the
only maximal set. R3 is minimal because it has the fewest unmatched items as compared
to the other covers that are comparable to it, in terms of the partial order on RULES this
is so because (P Q R) is a subset of both (P Q R S M) and (P Q R S T G). Hence, R3 is
chosen and its consequent is instantiated, so now FACTS = (P Q R W). Note that R was
not matched, but since R3 has been selected, R has been also instantiated, namely, it has
been inferred. W has been inferred also.
Let RULES be the same as before. If FACTS =(P Q M G) then there are two maximal
sets, (P Q M) and (P Q G). R1 covers (P Q M) and R2 covers (P Q G). Hence, the result
is the union of the instantiated consequents of R1 and R2 , i.e.,
(P Q R S T G V M U)
10
Joshi and Rosenschein's use of the term specicity is not very felicitous, as it roughly corresponds
to ordering the rules according to the number of items, whether predicates or variables, that have to be
matched in their antecedents, rather than to their antecedents really being one more speci c than the other,
which would be the usual understanding of the word specicity .
11
Forms include constants, variables, and predicate constants that may be applied to constants, variables
and other predicates.
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Again, R, S, T have been instantiated, although not matched in the antecedent of R1 and
R2 .
Notice that therefore the partiality of the match is with respect to RULES, not to FACTS:
namely, all the FACTS have to be covered, but each rule may cover only part of FACTS,
and the antecedent of a certain rule may be more speci c than the subset of FACTS it
covers. Some of the inferences I perform can be seen as related to this approach to partial
match: we could take stored as the antecedent of a rule, and input as the FACTS to be
covered. The assumption that stored is the action to be performed when input is less
speci c than stored , is comparable to ring a rule even if its consequent is more speci c
than FACTS. However, in Joshi's approach all the FACTS must be covered, possibly by
taking the union of more than one rule therefore, it would seem not to cover the cases
in which input is more speci c than stored , and the ones in which neither subsumes the
other, but (and input stored ) is coherent: such cases would correspond to situations in
which there are FACTS not covered by RULES. Clearly the rst case is rather trivial if one
has classi cation / realization at one's disposal, but the de nition of speci city in Joshi's
system is rather simpler than subsumption.

7.3.2 Uni cation based matching
As mentioned above, the uni cation algorithm itself can be seen as performing some kind of
structural matching. In 1988], Charniak extends uni cation with nonmonotonic equality.
The work presented in the paper is motivated by the fact that Charniak notes that a major
component of story comprehension is understanding the character's actions in terms of the
character's motivations : this problem can be characterized as abduction , as one wants
to explain the observed actions in terms of an inferred motivation. Charniak divides
motivation analysis into four parts:
1. nding possible motivations
2. seeing if a suggested motivation is consistent with the action in question
3. determining what additional information is needed to integrate the new line with the
suggested motivation and
4. if there is more than one possible motivation, selecting the most plausible.
After noticing that the rst and fourth parts are the most important, but also the most
dicult and least understood, Charniak concentrates on the second one | is the proposed
motivation consistent with the given action? | and tries to give it a reasonably formal
basis . He notices that his algorithm will also handle the third | determining the extra
information needed.
Charniak views the check for consistency as a kind of pattern matching, where the incoming
action is matched against actions we would expect given certain motivations. A problem
arises when matching roles in the hypothesized explanation (e.g., \the instrument of the
action") against objects in the story (e.g., telescope-22): in a rst order representation,
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this is equivalent to matching a Skolem function against a constant. Charniak proposes
to handle this matching by an extension of uni cation which allows two terms to unify
if they can be proven nonmonotonically equal, namely, if their equality is consistent with
everything we know.
Charniak's starting point is that motivations are generally encoded by means of \frames",
\scripts", etc. He notices that when such representations are translated into predicate
calculus, role names and step names in the frame version are translated to existential
variables in the predicate calculus version.
If there was an instance of cigarette lighting, then there must have been an
agent, a re source, an event of setting re to the re source, etc. ... The next
step is to translate from existentially quanti ed variables to Skolem functions.
Since the existential variables are within the scope of the universally quanti ed
variable ?l:light-cigarette,12 the Skolem functions will be functions of this
variable. p.277-278]
Charniak explains why the need to match Skolem functions against objects from the story
arises: in looking for motivations an action A is given, and what is looked for is a supertask
(or goal) G, such that A is a substep of G. To nd such actions one would request,
(retrieve '(sub-step ?goal A))

A is a substep of what plan?

For example, to nd a motivation for light-1, the action of Norm lighting a match, the
following request would be made:
(retrieve '(sub-step ?goal light-1))

light-1 is a substep of what plan?

Presumably one of the statements initially found would be:
(sub-step ?l:light-cigarette (light-step ?l))

Light-steps of cigarette lighting are substeps of same.

We are then faced with unifying the following statements:
(sub-step ?goal light-1))
(sub-step ?l:light-cigarette (light-step ?l))

The only problem in unifying these two is allowing light-1 to match (light-step ?l),
which is a problem of matching a constant against a Skolem function.
Charniak then turns to discussing how the problem can be solved. First of all he notices
that uni cation has to be extended with equality. However, this is not sucient, as uni cation with equality allows matching Skolem functions against constants, but only in the
12

Charniak's notation is as follows:

?e:elephant indicates
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that ?e is universally quanti ed over elephants.

context of a suitable proof of equality. However in motivation analysis typically cannot be
proved the necessary equality relation. In
(sub-step ?goal light-1))
(sub-step ?l:light-cigarette (light-step ?l))

we cannot prove that light-1 is equal to the Skolem function. Indeed, deciding
this is what our abduction procedure is all about , since if they were equal we
would know why Norm lighted the match|in order to light a cigarette.p.280]
Therefore, the problem of abductive uni cation is reduced to that of proving the consistency of an equality statement between a Skolem function and an instance of an object.
To do so, Charniak resorts to the equality of indiscernibles : if two objects have all the
same properties (size, shape, location, etc.), then they are equal. Charniak notes that
in general this rule is not useful in AI systems, because it requires complete information
about the two objects, and it is computationally intractable for objects about we know a
lot. However, in this case these two problems are not so bad. First, one does not need
perfect information to prove consistent equality. Second, the knowledge about a speci c
Skolem function is not too large, as the function is de ned only within the boundaries of
the clause in which it is introduced. Charniak concedes that in the case of plans this clause
will be rather large, containing a conjunction of statements which describe all the steps
of the plan, all of the objects used in the plan etc. However, it seems unlikely that more
than ten or twenty relevant facts will be known. Therefore Charniak concludes that to use
the non-monotonic version of equality of indiscernibles all that is required is to nd out
everything we know about the Skolem function, substitute in the instance, and then prove
the result consistent.
Given the knowledge encoded in the plan for light-cigarette, we would nd out the
following about light-step: that it is of type set-fire-to, that the agent of
light-cigarette sets re to a patient which is the fire-source of the touch-step, that
sets re to the cigarette. The constants from the story | light-1, match-22 | would
then be substituted into such constraints, and they would be checked for consistency. This
could recursively generate other consistency statements.13 For the details of the algorithm,
I refer the reader to Charniak, 1988].
My own research is clearly closely related to Charniak's. Going back to his four ingredients
for motivation analysis, my work could be characterized as an instance of (3) determining
what additional information is needed to integrate the new line with the suggested motivation . In my work, step (1), nding possible motivations, is made easier by the fact that
I exploit the explicit goal mentioned in the purpose clause I have concentrated on (3),
and, as I've shown in Sec. 7.2.1, I have considered cases where the additional information
comes from the input description, or from the stored knowledge moreover, I have shown
how sometimes checking for structural matching helps detect incompatibility.
A very close connection between my algorithm and Charniak's is the following. The latter,
while checking consistency, for every variable ?x:TYPE nds the set of objects whose type
13

Constraints are imposed on formulas to ensure termination of the algorithm.
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is consistent with TYPE. This includes
1. all objects OB of type TYPE
2. all objects OB of TYPE', with TYPE' subset of TYPE
3. all objects OB of TYPE'', where TYPE is a subset of TYPE'',
and (consistent (inst OB TYPE)).14
The way I check compatibility between the input and stored action descriptions follows
this schema however, in my case types are complex structures, while in Charniak's paper
they are primitive terms.

7.3.3 Plan inference
In Sec. 3.2 I already extensively described the motivations behind plan inference work, and
various approaches to the problem. I will now go back to some of those systems and focus
on whether and how their algorithms perform some sort of structural matching. In general
in all these approaches action descriptions are primitive terms, while in my case they are
structured.

7.3.3.1 Kautz
The problem that Kautz, 1990] sets out to solve is to infer the plan(s) underlying a sequence of events. Kautz's representation is based on event hierarchies . An event hierarchy
is a collection of rst-order axioms expressing abstraction and decomposition relations
among events. The decomposition axioms include both information about components
of actions and equality and temporal constraints, preconditions, and e ects | Fig. 7.12
shows a decomposition axiom for the event MakePastaDish .
By using such event hierarchies, Kautz's algorithm is able to infer what plans a certain
event can be part of at each iteration, the algorithm tries to nd an abstract event that
covers all the events considered so far and the current one. Suppose the initial event
description is : it may be inferred that can be part of the plans to achieve G1 or G2.
A second event description ! is in turn part of plans to achieve G1 or G3. Finally, by
merging the two subgraphs, Kautz obtains a description of what plans both and ! may
be part of - see Fig. 7.13.
In general, the di erence between my algorithm and Kautz's is that I don't assume an exact
description of the action to be performed, and in fact I use a known goal to compute the
more re ned actions needed to satisfy the goal. Kautz goes the other way, as he exploits
known and complete descriptions of events to infer higher and unknown goals.
Furthermore, Kautz's event hierarchies only encode planning, rather than linguistic, knowledge: they correspond to my recipes. It is true that Kautz does provide role functions on
14

(consistent (inst OB TYPE)) means \it is consistent to assume that OB is an instance of TYPE.
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8x Make.Pasta.Dish(x) )
Components
Equality
constraints
Temporal
constraints
Preconditions
Eects

MakeNoodles(s1(x)) ^
MakeNoodles(s2(x)) ^
Boil(s3(x)) ^
agent(s1(x)) = agent(x) ^
result(s1(x)) = input(s3(x)) ^
During(time(s1(x)), time(x)) ^
Before(time(s1(x)), time(s3(x))) ^
Meets(time(x), postTime(x)) ^
Dexterous(agent(x)) ^
Holds(readyToEat(result(x)),postTime(x))
Figure 7.12: A plan in Kautz's formalism
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Figure 7.13: Kautz's inferences
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event tokens, that yield the parameters of the event however, the parameters lling the
roles are not structured, they are basic terms, and therefore no structural matching is performed on them. In general, events are terms rather than structures, and terminological
inferences are not of concern.

7.3.3.2 Pollack
I already discussed the main contributions of Pollack, 1986 Pollack, 1990] in Sec. 3.2.1.2
here I would like to briey discuss the algorithm she implements. She is concerned with
nding the relation between a known goal G and a known action , relation that for her is
embodied in an explanatory plan, or E-plan, which is built out of beliefs and intentions as
explained in Sec. 3.2.1.2. Pollack's algorithm nds the proper E-plan relating G and by
searching in parallel for E-plans of which is part, and for E-plans which achieve G. The
important point is that certain conditions have to hold for an E-plan to achieve G. The
conditions arise from generation relations that relate pairs of actions which appear in the
E-plan, and form a totally ordered sequence that links to G. If these conditions don't
hold, then the algorithm will search for another E-plan, possibly independent from , that
can achieve G, and will suggest it to the user { see Fig. 7.14.

G

G

G
C such that

Ci

j

C holds
j

? E-Plan

E-Plan i

if C does
i

E-Plan

j

not hold

α

α
Figure 7.14: Pollack's inferences

Therefore, both my and Pollack's algorithm heavily rely on already knowing the goal.
However, if doesn't achieve the goal, my approach is to compute constraints on it, so
that can be understood as ', that does achieve G instead, Pollack nds another E-plan
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that does achieve G, where and the new E-plan are not necessarily related. Moreover,
Pollack, although her general motivations arise from modelling NL dialogues, doesn't take
the linguistic structure of action descriptions into account. She represents actions by means
of predicates, and her recipes-for-action are limited to conditional generation relations
between two action types. So once more, in her work no structural matching is performed
on the inner structure of action terms, which are considered as primitives.

7.3.3.3 Lochbaum
As described in Sec. 3.2.1.3, Lochbaum's work 1991a 1991b] focuses on how, in the context
of collaborative activity, the agents build a SharedPlan to achieve a certain known goal A.
If the two agents are indicated by Gi and Gj , Lochbaum's algorithm models Gj 's attempt
to relate  to A, where  is the type of the Act Gi has just mentioned. The algorithm
examines all the known recipes for A that Gj knows, to see whether  is contained in such
recipe. If yes, it computes possible constraints that may have to hold for the particular
relation R between  and A to hold. The recipes are represented by means of the action
formalism devised by Balkanski 1990].
Lochbaum's algorithm builds augmented recipe graphs which are composed of two parts,
a recipe graph or rgraph , representing activities and relations between them, and a set
of constraints, representing conditions on the agents and times of these activities. The
structure of an rgraph mirrors the structure of the recipe to which it corresponds: each
activity and activity relation in an rgraph is derived from the corresponding act-type
and act-type relation in its associated recipe. The set of constraints is derived because
the constructors and relations used in specifying recipes may impose agency and timing
constraints on the successful performance of act-types.
Lochbaum's work can be seen as an improvement on both Pollack's and Kautz's. With
respect to both, Lochbaum uses a much more complex representation of actions.
Pollack's algorithm doesn't look for parameter bindings that may support the relation
between the E-plan and the goal G: parameters are automatically bound, and the only
test performed is whether the ground conditions hold with respect to the agent's beliefs.
On the other hand, Lochbaum's algorithm computes the possible variable bindings under
which such conditions may hold.
Kautz's algorithm is limited to reasoning about actions performed by the same agent, and
also deals only with ground events, while Lochbaum allows more exibility by reasoning
about actions whose agents and time are not speci ed.
With respect to my algorithm, again, Lochbaum's su ers from not taking into account
a complex action hierarchy. Although Balkanski's representation calls for the usage of
a lattice of act-types, the usage of such lattice is never speci ed and in fact Lochbaum
remarks:
further research is required to determine how to represent and use this type of
information act-type lattice] in the augmented rgraph representation. 1991b,
p.22]
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As regards the constraints that Lochbaum computes, they are of limited scope, as they
concern either the agent(s) or the time of an activity. My algorithm instead is able to
compute more complex constraints, such as those relative to the location of an object that
an action manipulates. On the other hand, Lochbaum deals with multiple agents, while I
don't.

7.3.4 Planning and abstraction
Making use of abstract operators as well as their more speci c specializations has been a
trend in planning since at least Sacerdoti's work on NOAH 1977]. However, abstraction
in planning has almost always been meant either as operator decomposition, or as having
more speci c operators that inherit preconditions and e ects from their ancestors | one
example is Kautz's representation described above. To my knowledge, the only one that
deals with really abstract operators, namely, operators that can solve a planning problem
on an abstract representation of the domain is Tenenberg, 1989]. Tenenberg claims that
the novelty of his approach emerges from two main sources: rst, the use of inheritance
orthogonally throughout a planning system, from inheritance of object types, to relations
between object types, to actions that e ect object types second, the precise speci cation of
the relations between levels, which support the relations holding between solutions derived
at these di erent levels.
Abstract representations typically di er from lower level representations by
distinguishing between those aspects of a domain which can be considered details, and those of primary importance. ... For example, Bottles and Cups
can be considered abstractly as Containers. Object classes are used as the
basis for an inheritance structuring on relations between objects, and actions
applied to objects. Therefore, abstract actions e ect relations between elements of abstract object classes. For example, one might abstract the predicate InBottle(WineX,BottleY) to InContainer(LiquidX,ContainerY), and
abstract the operator pourBottle(BottleY) to pourContainer(ContainerY).
Abstract plans are specialized by choosing, for each abstract step, a concrete
step that achieves the desired e ect over a smaller class of objects. p.475]
Tenenberg gives a complete speci cation of how to abstract rst-order theories, and building on this formalization, of how STRIPS systems can be abstracted by abstracting their
operators abstract STRIPS systems of this type have the downward-solution property ,
namely, each plan at an abstract level is specializable by an isomorphic concrete plan, and
for every abstract level inference, there exists a set of isomorphic images that de nes the
space of specializations.15
Tenenberg's contribution is an important one however, it should be clear that once again
the terms of the representation are atoms, and not structured objects. The results he
15
Although the solutions in Tenenberg, 1989] hold for an arbitrary number of levels of abstraction, he
refers to two levels in particular, abstract and concrete.
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obtains with rst order theories could probably be obtained as well exploiting subsumption,
as was done in CLASP Devanbu and Litman, 1991]: in fact, CLASP subsumption between
plans seems to be more exible than Tenenberg's model. In the latter, plans must always
be structurally isomorphic across levels, while in the former, plan classi cation allows to
de ne plan subclasses by adding substeps to the superclass.

7.4 Summary
In this chapter I have presented the algorithm that builds the rst pass of the plan graph
from the input instruction. I have shown how the inferences discussed in Sec. 5.2.1.1 are
implemented: in particular, how compatibility of two action descriptions is computed by
exploiting the classi cation mechanism of the hybrid system and how certain expectations
about the location of the objects manipulated by the actions described in the input and
about the site of some of these actions are computed.
Many issues can be pursued for future work, among them
A representation of the Hearer's intentions that distinguishes between Speaker's and
Hearer's beliefs. As mentioned in Sec. 4.2, this would be necessary to model negative
imperatives and it would be crucial to address issues of miscommunication and
repair, that may arise when the algorithm fails to nd the connection between and
 . If failure were to be addressed, then one further issue would be what recovery
strategies to adopt.
In Secs. 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 I mentioned that a geometric reasoner would be needed
to both compute compatibility, and to compute expectations: in particular this is
necessary in the latter case, given that the expectations I compute regard locations
of objects and of activities.
One of the assumptions behind the (implemented) algorithm is that the previous
PlanGraph is empty. Clearly this is an unattainable simpli cation, as the ultimate
goal of my work and of the AnimNL project is to process a sequence of instructions.
Therefore, the issue of integrating the local structure into a preexisting plan graph
has to be addressed: this brings in further issues of discourse modeling and so forth.
While discussing Ex. 7.8, I mentioned that some kind of default reasoning should be
brought in, as for example only the most common type of screw, but not all of them,
is loosened by turning it counterclockwise.
It is necessary to devise more complex search mechanisms, especially a recursive step
to look at the expansions of the substeps of a recipe, if no match between the input
action and any of the substeps has been found.
The algorithm is not able to deal with actions that may be construed as contributing
to achieving more than one substep of  . Consider
(7.20) Take the coee urn to the kitchen to wash it.
The main action take the coee urn to the kitchen achieves that both the agent
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and the object be at the washing site.
The algorithm may return more than one Recipe, that matches the input, in which
case it is necessary to infer which one \ ts best". Intuitively this would be the recipe
that best ts both and  , but it is not clear how \best t" should be evaluated.
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Chapter 8

Conclusions
8.1 Summary
Human agents are extremely exible in dealing with Natural Language (NL) instructions.
More speci cally, in this thesis I have argued that
1. Most instructions don't exactly mirror the agent's knowledge, but are understood
by accommodating them in the context of the general plan the agent is considering
the agent's accommodation process is guided by the goal(s) that s/he is trying to
achieve.
2. The concept of goal itself is pervasive in NL instructions: a NL system which interprets instructions must be able to recognize and/or hypothesize goals it must make
use of a exible knowledge representation system, that facilitates computing the description of the action to be performed and it may need to execute some specialized
inferences to perform such computation.
To support my claims
1. I de ned accommodation in the context of understanding instructions, building upon
Lewis's original de nition 1979]. I showed that the assumption made in the literature
both on plan inference and on instruction understanding, that there is a direct map
between the logical form of the NL instruction and the system's knowledge about
actions, is untenable when dealing with naturally occurring data.
2. I presented a pragmatic analysis of Purpose Clauses (PCs), in nitival "to" constructions as in Do to do  , and of Negative Imperatives.
3. I analyzed some of the computational issues that interpreting PCs gives rise to,
namely, the two questions of which relations between actions PCs express, and of
which inferences an agent has to perform to understand PCs. My answers to these
questions a ect both the knowledge about actions to be represented, and the algorithm that processes such instructions. In particular my analysis, by showing that
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purpose clauses express generation or enablement between and  , lends support
to the proposal, made in Pollack, 1986 Balkanski, 1993], that these two relations
should be used in modelling actions.
4. I proposed an action representation formalism that provides the required exibility.
Its two main components are the TBox which encodes linguistic knowledge about
actions, and the Action Library, which encodes planning knowledge about actions.
The TBox is expressed in the CLASSIC language Brachman et al. 91]. Hybrid
systems provide classi cation algorithms that compute subsumption between terms:
the classi er proves crucial to understanding the relation between the input and the
stored action descriptions. To guarantee that the primitives of the representation
are linguistically motivated, I derived them from Jackendo 's work on Conceptual
Structures 1990].
The Action Library contains commonsense plans about actions called recipes , and
employs notions derived from the planning literature. The action terms used in the
plans are those de ned in the TBox.
5. I presented an algorithm that implements inferences necessary to understand Do
to do  , and supported by the formalism I propose. The goal  is used as the anchor
to retrieve plans from the action library the classi er is used to infer whether can
be considered as matching (one of) the substeps in the recipe for  . The notion of
match is much broader than simply being an instance of : for example, a match may
hold under expectations concerning locations of objects. In Ch. 7, I showed both
how the match between two action descriptions, and how expectations about object
locations are computed. The implementation of the algorithm is used in the AnimNL
system to build the initial plan graph.

8.2 Future Directions
In the course of the dissertation I have mentioned many open problems and directions for
future research: I will comment here on those that seem more promising to me.

Purpose Expressions
As I mentioned in Ch. 5, one issue on which I have done some preliminary work is the
pragmatic di erence between di erent connectives expressing purpose , for example to , in
order to , so as to . Apart from in nitival constructions, other ways of encoding purpose
include so that  certain usages of and , as in Open the box and hand me the red block 
and Means Clauses, although the inferences about S's beliefs are di erent for Purpose and
Means clauses. Data needs to be collected as regards these other constructions.
After analyzing this extended corpus, I think one can answer some of the questions I posed
in Sec. 4.1.4: in particular, why so as to is generally considered unacceptable if the adjunct
clause precedes the main clause, and whether there is a correlation between the relations
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between the two actions and  and the felicitousness of the various connectives. Other
factors are likely to a ect the pragmatic acceptability of the di erent purpose expressions:
for example, the given / new status of the information respectively expressed in the main
and in the adjunct clause, and S's beliefs about H's beliefs and intentions that such purpose
expressions convey.

Modelling the discourse
The algorithm I proposed in Ch. 7 builds a representation that I see lacking in at least
three respects with regard to providing a real model of the discourse:
The discourse model, meant as the repository of information about the entities talked
about, is totally absent. Instructions, in particular cooking recipes, very often describe changing properties of objects: after executing Cut the square in half to create
two triangles the referent in the world to which the description the square used to
apply does not exist any more, having been transformed into two triangles | on the
topic of how the discourse model has to change, and of how referring expressions are
a ected by the di erent status of the entities they refer to, see Webber and Baldwin,
1992].
While it could be argued that the absence of the discourse model doesn't directly
a ect the structural inferences I proposed, the discourse model would play some role
in the case of computing object locations. Let's consider (7.10a), Go into the kitchen
to get me the coee urn , again. Notice that while de nite descriptions are normally
either textually evoked or inferable , the coee urn here is brand-new anchored , to use
Prince's taxonomy 1981]: namely, the hearer has to create a new referent for it, but
the new entity is anchored , as it is linked to another entity already in the discourse
model, the kitchen .1
Therefore an instruction such as (7.10a) may a ect the discourse model not just by
introducing a new referent: the computed expectation should be part of the properties
ascribed to it. However, this is just an expectation: if it doesn't hold against the
world, as in the case in which the agent goes into the kitchen and nds a note \the
urn is in the living room", it has to be retracted.
Notice also that the presence of instructions such as (7.10a) has interesting consequences for the interaction between di erent modules in the AnimNL system. Suppose there is another co ee urn in the discourse model: to avoid taking the new
description as referring to it, the discourse model should not be accessed before the
expectations are computed.
The discourse history is entirely lacking. Clearly, this would be necessary to process
sequences of instructions, or steps , discussed on Pag. 129. However, the presence of
the discourse history could a ect my algorithm more directly than in this general
way: in fact, it could be used to help select the right recipe. Recall from Ch. 7 that
1
Actually Prince de nes an Anchor as an NP properly contained in the NP of interest I am here
stretching that de nition.

168

it is possible for the goal  to select more than one recipe, and that is then used to
select the correct one. This may happen in particular when the goal is more abstract
than the header of any recipes it may retrieve | cf. Sec. 7.2.1.3. In these cases, the
discourse history may help.
Moreover, to interpret PCs that describe events to be prevented, the discourse history
is necessary: in such cases,  is often expected to happen in the context of a 
mentioned earlier. Consider:
(8.1) Line the tub with cardboard to protect the nish and to prevent debris

from clogging the drain.

1 , protecting the nish and 2, preventing debris from clogging the drain , can be
interpreted only in the context of the general goal  the agent is pursuing, namely,

tiling the wall above the bathtub.
The third issue I want to raise is that the PlanGraph is actually a representation
of the Speaker's beliefs about the Hearer's beliefs and intentions. As I mentioned
in Ch. 7, such representation is sucient for supporting my claims, but wouldn't
be sucient, for example, to model miscommunication between S and H, and to
account for some failures of the algorithm itself | as in the case H only knows
about left-handed screws, and therefore nds an instruction such as Turn the screw
clockwise to loosen incorrect. A well developed Speaker / Hearer Model would build
on top of Balkanski's ndings about beliefs and intentions in PCs and in Means
Clauses Balkanski, 1993], discussed in Sec. 4.1.2.2, to include also cases in which
instructions describe general rules of behavior, or advice on how to act in particular
situations: these are cases in which a PC provides, not so much a goal to achieve,
but a description of the situation in which a certain behavior is appropriate, as for
example in the case of a negative main clause, Don't use chemicals to clean your
parquet oor . Another component that should be taken into account while building
the Speaker / Hearer Model is the choices that S believes H has with respect to
acting.

Negative Imperatives
Recall that in Sec. 4.2 I showed how S can use di erent types of negative imperatives to
identify and prune H's possible choices:
A DONT imperative is used when S believes H to be aware of a certain choice point,
but expects him to choose the wrong alternative among many | possibly in nite |
ones.
A neg-TC imperative is used when S expects H to overlook a choice point. The
choice point is sometimes identi ed through a side e ect that the wrong choice will
cause.
Various issues need to be addressed to give a fuller account of negative imperatives:
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1. How di erent factors a ect the choice of one form of negative imperative, as discussed
in Sec. 4.2 | S's beliefs on H's possible choices, intentionality in actions, action
\relatedness" in discourse.
2. The whole issue of the computational consequences of negative imperatives needs to
be addressed: I believe that the action formalism I presented is adequate for dealing
with negative imperatives too, provided intentional acts are represented in a more
perspicuous way. However, other kind of inferences may be necessary to process
negative imperatives. Moreover, di erent kind of edges may have to be added to the
PlanGraph: for example an edge such as Avoid could be used to relate two actions,
one of which should be avoided in the context of executing another action.
3. Another issue worth considering is the interaction between negation and purpose
clauses, as I discussed in Sec. 4.3.

Action Representation
In Ch. 6 I mentioned various aspects of my action representation formalism that need
improvement. The main ones are
1. Maintenance actions . In Ch. 5 I discussed examples such as (5.11), Hold the cup
under the spigot to ll it with coee , and (5.14), Save wallpaper and leftover adhesive
to repair areas that may be damaged , where describes a maintenance action, namely,
an action that brings about a state of the world that has to hold for a certain time .
Intuitively, it is clear that there is a di erence between maintenance and achievement
actions, whose importance is in achieving the change in the state of the world, not in
the time that this new state has to hold for. This di erence may simply amount to the
grain size of the time interval that the state achieved after executing a certain action
has to hold for: it may be years for a maintenance action, while it can sometimes be
considered almost an instant for an achievement action. A crisper distinction could
probably be obtained by looking at examples of maintenance actions, and would have
to be included in the formalism. In fact, the di erence between maintenance and
achievement actions may a ect the agent's future behavior, and therefore, in the
case of AnimNL, it may a ect its planning processes: for example, in the case of
a maintenance action , the agent should avoid other actions that may change the
state brought about by .
2. Enablement . It is necessary to be clearer on the representation of executability conditions on , which in turn a ects the representation and interpretation of enablement:
I represent some of such conditions indirectly as substeps in a recipe for , but I don't
think this is sucient.
3. Hierarchical representation of plans. In Sec. 6.2.2, I mentioned two major shortcomings of the representation in the action library:
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(a) The fact that some roles, such as substeps, annotation, qualifier, cannot
be described in a compact way. A de nition as in (8.2) for the role substeps is
untenable:
(8.2) (ALL substeps intentional-act)(AT-LEAST 1 substeps)
In fact, more speci c recipes would inherit substeps from the concept recipe 
however, because of the lack of the DIFFerentiation operator on roles in CLASSIC, it would not be possible to specify that each substeps has a di erent value
restriction. Therefore, in the current implementation, roles such as substeps
have to be explicitly enumerated. In order to express recipes more perspicuously, a possible solution is to extend the underlying CLASSIC language to
include the DIFFerentiation operator.
(b) I didn't modify subsumption to take into account more complex notion of hierarchical relations between recipes, for example di erent temporal orders imposed on annotations belonging to recipes in some kind of hierarchical relation.
A simple example of this is: the move-recipe in Fig. 6.5 imposes a total order on its substeps through the annotations. Suppose I were to de ne moverecipe2 in which the temporal order of the substeps were BEFORE(1, 3 ) and
BEFORE(2 , 3 ), without any explicit ordering given on 1 and 2. moverecipe2 should be recognized as subsuming move-recipe .
This type of reasoning is performed in CLASP Devanbu and Litman, 1991],
which is built on top of CLASSIC: therefore a rst extension to my formalism would be to integrate the more complex action descriptions I use with the
subsumption mechanisms proposed in CLASP.

The algorithm
In Sec. 7.4 I discussed numerous ways in which the algorithm I present in Ch. 7 could be
extended. I think the major issues in that respect are:
1. The lack of a recursive step to look at the expansions of the substeps of a recipe, if
no match between the input action and any of the substeps has been found.
2. The need for more complex inferences, as the one necessary to infer hold the cup
under the spigot upright in (5.11), Hold the cup under the spigot to ll it with
coee. The inference is more complex because the augmented description of hold is
not already available as part of the stored knowledge, as for cut square in half along
the diagonal , but derives from some of the conditions on the generation relation
between depress the lever and ll cup with coee | see Fig. 5.5.
3. The fact that the algorithm can't deal with actions whose execution achieves more
than one of the substeps of a certain Recipe.
4. If in the end there is more than one Recipe which successfully matches, then heuristics should be applied to check whether one of them has the \best t" with the input
instruction: presumably, this would be the Recipe whose header and body have the
best match with respectively  and .
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5. The lack of the discourse context, represented by the PlanGraph built so far. This
issue relates to work on discourse structure as mentioned above, and to the management of the list of active nodes, namely, of those nodes open to further expansion.
The presence of the discourse context would also a ect the evaluation function that
has to decide which is the \best t" Recipe.
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Appendix A

Corpus
I include here all the purpose clauses and negative imperatives I collected, subdivided into
the subtypes I discussed in Secs. 4.1.1 and 4.2. For each example, I note the source. Note
the following: I use boldface to indicate the clause(s) of interest while emphasis and capital
letters come from the source itself. Some examples may include more than one purpose
clause: however, given that they are subdivided into types, the example will be repeated
in a di erent section if the two PCs are not of the same type, e.g. one PCs describes a
change in H's knowledge, and a second one introduces a new referent. Only the highlighted
clause is counted obviously.

A.1 Purpose Clauses
A.1.1 Bring event about
1. Transfer painting pattern to piece and nish according to personal preference. Be sure to
leave base piece and foot of cutout unnished to allow wood glue to adhere to nished
pieces. CWP, 1989]
2. Start in one corner of the room and measure oor-to-ceiling height for the rst panel. Subtract
1/2" to allow clearance top and bottom to maneuver the panel into place. CWP, 1989,
9]
3. Shut o the power, unscrew the protective plate to expose the box. CWP, 1989, 9]
4. On last sealer or primer coat, sand at surfaces lightly to level and remove all brush or
wipe marks, with very ne grade sandpaper. CWP, 1989, 19]
5. To cut sharp exterior corners, cut the rst line and keep on going past the corner. Loop
around in the waste portion of the stock, and come back to cut the second line. CWP, 1989,
20]
6. To cut sharp interior corners, cut the rst line up to the corner, then back the black out
of the stock and cut the second line. CWP, 1989, 20]
Comment:

The magazine says

black,

but it's probably
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blade.

7. If you wish to enlarge or reduce the pattern, divide a sheet of paper into larger or smaller
squares than those found on the patterns. To transfer the pattern to your grid, note
where each line on the vertical drawing crosses either a vertical or horizontal line on the
pattern in this section. Using a soft lead pencil locate the same point on your grid and place
a dot there. Continue this procedure until all intersecting points have been located, then join
the dots. CWP, 1989, 38]
8. Insert dowel to temporarily secure cutout with baseboard. CWP, 1989, 64]
9. To cut parts F measure 1-3/4" from the back and mark. Measure from that point 7-1/2"
and mark. Measure up from the bottom 1-3/4" and mark. Draw a line from the top mark
to the bottom mark to create the slant for the sides. Cut along this edge. CWP, 1989, 71]
10. Build this simple but elegant corner shelf to display all the other decorative pieces
found in this issue. CWP, 1989, 74]
11. 5. To assemble bed, lay headboard posts parallel on a at surface. Use the guide to align
the frame and headboard piece. If using dowels carefully drill both the frame and headboard
piece and post holes together for proper alignment. This is a dicult step, and if you are a
beginner use at head brass tacks to assemble the pieces.
6. Put a small amount of wood glue on the post and assemble headboard pieces. Align
footboard pieces and repeat the procedure. Allow glue to dry before assembling side pieces.
CWP, 1989, 76]
12. To nish, cut muslin and eece to 12 1/2 x 18 1/2 inches. Pin muslin to mat, right sides
facing, atop eece. Sew edges together, leaving an opening.
Turn, sew closed and quilt. CC, 1988, 7]
13. To nish the dolls with an antiqued look, lightly brush on a thin coat of burnt umber
oil-base paint. Rub paint into the wood with a turpentine-saturated rag then wipe away
excess with a clean, soft rag. CC, 1988, 48]
14. To fuse appliques, slip the shaped pieces of fusible webbing between the garment and the
applique' press the layers together using a warm iron. Note: Slip paper towels between iron
and fabric to catch stray wisps of the heated fusible webbing. CC, 1988, 52]
15. To make a similar quilt from new fabrics, follow the instructions below. Refer to the photograph for color and placement suggestions. Use 1/4-inch seams preshrink fabrics.
TO CUT THE BLOCKS: Make a 5x5-inch cardboard template. (measurement includes
1/4-inch seam allowance). Cut 56 squares from dark pindotted fabric.
Cut a 4 1/2-inch-square template in half diagonally for edging triangles add seam allowances
to one triangle set the other triangle aside. Cut 30 triangles from dark pindotted fabric (cut
long side of triangle with the straight grain).
For corner triangles, cut remaining triangle template in half add seam allowances. Cut four
triangles from dark pindotted fabric (cut short sides of triangle with the straight grain). Set
pieces aside.
Each Nine-Patch block has four dark-colored and ve light-colored squares. Cut a 2x2-inch
template. (measurement includes seam allowance). Cut 288 squares from dark fabrics, 360
from light fabrics.
TO PIECE BLOCKS: Sew a strip of three squares (light, dark, light). Sew another strip
of three (dark, light, dark). Sew a third strip the same as the rst. Piece the three strips
together to make a checkerboard pattern. Repeat for 72 blocks.
TO ASSEMBLE: Working diagonally from one corner, piece squares into strips following
the diagram below. Join strips into rows. For inner border, cut two 2 1/2x54-inch and two
2 1/2x64 1/2-inch strips piece if necessary. Join the short strips to the top and bottom of
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16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

28.
29.

the pieced top. Join long strips to sides. For outer border, cut two 8 1/2 x 58 inch and
two 6 1/2x80 1/2-inch strips piece if necessary. Join to edges in same manner above. Piece
the backing to the quilt-top size. Layer the backing, batting, and top into a quilt sandwich.
Baste together, then quilt as desired. Bind the edges with bias tape or 2-inch-wide fabric
strips. CC, 1988, 63]
To use in a dried bouquet, fasten oral wire to each stem with oral tape. CC, 1988,
75]
To promote vigorous blooming, spray your owers with a foliar fertilizer once every two
weeks. CC, 1988, 77]
To nish the pillows, cover the piping with the bias stripping and sew to the perimeter
of the needlepoint design. Add rue (optional) by cutting the yardage in 7-inch-wide strips.
Sew the strips end to end to make a 4 1/2-yard loop fold in half lengthwise and gather to
t pillow perimeter. Sew to pillow front over piping line. Folding rues in, sew pillow back
to right side of pillow front (leave opening for turning). Trim seams, clip corners, and turn
pillow right side out. Stu with berl and sew closed. CC, 1988, 77]
To start a strip, slip the hook through the top of the backing and pull the end of a wool
strip through the top so it extends about 1/2 inch (trim end later.) CC, 1988, 82]
To mix light colors, place white in the dish rst and add color slowly until desired color
is reached. CC, 1988, 83]
To prepare acrylic plastic, cut two 4x4 pieces. Mark and score the acrylic plastic along
the lines with a utility knife against a straightedge about 20 times. Bend until it breaks over
the edge of the table. CC, 1988, 88]
To open the bers in the fabric, soak the fabric bundle in the solution for 15 minutes.
CC, 1988, 88]
Heat on stove to simmer. CC, 1988, 88]
Whipstitch the feet to the legs to secure. CC, 1988, 90]
To shape the mouth, fold the face piece on the mouth line sew a 1/8-inch seam. CC,
1988, 91]
To attach arms, use doubled white carpet thread and push needle in one side of the body
and out the other side at points indicated by dots on the pattern. Thread needle through
arm at dot, then through one of the holes in the tiny button. Pass needle back through
second hole in button, through arm and body to opposite side. Pull thread tightly to pull
arm snugly against body. CC, 1988, 98]
To print the checkerboard, paint the end of the 3/4-inch wood scrap with rust paint press
the end onto the corner of the center square. Skip a 3/4-inch space print the next check.
Repeat until the checkerboard is lled, using previous line of checks as a guide. Decorate
the borders around the checks with gray-painted 1/4-inch scrap print ends with rust hearts
printed over gray hearts. Varnish. CC, 1988, 98]
To prepare the working area, clear away rugs, furniture, and anything else that might get
in the way. Cover adjacent nished areas with paper or plastic sheeting. Hallowell, 1988a,
42]
Wash the wall with a good household cleaner, such as trisodium phosphate (TSP, available
in hardware stores) to remove grease lm, which can impair the adhesive. Hallowell,
1988a, 42]
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30. To tile bathroom walls, remove wall-mounted basins or toilets. Hallowell, 1988a, 42]
31. Leave a slight gap, about 1/32", between adjacent panels to permit expansion. Hallowell,
1988a, 43]
32. To install, use nails or adhesive to fasten gypsum wallboard to existing walls or studs. Tape
corners and cover the nail heads. Use cement-based or mastic adhesive for ceramic tile on
gypsum wallboard. Hallowell, 1988a, 44]
33. In pouring a new slab for a tile base, be sure to place a plastic vapor barrier between the slab
and the ground, and reinforce the slab thoroughly to prevent any cracking. Finish the slab
with a light brooming to give it a slightly rough texture, which will make the adhesive
bond very well to the slab. Hallowell, 1988a, 44]
34. Waterproof membrane, which comes in a kit, consists of ber glass mesh and light tar. To
apply, rst cut the fabric to t the wall in a vertical section. Roll on a thin layer of tar
and then roll the piece of mesh into the tar. Cut a second piece of mesh to t at a right
angle over the rst piece1 and roll it into the tar. Apply a second layer and let it dry.
Hallowell, 1988a, 44]
35. If you must place new tile over old, clean it thoroughly to remove scum, mineral buildup,
coatings, wax, and dirt. Hallowell, 1988a, 44]
36. To tile to the ceiling, install new backing above the old. Shim the backing if necessary to
make it ush with the old tile. Hallowell, 1988a, 45]
37. To cut the hole, see the drawings below. Hallowell, 1988a, 47]
38. The best time to check a slab for dampness is just after a rainstorm, when the ground is
saturated with water. To make the test, place several 1' squares of plastic (bread wrappers
will do) on the slab. Tape all the edges down to trap any moisture.
After 24 hours, check the squares. If the underside are fogged with moisture, the slab is too
wet to lay tile on. Hallowell, 1988a, 47]
39. Marking the cuts. If your tiles have ridged backs, make cuts parallel to the ridges. To mark
for straight cuts, place the tile, nished surface up, exactly on top of the last full tile
you set. Then place another tile on top of this one, with one edge butted against the wall.
Hallowell, 1988a, 47]
40. To t a tile to an irregular contour, match it with a contour gauge and transfer the
outline to the tile with a felt-tip pen. You can also cut a pattern from cardboard and then
transfer the shape to the tile. Hallowell, 1988a, 47]
41. To cut a hole in tile, rst drill through it with a masonry bit. If the tile is held in a vise,
protect it with a piece of scrap wood on each side.
After the hole is drilledd, pass the rod saw (a cutting cable available at your dealer) through
the hole and hook it to your hacksaw. If you don't have a vise, clamp the tile to the edge of
a table, protecting the tile with pieces of wood. Hallowell, 1988a, 47]
42. Nail wood battens along the working lines to help keep the tiles straight. Hallowell,
1988a, 48]
43. To keep tiles from breaking, keep all but essential trac o the oor until you grout the
joint. Hallowell, 1988a, 49]
1
Both this and the immediately preceding in nitival are ambiguous between a rationale clause and a
PC in a syntactic sense.
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44. (caption to gure) Straightedge marked with tile spacing will help you maintain straight
course and even spacings. Check with square often to assure professional look. Hallowell,
1988a, 50]
45. To install a grab bar in a tub or shower enclosure, locate and mark the center of the
appropriate wall studs with pencil marks on the ceiling before you tile. After the tile is up,
locate the studs by following down the wall from the ceiling marks with a level. Screw the
bars directly to the studs through holes drilled in the tile. Hallowell, 1988a, 51]
46. On outside corner, set one column of tile with bullnose tiles to cover the un nished edges
of the tiles on the adjoining wall. Hallowell, 1988a, 53]
47. Press rmly to bed the tile in the bond coat. Hallowell, 1988a, 56]
48. To insert tiles in a wall of gypsum board, cut out openings the same size as the tiles.
Apply a beard of glue along the edges of a few pieces of wallboard. Slip them at an angle
through the opening and fasten against the back side of the wall until dry, closing the opening
as much as possible. Hallowell, 1988a, 61]
49. These are the steps involved in applying grout. Hallowell, 1988a, 63]
(a) Spread about a cup of grout to familiarize yourself with the process. ... Work
the trowel back and forth at dierent angles to the grout to force it into the joints.
...
(b) After this rst area, perhaps 5 square feet, has been grouted, scrape o the trowel
and go over it again to pick up the excess. This time hold the trowel at about a
50 degree angle and work at a diagonal to the joints to minimize disturbing the grout
there. Clean your trowel repeatedly in a bucket of water as you work.
50. On new tile installation, wait at least two weeks before applying the sealer to give the
grout a chance to cure completely. Hallowell, 1988a, 63]
51. Tiles in a panel are held rmly in position by the grout, but those in a mosaic sheet are not,
despite the mesh backing. You may have to move them slightly right after laying them in
the adhesive to keep the grout lines straight. Hallowell, 1988a, 63]
52. After washing the tile, rinse it thoroughly to remove detergent lm then wipe dry with
a soft, dry cloth. Hallowell, 1988a, 64]
53. If you have hard water spots and deposits may build up on tiles that are in shower enclosures,
on sink counters, and in other wet areas. You can help prevent such buildups by keeping the
tile surfaces dry. Use a sponge to wipe water o the tiles after showering or doing dishes.
To remove water deposits and soap lm from the tile, apply household ammonia or
a one-to-one mixture of vinegar and water, rinse thoroughly, and dry. Hallowell, 1988a, 64]
54. Hold dierent tiles to the light to compare the quality of the color and the depth it
appears to have. Hallowell, 1988a, 64]
55. To remove resilient sheet ooring, cut it into strips about 6" wide with a utility knife,
being careful not to damage the sub oor. The ooring will come up rather easily as it
separates from the backing, which is still stuck to the oor. Soak this backing in water {
without ooding the oor { and then use a oor scraper to remove it. Hallowell, 1988a, 69]
56. To remove old resilient tiles, use a oor scraper as shown in the drawing below. If tiles
don't come up easily, warm them to soften the adhesive. You can do this with an old
iron or a propane torch. Once you break the tiles loose you'll nd the oor still covered with
the rough adhesive. Paint on adhesive remover, allow to stand, then scrape up the softened
adhesive. If you can't remove the tiles, cover with an underlayment sheet. Hallowell, 1988a,
69]
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57. To remove paint or sealers, sand the oor to bare concrete with a oor sender and n.4 or
n.5 open-cut-sandpaper. Remove high spots by rubbing with a coarse abrasive stone. Finish
the preparation by scouring the oor with a sti bristle brush and vacuuming up all loose
material. Hallowell, 1988a, 70]
58. Snap chalk lines across these points to get diagonal working lines. Hallowell, 1988a, 70]
59. If the tile has a pattern or grain running in one direction, cut either right or left half tiles to
match the pattern or grain direction of the oor. Hallowell, 1988a, 71]
60. To cut tiles, score along the mark with a utility knife and snap the tile along the line.
For intricate cuts, use a pair of heavy scissors. The tiles will cut more easily in this case if
warmed in sunlight or over a furnace vent. Don't overheat or the tiles may scorch or melt.
Hallowell, 1988a, 71]
61. To mark and cut border tiles, position a loose tile exactly over one of the tiles in the
last row closest to the wall (A) making sure that the grain or pattern is running in the right
direction. Place another loose tile on top of the rst, butting it against the wall (B). Using
this tile as a guide, mark tile A with a pencil or score it with a utility knife. When cut, tile
A will t exactly in the border. Hallowell, 1988a, 72]
62. The nished wall will look better if you avoid narrow border tiles at the corners of the wall.
To arrange this, lay a row of loose tiles on the oor from the midpoint to the corner. If the
space from the last full tile to the corner is less than one half tile, move the vertical working
line over a distance of one half tile. Hallowell, 1988a, 73]
63. To replace a damaged tile, rst warm it and the adhesive below with a propane torch or
an old iron. Pry up the tile using a putty knife or cold chisel. Remove any excess backing or
adhesive from the oor until the surface is smooth and deep enough to install the new tile.
Next apply the proper adhesive, keeping it back about 1/4" from the perimeter. Be careful
not to get any on the surrounding tiles. Drop the new tile into place and press down rmly.
Weights along the edges will ensure that the tile does not pop up before the adhesive sets.
Hallowell, 1988a, 73]
64. You can also put the can of adhesive in hot water to soften it. Hallowell, 1988a, 77]
65. Work the adhesive from several dierent directions to spread it evenly. Hallowell, 1988a,
77]
66. (caption of a drawing) Tap tiles with rubber mallet as you work to bed them and to lower
any high corners. Hallowell, 1988a, 78]
67. Work to nish half a room at a time, but keep your eye on the clock. Within 4 hours of
the time the tile was laid, you must roll it to set the tile fully and to level any pieces
that have popped up. Hallowell, 1988a, 78]
68. To allow for pattern repeat, divide the height (in inches) of the wall by the number of
inches between the pattern repeat if you have a fractional remainder, round it o to the next
highest number. For example, a 96-inch wall height divided by an 18-inch pattern repeat
gives you 5.33 repeats, rounded o to 6.
Then multiply the repeat measurement by the number of repeats you'll need to determine
the working height gure you must use. In the case above, multiplying the 18-inch pattern
repeat by 6 repeats tells you that you must calculate your wallpaper needs according to the
requirements of the 108-inch wall, rather than the actual 96-inch wall. Hallowell, 1988b, 38]
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69. To remove the wallpaper, you can use either a steamer, available for rent from your
dealer, or a garden sprayer. Sometimes, you can add a liquid to the water to hasten the
paste-dissolving process, but ask your dealer before adding anything to the water.
A steamer converts water to steam that runs through a hose to a pan with a trigger. You
simply move the pan along the wall, allowing steam to penetrate the covering. To use a
garden sprayer, you just ll it with very hot water and spray the water onto the wallpaper.
Hallowell, 1988b, 38]
70. Don't hang the wallpaper over an existing wallpaper if the ink from the existing covering
comes o it could bleed through the new covering. To test, moisten a small piece of the
covering with a clean sponge. If the ink comes o, seal the old covering rst with an undercoat
that seals stains. Hallowell, 1988b, 40]
71. To repair holes and other surface damage, see page 70. Hallowell, 1988b, 41]
72. To paste and book the strips, follow these steps:
1) Place the strips for one wall in the center of your work table, pattern side down. Align
the rst strip to be hung with the edge of the table.
2) Using a roller or brush, apply paste evenly to the back of the rst strip (excess paste that
laps over the edges will be caught by the back of the next strip.) Using an outward stroke,
work from the center toward the edge. Be sure to apply enough paste to the edges.
3) To book the strip, fold the bottom third or more of the strip over the middle of the
panel, pasted sides together, taking care not to crease the wallpaper sharply at the fold. Be
sure the edges are aligned.
4) Fold over the remaining portion of the pasted strip until it meets the rst cut end. Again,
make sure the edges are aligned. Loosely roll booked strip and store it o the pasting table
until you're ready to hang the strip.
5) If necessary, trim the selvage. To do this, place the pasted and booked strip (its edges
aligned precisely) on the table. On one side, align a straightedge with the trim marks. Using
a razor knife, cut through both layers. turn the strip around and follow the same procedure
for the opposite side. Hallowell, 1988b, 44]
73. In most situations, the butt seam is the best way to join two strips of wallpaper, since it's
the least noticeable seam. To make one, tightly butt the edge of the strip you're hanging to
the edge of the previously hung strip. Be very careful not to stretch the wallpaper. Roll the
seam to atten it and prevent the edges from curling. Hallowell, 1988b, 45]
74. When a wall irregularity will cause the edge of the strip you're hanging to overlap the
previously hung strip, make a double cut seam. To do this, complete the hanging of the
second strip, disregarding the overlap. Immediately place a straightedge at the center of
the overlap and, using a razor knife, cut through both layers of wallpaper. Remove the top
cut-o section of the overlap. Carefully peel back the edge of the top strip until you can
remove the bottom cut-o section. Smooth down the top strip the seams should butt tightly
together. Hallowell, 1988b, 45]
75. To hang a strip around an outside corner, butt the new strip to the previous strip and
smooth as much as you can around the corner without buckling the wallpaper at the top and
bottom corners. Hallowell, 1988b, 48]
76. To paper around recessed windows, see the illustrations below. Hallowell, 1988b, 49]
77. After you've pasted and booked a strip, allow it to sit long enough to become limp. Then use
a soft, natural bristle brush for pressing and smoothing it onto the wall avoid overbrushing.
To lay the nap in the same direction, nish with upward strokes. Hallowell, 1988b, 50]
78. To hang the wallpaper, follow the steps on page 47. Hallowell, 1988b, 51]
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79. To roll seams at, glue a scrap of ocked wallpaper over the roller head press lightly on
the seams to atten them and prevent curling edges. Hallowell, 1988b, 51]
80. Before you can hang the rst strip, you'll need to establish plumb. To do this, measure from
the ceiling corner 1/2 inch less than the width of the wallpaper. Mark the ceiling at that
point. Move to the far end of the wall and measure in the same distance from the corner
mark the ceiling at this point also. Tack a string rubbed with chalk to the ceiling at both of
these marks and snap a chalk line between them. Hallowell, 1988b, 51]
81. Use a vinyl-to-vinyl paste for any type of border you plan to hang over wallpaper. To paste
the border for hanging, cover the entire back with paste and book the strip don't crease
the folds.
To hang the border, begin at the least conspicuous corner. The work will go much faster
if you have someone hold the folded section while you apply the border to the wall. Take
care not to drip paste onto the wall and be sure to remove excess paste.
Use your ngers to press the border into corners avoid crease marks. Because the border is
narrow, it's not necessary to be concerned about how straight the corners are. Just work the
border into the corner and continue around the room. Hallowell, 1988b, 52]
82. After you've nished cleaning, wipe the surface with a clean rag to remove any dough.
Hallowell, 1988b, 52]
83. To remove dirt, grease, and stains before they can penetrate the wallpaper,
thoroughly wash the soiled area with a mild soap and cold water solution. Hallowell, 1988b,
52]
84. You can apply a protective coating to a nonvinyl wallpaper to make it easier to clean and
prolong its life. Hallowell, 1988b, 52]
85. Save wallpaper scraps and leftover adhesive to repair areas that may be damaged or stained
in the future. Hallowell, 1988b, 52]
86. Take the compost bag from the pot, open it and add enough water to make the compost

thoroughly wet.
Source:

SimpleGrow

Source:

instructions for assembling a pot cover.

Source:

recipe for Roast Suckling pig, from Prince, 1981, 234].

Source:

recipe for Roast Suckling pig, from Prince, 1981, 235].

87. To unlock the knob from the underside of the lid, turn it rmly towards you as
illustrated here.
88. Put a block of wood in its mouth to hold it open.

89. To carve, place head to left of carver. Remove forelegs and hams. Divide meat down center
of back. Separate the ribs. Serve a section of crackling skin to each person.

Create new object

1. Piece the three strips together to make a checkerboard pattern. CC, 1988, 63]
2. To make a similar quilt from new fabrics, follow the instructions below. Refer to the
photograph for color and placement suggestions. CC, 1988, 63]
3. Stu stocking to form a body 8 inches in circumference. CC, 1988, 87]
4. Join the short ends of the hat band to form a circle. CC, 1988, 93]

180

5. Make three pieced-square blocks and one solid-square block. Join the blocks to form a
square. CC, 1988, 98]
6. To make a piercing cut, rst drill a hole in the waste stock on the interior of the pattern.
The diameter of the hole must be larger than the width of the blade. CWP, 1989, 21]
7. Draw a line from the top mark to the bottom mark to create the slant for the sides. CWP,
1989, 71]
8. In most situations, the butt seam is the best way to join two strips of wallpaper, since it's
the least noticeable seam. To make one, tightly butt the edge of the strip you're hanging
to the edge of the previously hung strip. Be very careful not to stretch the wallpaper. Roll
the seam to atten it and prevent the edges from curling. Hallowell, 1988b, 45]

A.1.2 Prevent event
1. If you're pad sewing a stack of veneer, put a sheet of poster board on the bottom and the
top of the stack to prevent small pieces from breaking o. CWP, 1989, 21]
2. To prevent weeds from getting a foothold in the garden, mulch your seedlings when
they are several inches high. Use a thick layer of straw, shredded bask, ground corn cobs,
cocoa bean hulls, leaves, or newspaper. The mulch will smother weeds and increase soil
moisture. CC, 1988, 74]
3. Bind the edges of the canvas with masking tape to prevent raveling. CC, 1988, 77]
4. Tape raw edges of fabric to prevent threads from raveling as you work. CC, 1988, 77]
5. Reinsert roughed-out bottle in lathe move the steady rest in as closely as possible to minimize the tendency of the irregular wood to grab the tool as it rotates. CC, 1988,
86]
6. Remove any doors that open into the room by tapping out the hinge pins (don't unscrew the
hinges) and cut with a ne-toothed saw. To minimize splintering, cover the cutline on
both sides with masking tape. Hallowell, 1988a, 42]
7. Line the tub with cardboard to protect the nish and to prevent debris from clogging
the drain. Hallowell, 1988a, 42]
8. In pouring a new slab for a tile base, be sure to place a plastic vapor barrier between the slab
and the ground, and reinforce the slab thoroughly to prevent any cracking. Finish the
slab with a light brooming to give it a slightly rough texture, which will make the adhesive
bond very well to the slab. Hallowell, 1988a, 44]
9. Starting at the wall. Many traditional tile setters use this method. Its roots are in the
traditional way of setting tiles, in which tile setters worked from one end to avoid disturbing
the carefully leveled mortar bed. Hallowell, 1988a, 48]
10. If you start tiling against a wall that's out of square, the last course of tile along the opposite
wall may have to be cut progressively wider or narrower. To avoid this, correct the room's
layout and squareness using the following method. ... Hallowell, 1988a, 52]
11. The vertical lines. Measure to nd the midpoint of a wall and mark it on the horizontal line.
Starting at this midpoint, measure with the tile stick or set a row of loose tiles on the batten
to determine the size of the tiles at each end of the wall. Don't forget the spacers. If the end
tiles will be less than half a tile, move your midpoint mark one-half tile to avoid narrow
pieces at each end. Then use the level and straightedge to mark a vertical line on the wall
through the mark. Hallowell, 1988a, 55]
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12. First, cover the drain and line your tub with cardboard to prevent damage. Hallowell,
1988a, 57]
13. Butter (i.e. apply adhesive to) the last row of tiles individually to prevent adhesive
showing above the tiled area. Hallowell, 1988a, 60]
14. After this rst area, perhaps 5 square feet, has been grouted, scrape o the trowel and go
over it again to pick up the excess. This time hold the trowel at about a 50 degree angle and
work at a diagonal to the joints to minimize disturbing the grout there. Clean your
trowel repeatedly in a bucket of water as you work. Hallowell, 1988a, 63]
15. To prevent stains, wipe up spills as soon as they happen. Hallowell, 1988a, 64]
16. To protect the oor from indentation, remove any small metal domes or glides from
furniture legs, replacing them with wide glides or furniture cups like those shown in the
drawing below. Hallowell, 1988a, 73]
17. Work carefully to avoid nicking or chipping the wall's surface. Hallowell, 1988b, 38]
18. Some paper-backed vinyls have a tendency to curl at the edges. To prevent this, make
sure to book each strip before hanging. Hallowell, 1988b, 46]
19. To avoid scratches, creases, and folds (even slight creases or scratches can greatly
impair the appearance of foil), roll up the strip, pattern side in. Hallowell, 1988b, 50]
20. To roll seams at, glue a scrap of ocked wallpaper over the roller head press lightly on the
seams to atten them and prevent curling edges. Hallowell, 1988b, 51]
21. Use premixed vinyl adhesive to install fabrics laminated to paper backing. Trim all selvages
before hanging. Then spread paste on the fabric's backing and hang, butting edges. To
prevent staining, keep adhesive o the fabric surface. Hallowell, 1988b, 51]

A.1.3 Augment agent's knowledge
1. Transfer pattern to heavy paper or cardboard. Measure dimensions of box from pattern to
determine the amount of material you will need. CWP, 1989, 36]
2. New tile on the oor may mean you'll have to trim the doors to allow for the added height.
To determine where the door must be cut, place a tile on the oor against the door
and mark. Allow an additional 1/8" clearance for inside doors. On exterior doors allow for
weather-stripping on the bottom edge of the door. Hallowell, 1988a, 42]
3. To check a oor for dips, run a long straightedge over the oor and look at it against the
light for gaps under the board. Hallowell, 1988a, 43]
4. To lay ceramic tile over a vinyl or linoleum oor, use epoxy adhesive or a good mastic. Be
sure that the oor is 1 1/4" thick, drilling a small hole to check if necessary. Hallowell,
1988a, 44]
5. Before you start to mark your working lines, make a dry run { laying the tile out on the oor
{ to help determine the best layout and minimize the number of cut tiles. Hallowell,
1988a, 49]
6. From time to time, check with a square and straightedge to make sure the courses are
straight. Hallowell, 1988a, 50]
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7. The vertical lines. Measure to nd the midpoint of a wall and mark it on the horizontal
line. Starting at this midpoint, measure with the tile stick or set a row of loose tiles on the
batten to determine the size of the tiles at each end of the wall. Don't forget the
spacers. If the end tiles will be less than half a tile, move your midpoint mark one-half tile to
avoid narrow pieces at each end. Then use the level and straightedge to mark a vertical line
on the wall through the mark. Repeat the process with the other walls. Hallowell, 1988a,
51]
8. The most pleasing eect is to center the tiles so that those at each end are of equal width. To
do this, measure and mark the midpoint of the wall on the horizontal working line. Starting
with the edge of one tile on the center mark, stand a row of loose tiles along the back of
the tub to determine the size of the end tiles. Don't forget the spacers. If the end
tiles are larger than half a tile, work from a centered vertical working line. With level and
straightedge, mark the vertical working line on the backing. Hallowell, 1988a, 54]
9. The illustration below shows typical positions of the vertical working line on an end wall.
Choose the one that best suits your situation then make a dry run with loose tiles to check
the layout for inconvenient cuts. Hallowell, 1988a, 55]
10. To nd the amount of tile you need, rst nd the area of the oor by multiplying the
overall length of the room by its width, both in feet. Deduct the area of any protrusions
into the room, such as a kitchen counter or a bathtub. For a room with an odd shape, such
an L-shaped room, divide the oor area into rectangles. Then measure each and add the
areas together. Once you have found the area, add 5 percent so you will have extra tiles for
cutting, waste, and later repairs. Hallowell, 1988a, 65]
11. Resilient tile comes in boxes that contain enough to cover 45 sq. feet. To nd the number
of boxes you need, divide the overall oor area (including the 5 percent extra) by 45.
Hallowell, 1988a, 68]
12. Refer to the section on preparing the surface, on the facing page, to determine if you'll
need additional tools and materials for preliminary work. Hallowell, 1988a, 68]
13. Marking the working lines. After you have prepared the wall surface and removed the base
molding, check the oor along the wall to see if it is level. If it isn't, nd and mark the lowest
spot. Then measure up to a point 1/4" less than the width of the base molding, as shown in
the drawing below. From this new point, measure up the wall a distance equal to four tiles
to establish the height of your horizontal working line. Establish a level line across
the wall through this point. Hallowell, 1988a, 72]
14. Concrete makes a good sub oor if it is dry. To make sure, place 1' squares of plastic in half
a dozen spots around the oor, carefully taping down all edges. This is best done during wet
months. After 24 hours take up the plastic. If there is condensation underneath, moisture is
coming through the concrete and it is unsuitable for the parquet. Hallowell, 1988a, 77]
15. Begin it's continuation of previous example] by measuring to nd the exact center of
two facing walls, A and B. Snap a chalk line (AA) between the two center points. Find
the center of walls C and D and again snap the chalk line (BB). To check that these lines
cross at a 90 degrees angle, use the 3-4-5 method: From the center measure 3' down line
AA and 4' down line BB. The diagonal distance between these two points will be exactly 5'
if the lines are square. Hallowell, 1988a, 77]
16. To decide how much wallpaper you need, rst measure the wall or room with a steel
tape. Hallowell, 1988b, 37]
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17. Measure the height and width of each wall (including openings) then multiply the two gures
to determine the total area of the wall in square feet. Add the square footage of all
the walls to be covered to determine the total area. Hallowell, 1988b, 37]
18. To gure the total number of single rolls you need, divide the total square footage of
wall space by 30 (25 for European rolls) square feet. If you're left with a fractional remainder
of square feet, buy an additional roll. Hallowell, 1988b, 37]
19. Wallpaper dealers stock adhesives for every type of installation. To nd an adhesive
suitable for your material, check the manufacturer's instructions, or ask your dealer.
Hallowell, 1988b, 38]
20. You may want to hang a coordinating border around the room at the top of the walls. To
determine the amount of border, measure the width (in feet) of all walls to be covered
and divide by three. Since borders are sold by the yard, this will give you the number of
yards needed. Hallowell, 1988b, 38]
21. To allow for pattern repeat, divide the height (in inches) of the wall by the number of inches
between the pattern repeat if you have a fractional remainder, round it o to the next highest
number. For example, a 96-inch wall height divided by an 18-inch pattern repeat gives you
5.33 repeats, rounded o to 6.
Then multiply the repeat measurement by the number of repeats you'll need to determine
the working height gure you must use. In the case above, multiplying the 18-inch
pattern repeat by 6 repeats tells you that you must calculate your wallpaper needs according
to the requirements of the 108-inch wall, rather than the actual 96-inch wall. Hallowell,
1988b, 38]
22. Before you cut, study the pattern to determine how you want it to appear on the
wall. Hallowell, 1988b, 43]
23. To nd the square footage of the ceiling, multiply the length of the room by the width.
Hallowell, 1988b, 51]

A.2 Negative Imperatives
A.2.1 DONT imperatives
1. Soak garment for 3 minutes. Gently squeeze suds through. Rinse thoroughly in cool or cold
water. Roll in towel to remove excess water. Do not wring or twist. Dry at, away from
sun or heat.
SOURCE:Woolite, cold water wash

2. Pour Neet into palm of hand and spread thickly over hair to be removed. Do not rub in.
... If hair removes easily, rinse o Neet with wet cloth or in shower with lukewarm water.
Do not use soap. ...
Caution: Do not use on irritated, inamed or broken skin. ... Do not use Neet

around the eyes, inside nose or ears.
SOURCE:Neet, hair remover

3. Do not apply to broken or irritated skin.
SOURCE:Shower to Shower, body powder

4. Caution: Do not puncture or incinerate container. Do not expose to heat or store

at temperatures above 120 F.

SOURCE:Old English, furniture Polish
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5. To use: Shake well. Turn can upside down and dispense into hand. Work or comb through
towel-dried hair and style as desired. Do not rinse. Apply to roots for maximum lift and
volume.
SOURCE:Finesse, Hair Mousse

6. To use the Citronella 'Liquid Light' cartridge, remove the plastic wick cover. Do not attempt to adjust wick. Discard when empty. Do not attempt to re ll.
SOURCE:Lamplight Farms' Citronella "Liquid Light" Insect Repellant.

7. Remove any doors that open into the room by tapping out the hinge pins (don't unscrew
the hinges) and cut with a ne-toothed saw. Hallowell, 1988a, 42]
8. Don't try to install tile over a springy surface. Hallowell, 1988a, 43]
9. Your sheet vinyl oor may be vinyl asbestos, which is no longer on the market. Don't sand
it or tear it up because this will put dangerous asbestos bers into the air. It must be
covered over. Hallowell, 1988a, 44]
10. Cutting tile. Shown below are the common methods of cutting tile. When using tile nippers,
don't try to cut the rst time on the line cut short of it and then carefully nibble up.
Too big a bite the rst time usually results in chipping beyond the line. Hallowell, 1988a,
47]
11. (caption of drawing) If backing is damaged, ll and smooth with patching plaster don't
over ll. When dry, paint with latex primer. Hallowell, 1988a, 52]
12. For jack-on-jack bond, set the rst tile on the batten with one side aligned exactly with the
vertical line. Press the tile rmly into the adhesive. Don't slide it this will push adhesive
into the joints. Hallowell, 1988a, 53]
13. (drawing caption) Wall tiles should be set in step, or pyramid, pattern. Place each with a
slight twist do not slide. Use 6-penny nishing nails to space tiles with no lugs. Hallowell,
1988a, 53]
14. The positions of any ush-mounted or recessed accessories, such as soap dishes and towel
bars, should be marked on the wall before the adhesive is applied. Don't cover the marks
with adhesive. Hallowell, 1988a, 55]
15. The positions of any ush-mounted or recessed accessories, such as soap dishes and towel
bars, should be marked on the wall before the adhesive is applied. Don't cover the marks
with adhesive. Hallowell, 1988a, 55]
16. Setting the rst tile. If you nailed a batten support to the wall, set the rst tile at the
intersection of the vertical guideline and the batten. Set the tile rmly but don't slide it.
Hallowell, 1988a, 56]
17. After washing the tile, rinse it thoroughly to remove detergent lm then wipe with a soft, dry
cloth. For stubborn dirt, scrub tiles with a white, cleansing powder. Don't use a cleaner
containing bleach this can pull the color out of the colored grouts. Hallowell, 1988a, 64]
18. This material vinyl-asbestos] is no longet on the market. If you think it might be in your
house, do not tear it up or sand it. Simply cover with another ooring material. Hallowell, 1988a, 67]
19. (All the following in boldface). Caution: Do not sand or tear up the oor if it is vinylasbestos. This material contains bers that can damage your lungs if inhaled. If in doubt,
just cover the oor with 1/4" plywood. Hallowell, 1988a, 69]
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20. To cut tiles, score along the mark with a utility knife and snap the tile along the line. For
intricate cuts, use a pair of heavy scissors. The tiles will cut more easily in this case if warmed
in sunlight or over a furnace vent. Don't overheat or the tiles may scorch or melt.
Hallowell, 1988a, 71]
21. You can put parquet down over a wide variety of surfaces, whether old or new, if they are
rm, clean, smooth, and dry. Don't put parquet down on a surface that is below
ground level because of the moisture problem. Hallowell, 1988a, 76]
22. Resilient tile surface. Parquet can be put over linoleum or vinyl tile oors if they are smooth
and in good shape. If the vinyl tile is several years old, it may be vinyl-asbestos. In this case
do not disturb it because the asbestos particle are a health hazard. Hallowell, 1988a, 77]
23. Placing the parquet. ... Do not slide except for the small amount necessary with
tongue-and-groove pieces. Hallowell, 1988a, 77]
24. (caption of a drawing) Spread adhesive with notched trowel. Do not cover working lines.
Hallowell, 1988a, 78]
25. Spread adhesive with notched trowel. Do not cover working lines.
Hallowell, 1988a, 78]
26. Let the oor dry overnight and then sand the oor. Practice on some old plywood rst
if necessary don't let the sander remain in one place or you'll damage the oor.
Hallowell, 1988a, 79]
27. If you must replace a tile, rst cut around the edges with a circular saw. Set the blade to
the depth of the tile and don't damage adjoining tiles. Hallowell, 1988a, 79]
28. Dust-mop or vacuum your parquet oor as you would carpeting. Do not scrub or wet-mop
the parquet. Hallowell, 1988a, 79]
29. If you're using a lightweight or porous wallpaper, prot from these \don't":
(a) Don't hang the wallpaper over dark painted walls it could show through.
Lighten the walls with a at, oil-base enamel undercoat before hanging the wallpaper.
(b) Don't paper over a dark colored or patterned wall covering. First, lighten the
background with paint or lining paper.
(c) Don't hang the wallpaper over an existing wallpaper if the ink from the existing
covering comes o it could bleed through the new covering. To test, moisten a small
piece of the covering with a clean sponge. If the ink comes o, seal the old covering
rst with an undercoat that seals stains.
Hallowell, 1988b, 40]
30. Cut a strip 1/2 inch wider than the widest measurement (don't disregard the leftover
piece of wallpaper you'll use it to cover the adjacent side of the corner.) Hallowell, 1988b,
46]
31. Use a vinyl-to-vinyl paste for any type of border you plan to hang over wallpaper. To paste
the border for hanging, cover the entire back with paste and book the strip don't crease
the folds. Hallowell, 1988b, 52]
32. Step 4. Lift brush straight up, letting excess paint drip back into pail. Gently slap both sides
of brush against inside of pail two or three times. Don't wipe brush across lip of pail,
or bristles may separate into clumps, leaving less paint on brush. Hallowell, 1988b, 40]
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Never
1. Place the rst tile with a gentle rocking motion into the corner formed by the two battens.
Never slide tile on the adhesive it pushes the adhesive up between the joints. Hallowell,
1988a, 49]
2. Never mix cleaners containing acid or ammonia with chlorine bleach. The chemical
reaction releases the chlorine as a poisonous gas. Hallowell, 1988a, 64]
3. Never slide tile into position or the adhesive will come up through the joints. Hallowell,
1988a, 71]
4. If you haven't used a oor sander, practice on a full sheet of old plywood rst because it
takes a little practice to learn how to control one. Never let the sander remain in one
spot while in use, or it will immediately sand a depression in your oor. Hallowell, 1988a,
76]

A.2.2 neg-TC imperatives
Take care
1. Snip at all the triangular marks on the pattern to ease the seam, taking care not to cut

the stitching.
Source:

opportunistic collection.

2. Attach washboard to the base assembly with nishing nails driven carefully through back
sides of washboard. Take care not to split wood frame, drill very small pilot holes for
the nails or blunt nail tips to avoid splitting the wood. CWP, 1989]
3. To book the strip, fold the bottom third or more of the strip over the middle of the panel,
pasted sides together, taking care not to crease the wallpaper sharply at the fold.
Hallowell, 1988b, 44]
4. To hang the border, begin at the least conspicuous corner. The work will go much faster if
you have someone hold the folded section while you apply the border to the wall. Take care
not to drip paste onto the wall and be sure to remove excess paste. Hallowell, 1988b,
52]

Be sure, make sure
1. If the sub ooring is accessible from underneath, as it is from the unnished ceiling of a
basement, it is best to work from the underside. In this case, drill a pilot hole at the squeaky
spot. Be sure not to drill it deeper than 1 1/4 inches or you will penetrate the top
surface. CWP, 1989]
2. Border fabric can be pasted on top of fabric walls after the wall is completely dry. Use the
same procedure as for pasting walls, but make sure not to drip paste onto the fabric.
Hallowell, 1988b, 63]
3. To wash, load clothes into tub, making sure not to over ll it.
Source:

opportunistic collection.
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Be careful
1. Center and mark the placement of the two crossbraces on the table's bottom surface. Drill
pilot holes to secure the crossbraces be careful not to penetrate the table top surface.
FH, 1990]
2. Cut under eaves of cabin with chisel, being careful not to chip roof. HC, 1988, 81]
3. Make a small 1/4-inch slit (cut on the bias to avoid ravels) in the center of each area to be
stued. Be careful not to snip the surface fabric. HC, 1988, 83]
4. When glue is dry nish assembly with nishing nails. Be careful not to split wood.
CWP, 1989]
5. To make a piercing cut, rst drill a hole in the waste stock on the interior of the pattern.
The diameter of the hole must be larger than the width of the blade. If you want to save
the waste stock for later use, drill the hole near a corner in the pattern. Be careful not to
drill through the pattern line. CWP, 1989]
6. If the damage has occurred in a smaller area, you can cut out that portion of the wall with
a compass or saber saw, being careful not to pierce the inside wall, and make a patch
out of wallboard. CWP, 1989]
7. Whichever pattern you choose, begin each new row from the same side of the room as the
rst one. Measure and cut the last tile as required. After you have laid a section, the tiles
should be bedded in. Do this with a rubber mallet or by hammering lightly on a block of
padded wood large enough to cover several tiles at once. This process sets the tile rmly in
the adhesive and levels each with the others. In moving the padded block about, be careful
not to push a tile out of line. Hallowell, 1988a, 50]
8. Punch hole through center of damaged tile with hammer and nail set or large nail. Be
careful not to damage the surface behind. Hallowell, 1988a, 52]
9. If your plans call for replacing the wood base molding with vinyl cove molding, be careful
not to damage the walls as you remove the wood base. Hallowell, 1988a, 68]
10. To remove resilient sheet ooring, cut it into strips about 6" wide with a utility knife or
linoleum knife, being careful not to damage the suboor. Hallowell, 1988a, 69]
11. Following application instructions on the label, begin spreading the adhesive near where the
working lines intersect. Spread the adhesive up, but not over, the working lines that will
guide your tile placement. Be careful not to cover too large an area at one time,
or the adhesive may set up before you can cover it start with an area about 3' square.
Hallowell, 1988a, 71]
12. To replace a damaged tile, rst warm it and the adhesive below with a propane torch or an
old iron. Pry up the tile using a putty knife or cold chisel. Remove any excess backing or
adhesive from the oor until the surface is smooth and deep enough to install the new tile.
Next, apply the proper adhesive, keeping it back about 1/4" from the perimeter. Be careful
not to get any on the surrounding tiles. Weights along the edges will ensure that the
tile does not pop up before the adhesive sets. Hallowell, 1988a, 73]
13. Spread the adhesive with notched trowel held at about a 30 degrees angle. Work the adhesive
from several directions to spread it evenly. If you can't see the working lines through the
adhesive, be careful not to cover them. Hallowell, 1988a, 77]
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14. In most situations, the butt seam is the best way to join two strips of wallpaper, since it's
the least noticeable seam. To make one, tightly butt the edge of the strip you're hanging to
the edge of the previously hung strip. Be very careful not to stretch the wallpaper.
Hallowell, 1988b, 45]
15. To combat mildew and to provide strong adhesion, use a vinyl adhesive, never a wheat paste.
Apply paste to the wall (unless the wallpaper manufacturer species dierently), being
careful not to overpaste. Hallowell, 1988b, 50]
16. With your hands, lightly smooth the fabric into place. Work from the center out to the sides,
being careful not to stretch the fabric. Hallowell, 1988b, 63]
17. You can lay the door across sawhorses. Working on a horizontal surface allows you to apply
a good coat of paint without worrying about the paint collecting in the lower corners of the
panels and eventually dripping down. But, you do have to be careful not to apply too
thick a coat or the paint may \puddle". Hallowell, 1988b, 76]
18. A second way to remove molding is to locate the nails and, using a nailset, drive each one
all the way through the molding. After the molding is lifted o, pull out the nails. For
hardwood moldings, this method is the best, but be careful not to crack the molding.
Hallowell, 1988b, 86]
19. Remove the block and press the panel rmly into place. To force the adhesive into tight
contact, knock on the panel with a rubber mallet or hammer against a padded block. Be
careful not to mar the surface. Hallowell, 1988b, 92]
20. When nailing the panels, be careful not to mar the surfaces. Hallowell, 1988b, 92]
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Appendix B

Paraphrase Experiment
I report here the data of the experiment I ran to collect judgements on paraphrases of
purpose clauses. I remind the reader that I ran an informal experiment in which I asked
11 native speakers to judge the pragmatic felicity of various possible paraphrases on 10
of my examples the judgements were on the scale 0-3], with 0 totally unacceptable, and
3 totally felicitous. 8 informants answered, although one of them didn't answer all the
questions. For each example, I list the tested paraphrases, and for each paraphrase I give
a list of four pairs the rst element in each pair is the judgement, the second is how many
informants gave that judgement.

Final Purpose Clause
1. Place a plank between two ladders to create a simple sca old.
(a) Place a plank between two ladders so as to create a simple sca old.
0-], 1-1], 2-2], 3-5]
(b) Place a plank between two ladders in order to create a simple sca old.
0-], 1-], 2-2], 3-6]
(c) By placing a plank between two ladders create a simple sca old.
0-], 1-3], 2-3], 3-2]
(d) Create a simple sca old by placing a plank between two ladders.
0-], 1-], 2-2], 3-6]
2. Line the tub with cardboard to prevent debris from clogging the drain.
(a) Line the tub with cardboard so as to prevent debris from clogging the drain.
0-], 1-], 2-2], 3-6]
(b) Line the tub with cardboard in order to prevent debris from clogging the drain.
0-], 1-], 2-], 3-8]
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(c) By lining the tub with cardboard prevent debris from clogging the drain.
0-], 1-8], 2-], 3-]
(d) Prevent debris from clogging the drain by lining the tub with cardboard.
0-], 1-1], 2-3], 3-4]
3. Slip paper towels between iron and fabric to catch stray wisps of the heated fusible
webbing.
(a) Slip paper towels between iron and fabric so as to catch stray wisps of the heated
fusible webbing.
0-], 1-], 2-], 3-8]
(b) Slip paper towels between iron and fabric in order to catch stray wisps of the
heated fusible webbing.
0-], 1-1], 2-1], 3-6]
NB: one 2.5, counted as 2

(c) By slipping paper towels between iron and fabric catch stray wisps of the heated
fusible webbing.
0-1], 1-6], 2-], 3-]
(d) Catch stray wisps of the heated fusible webbing by slipping paper towels between
iron and fabric.
0-], 1-2], 2-4], 3-2]
4. Go into the kitchen to get me the co ee urn.1
(a) Go into the kitchen so as to get me the co ee urn.
0-3], 1-3], 2-2], 3-]
(b) Go into the kitchen in order to get me the co ee urn.
0-1], 1-3], 2-1], 3-3]
(c) By going into the kitchen get me the co ee urn.
0-5], 1-3], 2-], 3-]
(d) Get me the co ee urn by going into the kitchen.
0-4], 1-2], 2-2], 3-]
5. Work to nish half a room at a time.
(a) Work so as to nish half a room at a time.
0-1], 1-2], 2-1], 3-4]
(b) Work in order to nish half a room at a time.
0-3], 1-4], 2-1], 3-]
(c) By working nish half a room at a time.
0-6], 1-2], 2-], 3-]
1

I remind the reader that this example is constructed.
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(d) Finish half a room at a time by working.
0-6], 1-2], 2-], 3-]
6. Place on rack to cool.2
(a) Place on rack so as to cool.
0-1], 1-3], 2-2], 3-2]
(b) Place on rack in order to cool.
0-], 1-], 2-3], 3-5]
NB: one 2.4 counted as 2

(c) By placing on rack cool.
0-5], 1-3], 2-], 3-]
(d) Cool by placing on rack.
0-], 1-], 2-3], 3-5]

Initial PC
1. To determine the amount of border, measure the width of all walls to be covered and
divide by three.
(a) So as to determine the amount of border, measure the width of all walls to be
covered and divide by three.
0-1], 1-5], 2-1], 3-1]
(b) In order to determine the amount of border, measure the width of all walls to
be covered and divide by three.
0-], 1-], 2-], 3-8]
(c) Determine the amount of border by measuring the width of all walls to be
covered and dividing by three.
0-], 1-], 2-2], 3-6]
NB: one 2.5, counted as 2

2. To nish the dolls with an antiqued look, lightly brush on a thin coat of burnt umber
oil-base paint.
(a) So as to nish the dolls with an antiqued look, lightly brush on a thin coat of
burnt umber oil-base paint.
0-], 1-3], 2-3], 3-1]
(b) In order to nish the dolls with an antiqued look, lightly brush on a thin coat
of burnt umber oil-base paint.
0-], 1-], 2-3], 3-4]
NB: one 2.5 counted as 2

2

This example is a variation of one in Thompson, 1985].
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(c) Finish the dolls with an antiqued look by lightly brushing on a thin coat of
burnt umber oil-base paint.
0-], 1-1], 2-1], 3-5]
3. To install a grab bar in a tub or shower enclosure, locate and mark the center of the
appropriate wall studs with pencil marks on the ceiling before you tile. After the
tile is up, locate the studs by following down the wall from the ceiling marks with a
level. Screw the bars directly to the studs through holes drilled in the tile.
(a) So as to install a grab bar in a tub or shower enclosure, locate and mark the
center of the appropriate wall studs with pencil marks on the ceiling before you
tile. After the tile is up, locate the studs by following down the wall from the
ceiling marks with a level. Screw the bars directly to the studs through holes
drilled in the tile.
0-2], 1-4], 2-], 3-1]
(b) In order to install a grab bar in a tub or shower enclosure, locate and mark the
center of the appropriate wall studs with pencil marks on the ceiling before you
tile. After the tile is up, locate the studs by following down the wall from the
ceiling marks with a level. Screw the bars directly to the studs through holes
drilled in the tile.
0-], 1-], 2-2], 3-5]
(c) Install a grab bar in a tub or shower enclosure by locating and marking the
center of the appropriate wall studs with pencil marks on the ceiling before you
tile. After the tile is up, locate the studs by following down the wall from the
ceiling marks with a level. Screw the bars directly to the studs through holes
drilled in the tile.
0-1], 1-3], 2-2], 3-1]
(d) 3 Install a grab bar in a tub or shower enclosure by locating and marking the
center of the appropriate wall studs with pencil marks on the ceiling before you
tile after the tile is up, by locating the studs by following down the wall from
the ceiling marks with a level and by screwing the bars directly to the studs
through holes drilled in the tile.
0-2], 1-2], 2-3], 3-]
4. To hang the wallpaper, follow the steps on page 47.
(a) So as to hang the wallpaper, follow the steps on page 47.
0-2], 1-5], 2-], 3-]
(b) In order to hang the wallpaper, follow the steps on page 47.
0-], 1-1], 2-2], 3-4]
(c) Hang the wallpaper by following the steps on page 47.
0-], 1-1], 2-], 3-6]
3
This fourth paraphrase is due to the fact that, with a pattern such as To do , do 1 do 2 ... do
 , two paraphrases are possible: Do by doing 1 do 2 , ... , do  and Do by doing 1 , 2 , ... ,  .
n

n
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Appendix C

Knowledge Representation

 The ROLES --- the flag "t" indicates
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role

attributes

'achieved-role t)
'agent t)
'along-role t)
'at-role t)
'basic t)
'caused-role t)
'destination t)
'direction t)
'experiencer t)
'in-role t)
'instrument)
'lex-item t)
'location t)
'manner)
'means t)
'patient t)
'path-role t)
'polarity t)
'semfield-role t)
'source t)
'water-availability t)
'with-role t)
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 The OBJECT hierarchy

(cl-define-concept 'semfield
'(one-of spatial control ident contact composition))
(cl-define-concept 'entity
'(disj-prim classic-thing type entity))
(cl-define-concept 'animate
'(disj-prim entity life animate))
(cl-define-concept 'inanimate
'(disj-prim entity life inanimate))
(cl-define-concept 'geometric-concept
'(disj-prim inanimate type geometric-concept))





Clearly there are necessary and sufficient definitions for polygons,
squares, diagonals etc. However, as they involve notions like "all
sides have the same length", for simplicity I defined all these
concepts as disjoint primitives.

(cl-define-concept 'geometric-figure
'(disj-prim geometric-concept type geometric-figure))
(cl-define-concept 'diagonal
'(disj-prim

geometric-concept type diagonal))

(cl-define-concept 'perp-axis
'(disj-prim

geometric-concept type perp-axis))

(cl-define-concept 'polygon
'(disj-prim geometric-figure type polygon))
(cl-define-concept 'rectangle
'(disj-prim polygon type rectangle))
(cl-define-concept 'square
'(disj-prim polygon type square))
(cl-define-concept 'triangle
'(disj-prim polygon type triangle))
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(cl-define-concept 'screw
'(disj-prim inanimate type screw))
(cl-define-concept 'event
'(disj-prim classic-thing type event))
(cl-define-concept 'state
'(disj-prim classic-thing type state))
(cl-define-concept 'property
'(and (disj-prim classic-thing type property)
(one-of loose tight clean dirty)))
 The PLACE subhierarchy
(cl-define-concept 'place
'(and (disj-prim classic-thing type place)
(all semfield-role semfield)))
(cl-define-concept 'spatial-place
'(and place (fills semfield-role spatial)))
(cl-define-concept 'control-place
'(and place (fills semfield-role control)))
(cl-define-concept 'comp-place
'(and place (fills semfield-role composition)))
(cl-define-concept 'ident-place
'(and place (fills semfield-role ident)))
(cl-define-concept 'at-sp-place
'(and spatial-place
(all at-role entity)))
(cl-define-concept 'washing-site
'(and at-sp-place
(fills water-availability yes)))
(cl-define-concept 'in-sp-place
'(and spatial-place
(all in-role entity)))
(cl-define-concept 'along-sp-place
'(and spatial-place
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(all along-role

entity)))

(cl-define-concept 'along-diagonal
'(and along-sp-place
(all along-role

diagonal)))

(cl-define-concept 'along-perp-axis
'(and along-sp-place
(all along-role

perp-axis)))

(cl-define-concept 'at-control-place
'(and control-place
(all at-role animate)))
(cl-define-concept 'at-comp-place
'(and comp-place
(all at-role

entity)))

(cl-define-concept 'at-comp-triangle
'(and comp-place
(all at-role

triangle)))

(cl-define-concept 'at-comp-rect
'(and comp-place
(all at-role

rectangle)))

(cl-define-concept 'at-comp-square
'(and comp-place
(all at-role

square)))

(cl-define-concept 'at-ident-place
'(and ident-place
(all at-role

property)))

(cl-define-concept 'at-ident-clean
'(and ident-place
(fills at-role clean)))
(cl-define-concept 'at-ident-dirty
'(and ident-place
(fills at-role

dirty)))

(cl-define-concept 'at-ident-loose
'(and ident-place
(fills at-role loose)))
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(cl-define-concept 'at-ident-tight
'(and ident-place
(fills at-role

tight)))

 The PATH subhierarchy
(cl-define-concept 'path
'(and (disj-prim classic-thing type path)
(all semfield-role semfield)))
(cl-define-concept 'spatial-path
'(and path (fills semfield-role spatial)))
(cl-define-concept 'control-path
'(and path (fills semfield-role control)))
(cl-define-concept 'comp-path
'(and path (fills semfield-role composition)))
(cl-define-concept 'ident-path
'(and path (fills semfield-role ident)
(all source ident-place)
(all destination ident-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'tl-ident-path
'(and ident-path
(fills source at-ident-tight)
(fills destination at-ident-loose)))
(cl-define-concept 'lt-ident-path
'(and ident-path
(fills source at-ident-loose)
(fills destination at-ident-tight)))
(cl-define-concept 'clean-ident-path
'(and ident-path
(fills source at-ident-dirty)
(fills destination at-ident-clean)))
(cl-define-concept 'from-path-sp
'(and spatial-path
(all source spatial-place)))
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(cl-define-concept 'to-path-sp
'(and spatial-path
(all destination spatial-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'to-at-path-sp
'(and to-path-sp
(all destination at-sp-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'to-path-control
'(and control-path
(all destination control-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'to-at-path-control
'(and to-path-control
(all destination at-control-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'from-to-path-sp
'(and from-path-sp to-path-sp))
(cl-define-concept 'circular-path
'(and path (same-as source destination)))
(cl-define-concept 'circular-path-sp
'(and circular-path from-to-path-sp))
(cl-define-concept 'from-path-comp
'(and comp-path
(all source comp-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'to-path-comp
'(and comp-path
(all destination comp-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'to-path-comp-inhalf
'(and to-path-comp
(fills destination in-half)))
(cl-define-concept 'from-to-path-comp
'(and from-path-comp to-path-comp))
 The STATE subhierarchy
 Notice: the name "experiencer" is a bit misleading to indicate
 the role filled by the entity which is "in" that state.
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(cl-define-concept 'be
'(and state
(all semfield-role semfield)
(all experiencer entity)
(all location place)
(same-as semfield-role
(location semfield-role))))
(cl-define-concept 'be-spatial
'(and be
(fills semfield-role spatial)
(all location spatial-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'be-sp-washing-site
'(and be-spatial
(all location washing-site)))
(cl-define-concept 'be-control
'(and be
(fills semfield-role control)
(all location at-control-place)))









The following definitions are required to approximate Jackendoff's
notion of verbs of material composition: the polarity is used to
distinguish the cases in which the Theme is the whole and the parts
the reference objects ("Sam assembled the house out of bricks" /
"Sam broke the bowl into one thousand pieces"), from the reverse
case ("Sam assembled the bricks into a house"). These definitions
will be used in the recipe for "create triangles from cutting
square". The same distinctions apply to "go-comp" below.

(cl-define-concept 'be-comp
'(and be
(fills semfield-role composition)
(all location at-comp-place)
(all polarity (one-of yes no))))
(cl-define-concept 'be-comp-plus
'(and be-comp
(all location at-comp-place)
(fills polarity yes )))
(cl-define-concept 'be-comp-minus
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'(and be-comp
(all location at-comp-place)
(fills polarity no)))
(cl-define-concept 'be-comp-sq-tr
'(and be-comp-plus
(all experiencer square)
(all location at-comp-triangle)))
(cl-define-concept 'be-comp-sq-rect
'(and be-comp-plus
(all experiencer square)
(all location at-comp-rect)))
(cl-define-concept 'be-ident
'(and be
(fills semfield-role ident)
(all location at-ident-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'be-ident-dirty
'(and be
(fills semfield-role ident)
(all location at-ident-dirty)))
(cl-define-concept 'be-ident-clean
'(and be
(fills semfield-role ident)
(all location at-ident-clean)))
(cl-define-concept 'be-ident-loose
'(and be
(fills semfield-role ident)
(all location at-ident-loose)))
(cl-define-concept 'be-ident-tight
'(and be
(fills semfield-role ident)
(all location at-ident-tight)))
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The ACTION subhierarchy




(cl-define-concept 'act-type
'(and event

(all experiencer entity)))

(cl-define-concept 'cause
'(and event
(all agent animate)
(all caused-role act-type)))
(cl-define-concept 'intentional-act
'(and act-type
(all experiencer animate)))
(cl-define-concept 'achieve-act
'(and act-type
(all achieved-role state)))
(cl-define-concept 'achieve-spatial
'(and achieve-act
(all achieved-role be-spatial)))
(cl-define-concept 'achieve-sp-wash
'(and achieve-act
(all achieved-role be-sp-washing-site)))
(cl-define-concept 'achieve-ident
'(and achieve-act
(all achieved-role be-ident)))
(cl-define-concept 'act-on
'(and act-type
(all patient entity)))
(cl-define-concept 'go
'(and act-type
(all path-role path)
(all semfield-role semfield)
(same-as semfield-role
(path-role semfield-role))))

202

(cl-define-concept 'go-spatial
'(and go (fills semfield-role spatial)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-control
'(and go (fills semfield-role control)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-control-to-at
'(and go-control
(all path-role

to-at-path-control)))

(cl-define-concept 'go-ident
'(and go (fills semfield-role ident)
(all path-role ident-path)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-ident-loose
'(and go (fills path-role tl-ident-path)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-ident-tight
'(and go (fills path-role lt-ident-path)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-ident-clean
'(and go (fills path-role clean-ident-path)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-contact
'(and go (fills semfield-role contact)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-comp
'(and go (fills semfield-role composition)
(all path-role comp-path)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-comp-plus
'(and go-comp (fills polarity yes)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-comp-minus
'(and go-comp (fills polarity no)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-comp-inhalf
'(and go-comp-plus
(all path-role to-path-comp-inhalf)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-spatial-with
'(and go-spatial
(all with-role inanimate)))
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(cl-define-concept 'go-sp-from-to
'(and go-spatial
(all path-role from-to-path-sp)))
(cl-define-concept 'go-sp-circ
'(and go-spatial
(all path-role circular-path-sp)))
(cl-define-concept 'cause-and-acton
'(and cause act-on
(same-as experiencer agent)
(same-as patient (caused-role experiencer))))
(cl-define-concept 'cause-of-acton
'(and cause-and-acton
(all caused-role act-on)))
(cl-define-concept 'move-sth-swh
'(and cause-and-acton
(all caused-role go-sp-from-to)))
(cl-define-concept 'get-control
'(and cause-and-acton
(all caused-role go-control-to-at)
(same-as patient (caused-role experiencer))
(same-as experiencer
(caused-role path-role
destination at-role))))
(cl-define-concept 'reduce-to-pieces
'(and cause-and-acton
(all caused-role go-comp-plus)
(all lex-item (one-of cut break))))
(cl-define-concept 'cut-location
'(and reduce-to-pieces
(fills lex-item cut)
(all location spatial-place)))
(cl-define-concept 'cut-sq-inhalf-alongdiag
'(and cut-location
(all patient square)
(all caused-role go-comp-inhalf)
(all location along-diagonal)))
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(cl-define-concept 'cut-sq-inhalf-alongaxis
'(and cut-location
(all patient square)
(all caused-role go-comp-inhalf)
(all location along-perp-axis)))







"create" inherits "patient" from act-on. Patient is not
the best name for the object which is being created.
There are two types of "create" because both "create whole
from parts" or "create parts from whole" are possible.
The latter one applies in the "cut square" case.

(cl-define-concept 'create-act
'(and cause-and-acton
(all caused-role go-comp)
(all lex-item (one-of create form))))
(cl-define-concept 'create-whole-from-parts
'(and create-act
(all caused-role go-comp-plus)))
(cl-define-concept 'create-parts-from-whole
'(and create-act
(all caused-role go-comp-minus)))
(cl-define-concept 'turn
'(and cause-and-acton
(all caused-role go-sp-circ)))
(cl-define-concept 'turn-direction
'(and turn
(all direction
(one-of clockwise counterclockwise))))
(cl-define-concept 'turn-clockwise
'(and turn (fills direction clockwise)))
(cl-define-concept 'turn-counterclockwise
'(and turn (fills direction counterclockwise)))
(cl-define-concept 'cause-state-change
'(and cause-and-acton
(all caused-role go-ident)
(same-as patient
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(caused-role experiencer))
(all lex-item
(one-of loosen tighten wash))))
(cl-define-concept 'loosen-screw
'(and cause-state-change
(all caused-role go-ident-loose)
(all patient screw)
(fills lex-item loosen)))
(cl-define-concept 'tighten-screw
'(and cause-state-change
(all patient screw)
(all caused-role go-ident-tight)
(fills lex-item tighten)))
(cl-define-concept 'wash
'(and cause-state-change
(all caused-role go-ident-clean)
(fills lex-item wash)))
(cl-define-concept 'physical-wash
'(and wash
(fills basic yes)
(all location washing-site)))
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ACTION LIBRARY





 ROLES
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role
(cl-define-role

'header t)
'substep1 t)
'substep2 t)
'substep3 t)
'ann-relation t)
'ann-arg1 t)
'ann-arg2 t)
'annot1 t)
'annot2 t)
'annot3 t)
'qualif1 t)
'effect1 t)

 AUXILIARY CONCEPTS
(cl-define-concept 'poss-relations
'(one-of enables precedes during))
(cl-define-concept 'annotation-type
'(and classic-thing
(all ann-relation poss-relations)
(all ann-arg1 act-type)
(all ann-arg2 act-type)))
(cl-define-concept 'enab-annot
'(and annotation-type
(fills ann-relation enables)))
(cl-define-concept 'gsp-enab-getc
'(and enab-annot
(all ann-arg1 go-spatial)
(all ann-arg2 get-control)))
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(cl-define-concept 'getc-enab-gospw
'(and enab-annot
(all ann-arg1 get-control)
(all ann-arg2 go-spatial-with)))
(cl-define-concept 'achsp-enab-physwash
'(and enab-annot
(all ann-arg1 achieve-spatial)
(all ann-arg2 physical-wash)))

 RECIPES
(cl-define-concept 'recipe
'(and classic-thing
(all header
intentional-act)))
(cl-define-concept 'recipe-1-step
'(and recipe
(all substep1 intentional-act)))

(cl-define-concept 'recipe-3-steps
'(and recipe
(all substep1 intentional-act)
(all substep2 intentional-act)
(all substep3 intentional-act)))
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(cl-define-concept 'move-recipe
'(and recipe-3-steps
(all header move-sth-swh)
(all substep1 go-spatial)
(all substep2 get-control)
(all substep3 go-spatial-with)
(all annot1 gsp-enab-getc)
(all annot2 getc-enab-gospw)
(all qualif1 be-spatial)
(all effect1 be-spatial)
(same-as (header agent)(substep1 agent))
(same-as (header agent)(substep2 agent))
(same-as (header agent)(substep3 agent))
(same-as (header patient)(substep2 patient))
(same-as (header patient)(substep3 with-role))
(same-as (header caused-role path-role source)
(substep1 path-role destination))
(same-as (header caused-role path-role destination)
(substep3 path-role destination))
(same-as substep1 (annot1 ann-arg1))
(same-as substep2 (annot1 ann-arg2))
(same-as substep2 (annot2 ann-arg1))
(same-as substep3 (annot2 ann-arg2))
(same-as (qualif1 experiencer)
(header patient))
(same-as (effect1 experiencer)
(header patient))
(same-as (qualif1 location)
(substep1 path-role destination))
(same-as (effect1 location)
(substep3 path-role destination))
)
)

209

(cl-define-concept 'wash-recipe
'(and recipe-3-steps
(all header wash)
(all substep1 achieve-spatial)
(all substep2 achieve-spatial)
(all substep3 physical-wash)
(all annot1 achsp-enab-physwash)
(all annot2 achsp-enab-physwash)
(all qualif1 be-ident-dirty)
(all effect1 be-ident-clean)
(same-as (header agent)(substep1 agent))
(same-as (header agent)(substep2 agent))
(same-as (header agent)(substep3 agent))
(same-as (header agent)
(substep1 achieved-role experiencer))
(same-as (header patient)
(substep2 achieved-role experiencer))
(same-as (header patient)(substep3 patient))
(same-as (substep1 achieved-role location)
(substep2 achieved-role location))
(same-as (substep1 achieved-role location)
(substep3 location))
(same-as substep1 (annot1 ann-arg1))
(same-as substep3 (annot1 ann-arg2))
(same-as substep2 (annot2 ann-arg1))
(same-as substep3 (annot2 ann-arg2))
(same-as (qualif1 experiencer)
(header patient))
(same-as (effect1 experiencer)
(header patient))
)
)
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 The following two recipes have an obvious flaw, namely, they lack any
 reference to the cardinality of the triangle / rectangle set.

(cl-define-concept 'create-two-triangles
'(and recipe-1-step
(all header create-parts-from-whole)
(all substep1 cut-sq-inhalf-alongdiag)
(all effect1 be-comp-sq-tr)
(same-as (header agent) (substep1 agent))
(same-as (header patient)
(effect1 location at-role))
(same-as (header caused-role path-role destination)
(effect1 location))
(same-as (substep1 patient)
(effect1 experiencer))))







The following recipe may be optionally loaded in or not:
accordingly, the examples "cut the square in half to create two
polygons", "cut the square in half along the perpendicular axis to
create two polygons", etc will have different treatment. "cut the
square in half along the perpendicular axis to create two triangles"
will clearly always be judged incoherent.

(cl-define-concept 'create-two-rectangles
'(and recipe-1-step
(all header create-parts-from-whole)
(all substep1 cut-sq-inhalf-alongaxis)
(all effect1 be-comp-sq-rect)
(same-as (header agent) (substep1 agent))
(same-as (header patient)
(effect1 location at-role))
(same-as (header caused-role path-role destination)
(effect1 location))
(same-as (substep1 patient)
(effect1 experiencer))))
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(cl-define-concept 'loosen-screw-recipe
'(and recipe-1-step
(all header loosen-screw)
(all substep1 turn-counterclockwise)
(same-as (header agent) (substep1 agent))
(same-as (header patient) (substep1 patient))
(all qualif1 be-ident-tight)
(all effect1 be-ident-loose)
(same-as (header patient)
(qualif1 experiencer))
(same-as (header patient)
(effect1 experiencer))))
(cl-define-concept 'tighten-screw-recipe
'(and recipe-1-step
(all header tighten-screw)
(all substep1 turn-clockwise)
(same-as (header agent) (substep1 agent))
(same-as (header patient) (substep1 patient))
(all qualif1 be-ident-loose)
(all effect1 be-ident-tight)
(same-as (header patient)
(qualif1 experiencer))
(same-as (header patient)
(effect1 experiencer))))
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INDIVIDUALS




 A subset of the definitions of individuals used to test the
 algorithm.

(cl-create-ind 'hearer 'animate)
(cl-create-ind 'speaker 'animate)
(cl-create-ind 'mary 'animate)
(cl-create-ind 'urn1 'inanimate)
(cl-create-ind 'kitchen 'inanimate)
(cl-create-ind 'room 'inanimate)
(cl-create-ind 'sink 'washing-site)
(cl-create-ind 'ink (and in-sp-place
(fills in-role kitchen)))
(cl-create-ind 'inr (and in-sp-place
(fills in-role room)))
(cl-create-ind 'tok '(and to-path-sp
(fills destination ink)))
(cl-create-ind 'tor (and

to-path-sp
(fills destination inr)))

(cl-create-ind 'fromr '(and from-path-sp
(fills source inr)))
(cl-create-ind 'fromk-tor '(and from-to-path-sp
(fills source ink)
(fills destination inr)))
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(cl-create-ind 'go-kitchen '(and go-spatial
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills path-role tok)))
(cl-create-ind 'go-mary-kitchen '(and go-spatial
(fills experiencer mary)
(fills path-role tok)))
(cl-create-ind 'at-place1 '(and at-sp-place (fills at-role speaker)))
(cl-create-ind 'tospeaker '(and to-at-path-sp
(fills destination at-place1)))
(cl-create-ind 'go-urn-tospeaker '(and go-spatial
(fills experiencer urn1)
(fills path-role tospeaker)))
(cl-create-ind 'move-exp '(and move-sth-swh
(fills experiencer mary)
(fills patient urn1)
(fills caused-role go-urn-tospeaker)))
(cl-create-ind 'go-fromk-tor '(and go-sp-from-to
(fills path-role fromk-tor)))
(cl-create-ind 'move1 '(and move-sth-swh
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills patient urn1)
(fills caused-role go-fromk-tor)))
(cl-create-ind 'go-from-room '(and go-spatial
(fills experiencer urn1)
(fills path-role fromr)))
(cl-create-ind 'move2 '(and move-sth-swh
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills patient urn1)
(fills caused-role go-from-room)))
 the next command correctly fails, as the "inanimate" urn1 can't be
 in control of another entity.
(cl-create-ind 'at-place2 '(and at-control-place
(fills at-role urn1)))
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(cl-create-ind 'at-place3 '(and at-control-place
(fills at-role hearer)))
(cl-create-ind 'topc3 '(and to-at-path-control
(fills destination at-place3)))
(cl-create-ind 'go-control1 '(and go-control-to-at
(fills experiencer urn1)
(fills path-role topc3)))
(cl-create-ind 'get-control1 '(and get-control
(fills caused-role go-control1)
(fills experiencer hearer)))
(cl-create-ind 'go-to-room '(and go-spatial
(fills experiencer urn1)
(fills path-role tor)))
(cl-create-ind 'move3 '(and move-sth-swh
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills patient urn1)
(fills caused-role go-to-room)))









The previous three definitions show how fillers are propagated
because of same-as restrictions. The two actions to match are
go-kitchen (the substep) and move3 (the goal): the restriction
(source kitchen) from go-kitchen is added to tor during the
matching process therefore tor is reclassified as a
from-to-path-sp, and as a consequence also go-to-room is
reclassified as a go-sp-from-to.

(cl-create-ind 'go-no-path '(and go-spatial (fills experiencer urn1)))
(cl-create-ind 'move4 '(and move-sth-swh
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills patient urn1)
(fills caused-role go-no-path)))
(cl-create-ind 'wash1 '(and wash
(fills agent hearer)
(fills patient urn1)))

 Individuals relative to "cut"
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(cl-create-ind 'sq1 'square)
(cl-create-ind 'tr1 'triangle)
(cl-create-ind 'diagonal1 'diagonal)
(cl-create-ind 'perp-axis1 'perp-axis)
(cl-create-ind 'along-diagonal1
'(and along-diagonal
(fills along-role diagonal1)))
(cl-create-ind 'along-perp1
'(and along-perp-axis
(fills along-role perp-axis1)))
(cl-create-ind 'at-tr1 '(and at-comp-triangle
(fills at-role tr1)))
(cl-create-ind 'at-sq1 '(and at-comp-square
(fills at-role sq1)))
(cl-create-ind 'from-sq-to-tr '(and comp-path
(fills destination at-tr1)
(fills source at-sq1)))
(cl-create-ind 'go-comp1 '(and go-comp-minus
(fills path-role from-sq-to-tr)))
(cl-create-ind 'cut1 '(and reduce-to-pieces (fills lex-item cut)))
(cl-create-ind 'cut-sq '(and reduce-to-pieces
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills patient sq1)
(fills lex-item cut)))
(cl-create-ind 'create-tr '(and create-parts-from-whole
(fills lex-item create)
(fills caused-role go-comp1)
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills patient tr1)))
(cl-create-ind 'cut-sq-carefully '(and reduce-to-pieces
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(fills
(fills
(fills
(fills

experiencer hearer)
patient sq1)
lex-item cut)
manner carefully)))

(cl-create-ind 'cut-sq-diag '(and cut-location
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills patient sq1)
(fills lex-item cut)
(fills location along-diagonal1)))
(cl-create-ind 'cut-sq-perp '(and cut-location
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills patient sq1)
(fills lex-item cut)
(fills location along-perp1)))

 INDIVIDUALS FOR TURN 

(cl-create-ind 'screw1 'screw)
(cl-create-ind 'turn1 '(and turn-counterclockwise
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills patient screw1)))
(cl-create-ind 'loosen1 '(and loosen-screw
(fills experiencer hearer)
(fills patient screw1)))
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Appendix D

The AnimNL project
The AnimNL project has as its goal the automatic creation of animated task simulations
from NL instructions. Its agents are animated human gures, and the tasks they are to
engage in are assembly procedures and maintenance procedures. AnimNL is intended to
support advanced human factors analysis, to enable users of computer-aided design tools
to simulate human agents' interactions with the artifacts they are designing and thereby
to notice design aws that may only become apparent when people get at them. (AnimNL
may also have potential use in creating personalized training lms, using animated agents
whose size, strength and (assumed) skills mirror those of the apprentice being trained.)
The AnimNL project builds on an animation system, JackTM , that has been developed at
the Computer Graphics Lab at the University of Pennsylvania. Jack provides articulated,
animated human gures | both male and female | capable of realistic motion through
model-based inverse kinematics Badler et al., 1993]. In addition, Jack agents can be
anthropomorphically sized and given di erent \strengths", so as to vary agents' physical
capabilities. Di erent spatial environments can also be set up and modi ed at will, so as to
vary the situation in which tasks are carried out. Both types of exibility enable designers
to explore a wide range of situations of use, in which human agents will engage with the
objects under design.
The problems that AnimNL addresses lie in how to map from high-level task speci cations
(specifying a structure of related goals to be achieved and constraints | positive and
negative | on how to achieve them) to plausible physical behaviors performed veridically.
Generating and animating the behavior of highly articulated agents carrying out tasks
in a physically veridical manner, in an environment about which they have only partial
knowledge, raises a number of problems that have not previously been considered in a
world of fairly simple robots.
Figure D.1 shows a schematic diagram of the system. AnimNL's architecture reects both
what is necessary for an agent understanding and acting in accordance with assembly
and maintenance instructions and what is necessary for simulating and animating that
behavior.
The rst thing to notice about the diagram is that it consists of two relatively independent
sets of processes. One set produces commitments to act for a particular purpose { e.g.
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Figure D.1: AnimNL System Architecture
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goto(door1, open(door1)) \go to door1 for the purpose of opening it"
grasp(urn1, lift(urn1)) \grasp urn1 for the purpose of lifting it"

The other set of processes gures out how the agent should move in order to carry out
the speci ed actions on their speci ed objects for their speci ed purposes. What we will
describe here is how instructions lead to initial commitments to act and how actions once
embarked upon allow further commitments to be made and acted upon. (While the discussion here is in terms of single-agent procedures, it can be extended to multi-agent
procedures with the addition of communicative or coordinating actions.)
Instructions are given to AnimNL in steps consisting of one or more utterances, such as:
With door opened, adjust switch until roller contacts cam and continuity is
indicated at pins A and B. Verify positive switch contact by tightening bottom
nut one additional turn. (Air Force manual T.O. 1F-16C-2-94JG-50-2, p. 5-24)
A step speci es a continuous behavior that the agent must attend to. When the step is
complete, the agent can direct its attention to the next step in the procedure.
Steps are processed by a parser that uses a combinatory categorial grammar (CCG) Steedman, 1990]. The parser produces the logical form based on Conceptual Structures discussed
in Ch. 6. The Action Library that I described at length in that chapter is what is labelled
Action Schemata in the Action KB box in Fig. D.1.
The CS representation corresponding to a single instruction step is incrementally developed
into the plan graph described in Sec. 7.1.7, via processes of reference resolution, plan
inference, reference grounding and planning. An intention here is an intention to satisfy a
given goal or act in a given way at a given time (or in a given situation). Speci c intentions
develop incrementally via the processes mentioned above. The algorithm that I described
in Ch. 7 corresponds to the boxes plan graph initialization and plan inference in
Fig. D.1.
When an intention becomes suciently speci ed for the agent to be ready to commit to
it and temporal dependencies permit such commitment, the intention is gated, triggering
other, low-level planning processes (see Figure D.1 below the \action gate"). The output
of these processes may either be an indication that the agent's \body" is unable to carry
out the behavior that its \mind" would like it to or a collection of behaviors to be executed
(simulated) in parallel.1 Actions change the world, as well as the agent's knowledge.
Such changes trigger further elaboration of the agent's intentional structure and further
commitments to action.
In the following, I will describe some of the other modules in AnimNL.
1
Previous actions need not be completed before a new action is committed to: an agent can be (and
usually is) doing more than one thing at a time.
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Planning in Anticipation of Future Intentions
The relative benignity of the assumed environment encourages agents to seek behavioral
eciency by anticipating the future and choosing actions that allow them to not only satisfy
current sub-goals but do so in a way that best positions them for satisfying future goals.
This kind of look-ahead optimization cannot be achieved simply by post-hoc smoothing of
the transition between one otherwise xed behavior and another. At the highest conceptual
level, the agents should choose a method for achieving a current goal that reduces the
physical e ort they will have to expend to achieve the next one, and to exploit possible
overlapping of behavioral results. One goal of AnimNL's planner, in elaborating the initial
Plan Graph created in response to the speci ed instructions, is to use bounded look-ahead
so as to make current goal-decomposition decisions based on the curent state of the world
and future intentions | for further details see Geib, 1992].

Planning in Anticipation of Acquiring Knowledge
AnimNL assumes that an agent cannot have up-to-date knowledge of any part of its environment that is outside its direct perception. An AnimNL agent may know what nonvisible parts of its environment were like, when it perceived them earlier, and have expectations about what they will be like, when it sees them next, but its knowledge is limited
to general truths about the world and to its direct perceptions. As for the extent of an
AnimNL agent's perception, it is assumed that an agent cannot see into any space that has
no portal open into the space the agent occupies. Thus AnimNL agents have to open doors,
closets, boxes, etc., if they want to know what is inside, or go into other rooms to nd
out what is there, namely, they have to explore their environment. This is done through
search plans Moore, 1993]: search plans give an agent the ability to try out hypotheses
about the environment (e.g. cracking a safe by trying out various combinations, opening
and looking into kitchen cabinets to nd a bowl of sugar, etc.) and thereby expand its
knowledge and ability to act in its environment.

Geometric and Functional Planning
Instructions may tell an agent to open the door of a cabinet and remove some object
from inside. But the way the agent moves in order to open the door depends on both its
geometry (if and how it is latched, its degrees of freedom { di erent for hinged doors than
for sliding doors, etc.) and the goal the agent has in opening it.
Similarly, instructions may tell the agent to open a door, drawing his attention to a xture
on the wall. Up to that point, the agent may not have known whether the architectural
feature in question was a door or a French window. Characterized as a door however, the
agent develops di erent expectations about the object than if it had been characterized as
a window (e.g., about constraints on its motion, locations of possible latches, etc.).
The point of AnimNL's object-speci c planner Levison, 1993] is to direct an agent's movements in accordance with the artifacts being manipulated and the purpose of the manipulation.
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Simulator
An AnimNL agent possesses certain low-level behaviors that it performs \automatically"
when the situation demands. For example, an agent will take a step forward if necessary
for maintaining balance, or adjust its hip position while walking, to alter its direction to
avoid an object. Some of these behaviors are built into Jack itself, as inherent procedural
constraints on an agent's body. A second set are simple animal behaviors (such as attraction and avoidance) that can be speci ed to the simulator that sits over Jack. Di erent
types of agents can be speci ed as acting in accordance with di erent types of behaviors.
Finally, a third set of low-level behaviors are postural adjustments that are made to achieve
positional or orientational goals of an end e ector. Like Jack, the simulator exists independently of AnimNL, able to create scenarios of any number of agents acting in accordance
with any number of these simple behaviors.
Above those low-level behaviors, an AnimNL agent has a certain range of low-level actions
(such as walk and grasp) that it can be \told" to carry out. (Such actions are specied symbolically to the simulator, and multiple actions of multiple agents can speci ed
simultaneously.)
An AnimNL agent can be given general knowledge about types of simple actions at the
level of opening things, picking things up and carrying them. Such knowledge is speci ed
declaratively, with the speci cations mapped into a structure of low-level actions that can
be input to the simulator.
Among the modules that the simulator can call upon in simulating the behavior of agents
and their environment for eventual input to Jack is the posture planner Jung, 1992].
Quantitatively calculating an e ective posture for an articulated body with 70 joints and
136 degrees of freedom (not counting hands) is a daunting task. The posture planner discovers a nal global posture by nding collision-avoiding intermediate postural constraints
through reasoning about qualitative geometric relations between body parts and objects
and about motion dependencies between body parts. (Postural constraints are spatial constraints on control points and control vectors previously de ned on important body parts.)
The global posture satisfying a set of postural constraints is computed from a robust inverse kinematics algorithm. Posture planning complements joint space planning, which
starts with the strong assumption that a nal global posture is given.
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